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INTRODUCTION
In an age

c~

relatIvism, when ablolutes are orten

ablolutely denied, the lot of efficient causality is not an
enviable one.

The cQus.al concept 1s considered in some cirole.

aa nothing more than the naive outlook of a decadent rationalistic age.

Acoording to the Heisenberg uncertainty prinoiple, a

oomplete knowledge of the state of a physical system at anJ
given instant is not suffioient to permit an exaot prediction ot
that systemts future behavior.
statistical oaloulations.

The best one can do is to make

"As a consequence," says Tolman, "we

now have to regard the true connection between physical cause
and etrect as a statistical one."l The causal prinoiple is also
attaoked.

For Ayar, it is an example of nonsensical metaphysioal

assertions,
We may • • • derine a metaphYlical sentence as a
sentence which purports to express a genuine propOSition, but doe., in tact, express neither a
tautology nor an empirical hypothesis. And aa
tautologies and .mpiricall~poth.s.s form the
entire elass of significant propositiOns, we are
Justified in concluding that all metaphysioal
propOSitions are nonsensical. 2

1 Richard O. Tolman, "A Survey of the SCience.,"
SCience, BaltImore, OVI, August 15, 1947, 137.
2 Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth,
seoond ed., Rew York, 1950, 41.
viii

~

Logio,

ix

This contemporary attitude toward efticient causallt7
ls not a

~ecent

phenomenon.

Its historical and ideological

roots oan be traced back througb Hume to

Desc~tes.

With the

Carteslan pbilosophJ, as Haritaln polnts out, began a retrogression in which human reason graduallr lost its grasp on
aeing, and became available only for the mathemattcal readlng ot
senso~

phenomena, and tor the buIldIng up ot correspondlng

materlal techniques, fta field in which any absolute reality, an7
absolute truth, and &nJ absolute value is of course forbidden.")
But thepoat-Cartesian period also saw the riae ot one

ot the most ambitious defenders ot cauaalit7, Immanuel Kant. Hia
Oritical philosophy was an arrest1ng dlspla7 in the philosophical
p,rroteohnica set ott by Hume in the

twllI~t

hours ot elgbteenth

centurr rationalism and the Enlightenment.
The problem ot causalit7 not onl7 rouaed Kant tram the
"dogmatIc slumber" ot ratlonalls. but also constituted the crucial test ot bis philosophy.

As the clearest and most indIspen-

sable lnatanoe ot the synthetIc! prIori, causalltr was the
obstacle betore which both empIricIsm and rationalism had been
brought to a complete standstill.

The rationalist was contronted

with the very diffioult task of demonstratIng a prInciple whloh
was considered indIspensable tor science and pract1cal 11te and
ret the opposite of which did not seem. 2r1ma tacle at least,
)

Jacques Harltaln,

~

Ran,e

~

Beason, .ew York,

x

oontradictory.

He was further faced with the awkward tact that

partioular causal laws in nature were held to be unintelligible
and indemonstrable

~

priori but discoverable only b1 mean. ot

induction tram particular exper1enc.s.

The empiricist, on the

other hand, if he wished to be consistent with his first prinoiple., had the s till more difficult, it not impossible, task

ot deriving the universal and necessary principle of causality
from a mere enumeration of particulars.
Kant claimed that with his Critical philosoPnJ he
could prove the objective validity of the principle of causality.
Causality is thus a test-case in a larger issue.

Upon the

~uth

or falsity of Kant's causal teaching depends the success or
t&ilure ot Kant's Critical philosophy to answer the challenge ot
the synthetiC

~

priori.

In this thesis we shall center our attention upon Kant'
doctrine of causality.
2riori

w~ll

The larger iasu. of the synthetiC

only be touohed upon.

whether Kant's

o~sal

~

Our purpose will be to aee

doctrine, springing tram the roots ot his

Critical philosophy, conclusively answered Hume's challenge or
whether the Humenn diadain ot efficient causality in certain
contemporary circles only emphasizes Kant'. tailure.
The study ot Kantian causality naturally presuppose. a
study ot its leading l1nes ot thought as well as its dependence
on the findings ot previous thinkers.

But Kant's causal doc-

trine is oDv10ualy too complex to be treated 1n all it. ramit1-

xi

cationa wfth1n the bounds of this thesis.
one aspect of Kantian

caus~lit1

lity 1n the phenomenal physical

Consequently, only

will be treated, that of oausaorde~.

The problem ot causalit1

In the noumenal order ot tree will (Kant's moral order) as well
as the role of causality in the phenomenal psyohical order ot
the empirical e go will not be treated.
To limit the soope of the thesis to stll1 more manageable proportiona, we shall conoentrate on two important and
rather intrioate paslages in the Oritique

£!

~

Reason, the

"Transoendental Deduction ot the categories" and the "Second
Analogy."

The first passage deals with the obJeotivity of the

causal oonoept, or oategory.

It is the foundation tor the seoond

passage 1n whioh Kant explains the objeotivity of the causal
prinoiple.

'!he t ext usually cited is the s eoond edition of the

Critique o! ~ Reason, In Norman Kemp Smith's translation.4
We note here that, following Smith, we employ the term nappearano ,"
rather than "phenomenon," for Kant's Ersche1nung.
The matter of the thesis will be as follows.

Atter

posing the problem of causal1ty in its historic form by a perusal
of the doctrines ot the chiof representatives of e1ghteenth century rat10nalism and empiricism (Chapter I). we shall rocua
attention on Kant's solution (Chapter IIi'.

Here we shall bring

4 Immanuel Kant, Cr1tljUe of Pure Reason. trans. Norman Kemp Smith. New York, 19~.erealter-we 'sEa11 refer to this
work in the footnotes simply as the Critique.

xii
out the radioal Kantian view ot thought and experience, and hiB
corresponding causal doctrine, by a survey ot the "Transcendental
Deduction ot the Categories" and the "Second Analog."
III will be the critical portion of the study.

Chapter

In the course ot

the critique, the opinions of leading Kantian commentators will
be weIghed.
PrIchard, for example, insists upon Kant's subjectIvism.

I

Does this subjectivism invalidate the whole Kantian argument tor
causality?

Was the historical evolution of Kantianism trom Beckep

Kant'. Fichte-izing di.ciple, to aegel an indication of a tatal
flaw in the Kantian argument tor objectivit'1?

What about

Daval~f,.

statement that Kant'. post-Critical work was a continuous ettort
to resolve the problem of the ambiguity ot the objeet,6
But Kant's subjectivism i. onl1 the less important part

ot his theol'1.

Is his causal doctrine without flaw when viewed

in the light ot h1s phenomenalism?

Are Smith and Paton justified

in accepting for the most part this phenomenalist position in
their c~.ntarie.,7

A.a.Ewing oontends that Kant's argument.

for causality, though in themselves too bound up with the system

S R.A.Prichard, Kant's Theory
6

~

Knowledge, Oxford, 1904

Roger Daval, ~ MetaphyslQue ~~, Parie, 1951, 18

7 N.X.Smith, A aomment~ to Kant's Critiiue or Pure
Rea.on, seoond edition revl.ea an~nIirgea, lew Yor , l~o;-H:J.
'aEon, Kant's Met§?hlsic .2! EX2erience, New York, .L936.

•

xiii
to have given general satisfaction, can be re-stated in a way
acceptable to all schools of thought. 8 Is it true that it is
not the doctrine but only the method of transoendental idealism,
i.e., the method of proof by appealing to the possibility of
experience and knowledge, that torms the real presupposition and
basis of the Kantian deductIon ot oausalIty,9
~

Among those who profess realism, Marechal interprets
Kant's transcendental method of analysis as a stUdy of the immanent and objectivating activity of oognition.

Is he going too

far when be finds parallels wIth the epistemology of St. Thomas?
These important points will be discussed in Chapter III.
A word on the literature related to the present study.
With the excepticn of A.C.EWing, no one has singled out the
causal aspect of Kant's doctrine for speoial study, though its
importance invites the attempt. 10 Smith's and Paton's commentarie.
are $xcellent for a study of the

criti~ue

as a whole.

/

Marechalls

•

8 Alfred Cyril Ewing, Kant's Treatment
London, 1924, 96.

£! Causality,

,

Ibid. Mar.ohal seems to agree with Ewing when he
writes! "La arrr£que Kantienne rut destructrlce non pas en raisoD
du prInciple methodologlque." k! Point ~ De~art ~ l! Metaehlsique, ParIs, 1949, V. 594.
9

10 The present study differs from that of Ewing In
several important rsspectsl it emphaaizes the impact of Kant's
Humean presupposItions on hIs causal teaching; it atudiea Kant
frOM the viewpoInt or a critioal realism. in oontrast to Ewing'.
phena.menaliam; it disputes Ewing's contention that Kant's argument
tor causality oan be suitably re-stated without essential ohange ••

r
xlv
monumental-work has mal2l' interestIng and valuable 001'l'lD1enta.

It

i& •• peciallr helpful to one acquainted with scholasticiam
because ot its trequent contrasts and comparisons ot scholastic
and

Kantlan philosophy.

Frichard we found to be a most acute

critic ot tant's subjectivist tendencr.

Of the remaining books

in the bibllograPD7. thoa. of Adamson, boutroux. Oaira, and
Watson deserve speclal mention.

In a famous passage in the Prolecsomena .. ltant acknow-

ledges his debt to the past:

It we begin with a well-rounded, although undeveloped
thought, bequeathed to us b7 another, we -7 well
hope as the fruit of oontinued meditation to develop
it f'ul'ther than the keen-sighted man WhOUl we had to
thank tOIt the flrat spark of this llght.:l

What. tben, were the influence. upon !ant and what was
the evolution of' the problem which

he~

tvied to solve? Without

denying other le.8 1mportant 8ubsidial"1 il\tluenoes, we shall
lIalt ouraelvee to a dieousalon ot Locke, Berkelel, and J!\D'1e

amons the emplrict..,. and ot Lelbnlz

and Wolt'.t _ong the

rationaUs's.
A. THE BRITISH 1D!PlItICIS'l'S

JOhn Locke, 1n :reaction to nee.aPt •• ' theor.y ot innate
ide.8, maintained that the human knower has no Ide•• except those
obtained tlutoup '.lUIation and reflection on internal operationa.

1 IJaanuel Kant j Prolelomena to ~ .Puture Matameie.
with an Introduction br Lewls V.ecli, I'8wYOiil[, 195I, 8 l
).
The nuaber. in the parenth.... are the page nuabera or the Acade~
edition.
Schrlrten, 8d. Xoen1 al lche ¥reusalacae Akadem1.~
Berlin, 1
-1908.
.

tai".

1

r

2

With Descartes, however, he made the fatal ste, ot Betting up
idea., not things, .s the immediate object ot knowledge.

Further

mor., while admitting that the mind knows universals, Lock. denie
it the pow.r to know natures of real e.s.nces througb abstraction
Th. only •••• nc.s man knows are naminal.

The real .s.enoe is al-

w.,s an unknown substratum, the unseen statue beneath the accid.n s
which olothe and conceal it.
Knowl.dge was thus limit.d 07 Lock. to accidents and a
presupposed aubstanc. about whioh we know only the bare fact of
existence.

But even wi th regard to the aocidents, only the pri-

mary qualiti.s, such as form, ext.nsion, and motion, exist as
such in the obj.ct.

The so-oalled

second~ ~alitie.,

11ke colo ,

taste, and sound, are purelJ subj.otive reactions of the peroipient to the primarJ qualitie..
the nature ot the .ub.tance.

Ion. ot the aocidents flow trom
'.

Th.y are imposed on the substanc.

bT an arbitrar,J tiat ot th. divine will.

Without mants b.ing

8.DJ the wis.r, the deity could replace the unknown eubatratum
with another, the accid.nts remaining the same.

Accidents thus

tell us abaolutelT nothing about the na_ure ot the sub.tance
which supports the..

Quite 10glcallJ, Locke denied all but

hi8h11 probable knowledge of .cientitic laws.

Por scientific

lawa are grounded in the natures of things whlch the mind, accordlng to Looke, oan never know.
Looke'. aocount of causality 1a perhaps the least
aatlatactor,J part of his philosopbJ.

In introducIng the concept

)

ot cauae, ae apeaks aa though causality were a possible object ot
Yet Locke insiats on the my-

perception, like oolor or shape.

aterioua and unknowable character ot the causal nexus.

Since we

can only obaer.,e aenaible "'1deaa" or qualities in external object. ,
a power like causallt, can only be known as the potentialit, ot
producing changes in these sensible quallt1es, a mysterious something that can be described in terms ot ita ettects.

Actually,

Locke makes causa11ty a relation, thus remov1ng 1t trom its
proper categorr ot actlon and passion.
As regards the principle ot causalit"

Looke tries to

prove its va11dity b1 the argument that 1t 1s obviously impossibl.
tor noth1ng to produce something.

But as Hume was to point out,

Locke can !ssume that it an event is not caused by something it
muat be caused b,. noth1ng onl,. because he assumes the universalit.,

ot the causal principle.

But it is just this universality which

Looke is trying to prove.
Looke's basic Cartesian assumption that ideas are the
immediate object ot knowledge was accepted without any reaerve by
his .uccessor, George Serkeley,

Par le •• conservative than hia

conceptualistic predecesaor, Serkele, went on to

ot univeraals even In the mlnd.

de~

the exiatence

Moreover, a.elng that In Locke'a

doctrine ot aubstance aa an unknown substratum la, a tlne arsument agalnst tne rlsing tide ot materialism, Berkele,. denled not
onlT the capacitT ot the mlnd to know material aubatance but the
very existence ot matter.

Matter In its verr concept is pasalve

4
and material'!.

Therefore, it oertainly oannot oause the existence

of spIrItual Ideas In us.
and ideas.

fteallt1 was thus reduoed to spirits

And sinoe the mind does not perceIve sense objects

but only its ideas of them obtained through sensation, Berkel.,.
saw no reason tor admitting the existence of sensed objeots outside of perception.

TheIr!!!!

~

peroipl.

As regards cauaalitr, Serkele1 assumed the prinoiple
that everr change

must have a cause.

But he denied that causal

oonnection between pbJsical phenomena the nature of which Locke
had alread, asserted to be unknown.

Berkeley thus made another

step in the direotion of Burne.

His philosopbJ left in existence

onlJ spirits and their ideas.

How the latter cannot have cau.al

Por, sa,.a Berkele,., an 1dea cannot have an7 qual! tie.

etticaoJ.

be70nd thoae ot whioh we are conscious.
of oausal atfialencT In our idea8.
nature, passive.

Since we must

And we are not conscious

Ideas are, of their vel"7

suppose~

however, that the change.

In our ideas have 80me cause, we must conclude that spirits are
the cause ••

In dealing with the material world, Serkele,. subst!tute4
for Locke's relation of cause and e'fect the relation ot "sIgn"

and "thing signified." Thus "the fire which I see is not the oaus
of the pain I sutter upon
torewarns me ot It.,,2

I,
~

6S,

•• A'"

2

The

~

approaching it, but the mark that

A Treati.e Conoemine the PrinoiE1e. of Human Knowlec~&~
George Berk.l.y,-'dtt.~ br Alexander Oampoell

Work. of

"fiYf"ft,.tt

1 onl

T

2ql~

s
We tlnd

br ,experlenoe

that Ide.1 luoc.ed eaCh ether In

such a regular manner that we mar trame laws of nature and uae
the•• laws tor predicting tuture eventa.

Thi. orderly lucc •• slon

however, 18 ntt dependent on anJ causal influence ot ene Ide. on
another but Is dependent only on the direct will of God. Batural
8clen08 thul consists In the reduction ot the man1 observed
.equenc•• to a tew 81mple an.d univel's.l laws of sequence, not
explicable further except b1

aD

appeal to divine etticl.nt

causa11 t1_
At this polnt David Hume entered the philosophical
Icene.

The ataie had been well prepared tor bis entrance,

peclally regardlng o&ulalltl.3

.a-

Locke bad denied the capacity

ot

the mind to know natures and had .sorlbed causation to unknown
powera.

Berkele7 bad then denied that such unlmowable and Imper-

ceptible powers could be real qualltl •• and reduoed all material
c,uaatlon to tne activit1 ot spirlta.

Huae, more rad10al17

•

l The sU1.\'.l.Ul"7 or Bume'. phl1oaopbJ In 1me text above
deals prlmarilr with it. negatl ve aspecta. The tpadltional but
now le.. t&Yol'ed Interpretation holds that Hum. eontr1b~ted
nothing posltive to pb110sopbr but .ere17 reduoed tbe prinCiples
of Locke and aerkele,. to their absurdity_ A strong new school,
consisting or men like Ralph W. Ohuroh (I-e's Theoli ot the
l1nderstandlni. LondoD, 193~) and Hormanemp SmItE li.Pm'oso
01 DavId Bume, London, 1941) iuiats that Bume mad. Impor an
poslilve contrIbutions alao. Eapeolall1 signifioant contri"butl0
are his tbeOrJ or bellet o.s.d on the prtmaoJ or r.eling (derived
trom Hutoh•• on) and his teaohlng on the principle of assoclation
(derived from Hewton). In our summar" atter re.lew1ns Bu.e's
oriticism of causalitJ--a oritloism so signifIcant tor Kant--we
shall outline Bume's theory ot bellet In 1ta applicat10n to
oausalit,._ This positl.e complement to advera. crlticlama of him

,

6
logical or"'logioally more radical, tightened the Gordian knot
tied by predeoessors.

He d1rected his main attack against

causality, realizing all the while its importance for our know.
ledge of the phTs1cal world. 4
In his argument, Hume made two basic assumptions.
1) the Cartesian one, already subscribed to bJ Looke and BerkeleJ
that the idea was the tirst thing known, and 2) that every simple
i48a corresponds to an impression whose characteristics are torce
and vivacity.
The warp and wool ot the two Humean assumptions were:

1) his phenomenallsm, bJ whioh he denied the intentIonality ot
sense and intelleotual cognition and made perceptions instead of
things the oomplete obJeot ot knowledge; 2) his sensi.-, by
which he denied that the intellect can know anything which is
not explicItly perceived by the external or internal senses; and

3) his pSJchologioal atomism, bJ which he held that "whatever
objeots are ditterent are distinguishable, and whatever objects
are distinguishable are .eparable by thougbt and imagination."S

4 Se., tor example, his Treatise ot Human Hature, ed.
L.A.SelbJ-Bisse, Oxford, 1946, I, 111, 2. For lint, too, as vlll
be ••• n in Chapter II, knowledge of objeots depend. on causallty.
The Aantian argument 18 ba.ed on thl. central tactl we have kno v
ledge ot objective sequence. His question 18' what makes this
knovledge ot objective aequence possible, The anawerl cauaallty,
wh1ch is thus as real as the objective sequence it conditlona, or
makes poasible.
S Treati.e, I, 1, 7 (18). Numbers 6n parentheses
refer to pages in Selby-Bigge's edition of the Treatise.

7
Thrust into such unfavorable soil, the objeotive valld1t1 ot unlversal principles of knowledge, as well as all knowled e

ot supra-senaible objects,wal imposslble from the beginning.
First principles, which are seen b1 the mind to follow upon real
beiDg and are therefore universally applicable to real beings,
are valueless for Hume because, acoording to him, real beings are
unknown.

aupra-.enaiole

sations can be known.

~eings

are unknowable bedaus. on11 sen-

Valid .olentific:laws are impossible

because the natures upon whlch the, are based are unknown.

All

substance, whether material or spiritual, is unknown beoause 1t
1s not given immediatel, in sensation.

All that man can do

legltimatel, is to aftlr.m his own .ensations.
that ia invalid.

Anything beyond

Hume'. psychologioal at anisa, a.gai D, makes

impos81ble &nJthing like the factor of implication, ot causal
connection.

A world of discrete particulars •• vera an, necessarr

connection between thiDga.6

6 "As all distinct ideas are ••parable from each other
and as the Ideas ot cau.e and eftect are evldentl, distinct, ttwi 1
oe eas7 tor ua to conceive an1 object to be non-exi.tent this
moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the dl&tinct Idea ot a caus. or productive principle. The aeparation,
theretore, ot the Idea ot Ii. cause t~om that ot a beginning ot
existenee, i.plainly possiole to~ the tmagination; and cons.quan 11, the aotual separation ot these objects i. so fa~ possible
that it implies no contradictlon nor abaur41t7J and is therefore
incapable ot belng refuted b7 anr ~eason1ng tram mere Ideas,
without whlch it Is Impo.sible to demonstrate the neeessitl of a
caus •• " Treatise, I, 111, 3 (79-80). TWo .erious flaws 1n the
passage are the contusioa of the 10g1cal with the real world and
the absence of a notion of relat1vwa. one thing wh1ch ot Its

8
On such

So

:foundation, Hume now proceeded to e onstnuct

his doctrine of oausality.

His entire investigation was a seare

for the impression from which the idea of causal connection

arose.

His treatment of the subject in Book I of the Treatise

Nature can be divided into four parts. 1) an attempt to
-ofshowHuman
that the prinCiple of causality 1s neither intuitively nor
demonstratively certain; 2) an attempted reduction of reasoning
on particular causal laws to constant association o:f impressions
and ideas in the imagination, owing to constant conjunction 1n

past experience; J) an attempt to reduce the necessary character

of causal connection to an acquired impression or propensity to
pass from an objeot to the idea of its ·usual attendant, the
feeling

O~

beliet accompanying this propensity 1s misinterpreted

as representing a real necessary connection in the object itself}

and

4)

a oorresponding theory of belief, Humets important positiy

oomplement to his oriticism ot causality.
Tho first part is of special interest because it was

nature has a rapport tor another.
R.B.Bobart, in "Hume Without Scepticism," Mind, London,
xxxix, July, 1930, 273, states that Hume's "Whole diiCOierrft
about cause and ettect comes to this, that fta proposition mar
1mply another proposition, but a thing cannot impl,. another thing •
A reflection ot Huma's attitude is found in the .tatell'lent which helped to start :ttant on his inquirr. tt'Jiow do we know
that beoause oDlthlng 1s, another thing muat
Versuch ••n
Begriff der Neiatlven Grossen in die Weltweiaheit ElnztitUhren(on legame
r¥t1IS"Cm:inen, Iiaaeiiie ff, 202.
TliI's Is taKen up n Sipter I, PP .31 -

guantl!S.s"

b.,"

'f' .

9

the allegetl discovery of the synthetic character ot the causal
nexus which started Kant on his Oopernioan revolution.

"All

certaint7," says Hum., "arIses from tho oomparison of ideas, and
from the disoover,; ot suoh relations as are unalterable, so long
as the ideas continue the aame. ft7

Or, in other words, certain

lmowledge is found only in what oan bed educed trom the principlGl
of contradiction or intuited via the relations ot resemblance,
proportIons in quantlt1 and number, degrees ot &n1 quality, and
contrariety.

--

8.

Now the prlnoiple whatever

-------

~

! beg1nnins h!!

also a cause or existence does not imply any ot the relations

necesaary tor intuitlve certainty.

Therefore, it 1s not intui-

Nor i8 it daMonstratively certain.

tivel1' certain.

For it the

principle that everything which has a beginning must have a cauae
is to be proved, its opposite must be shown to be selt-contradictory.

But that cannot be shown. 9 For to imagine the etfect as

ocourring without the cause is not a oontradiotion sinoe the
.trect certaInly does not include in itself the cause or vice
veraa.
Hume oriticizes the arguments used b1' contemporaries
to establish the
was that

eve~y

0

a.u.al prinoiple.

The first ot these argument&

change must have a oauSe tor otherwise somethIng

7 Treatls., I. 111, 3 (79).
8 Ibid.

-

9 See footnote 6 on page 7.
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would be cauaed by nothIng or by Itself.

The second

was that all the points of apace and time belng

a~gument

unlto~,

a caus.

i8 neces.ary to detePmlne an event to happen at one moment and 11'1
one place :rather than
out that the

8

t sane other tIme or place.

a~guments p~8up~.8e

Hwn. points

what ther set out to prove.

Por 1t the cauaal prinCiple i8 dented, the conclusion Is not
that things ar. caused by nothing or by them.elves but that th-r
are not cau.ed at a11. 10
Hume next expands h1s

8

tudy of the causal principle

by an examination 01' oar realoning about partlcular causal laws.
"Why do we conclude that such particular causes must neceRsarll7

have euch particular ettects, and.

whr do we torm an interenoe

1'I'om ane to anothel"'t wll

Every interence must beg1n wIth some impression since
it cannot besln trOll nothing or go on ind81'inl tell".

concerning caus. and ertect, the

~nd

In reasoning

always gpes tram the pre •

• ent impression to the Ide. ot the absent but correlative Object.
There are then tbP.e thinss to expla1n, "Pirst, the
Imprea81on.
oause or

-

Thirdly. the nature and

Ide •• "12

-

or the connecte
qualitIes or that

Seoondly. the transition to tbe idea

et~eot.

10 Treatis., I, 111, 3 (80-81).
11

Ibid., I, 111, 3 (82).

12

Ibld., I, 111, S (84).

o~lginal

11
Rega~dlng

the tiPlt ele.ent, the origlnal 1D1prea81on

11 an Inexpllcable datum

to~

H...e.

WhAtther it comes trOll the

object, the mlnd, or God i. an appaztent17 ll'l8oluble question.
A8 tor the a.cond element, the tpanlltlon or lnterenoe,
Bum. aaaiR reters to tbe pr!noiple tbat what Is distingulsbaale
11 separable.

On this ground there Is no implioation betw.en

the impression ot an ettect and the Idea ot • o.uae.

13 For the

ide. assoolated wlth the impressIon D11gbt be displaced and another
lubstltuted tor It.

R••• on Is Incapable ot aD1thlng like the

rational penetratIon ot esa.n.os wbich might reveal the necessary
conneotlon ot one thing vith another.
Sino. the cauaal interenoe Is not d1800vered b1 reasOD,
It muat be experientlal In nature--a oonolualoD. partloularlJ
Ilgnlflcant tor lant.

Experience glv•• U8 the conatant

ilon ot repeated events.

Co~UDO

Thus atter innumerable Instanoe. ot

tlame In conetant opdered conjunction wlth heat, v • •all the cne
~au.e

and the other ettect.
But experIence ot 1ta nature can Intorm UI onlJ ot the

past and pre.ent, not ot the future.

How, then, justify the

eau.al interence trom past to tuture exper1ence'
Hume answers that a presumpt10n Is added to t

he

data

ot experience: the future vlll be contormable to the past. 14 10
1)

Treatls~,

I, 111, • (86.87).

14 1214 .,1, 111, 6. (90).

12

"logloal r.ason" can be ottered tor the presumptIon.

Thus In all

reasonIng tram experIence there Is a step unsupported by &n7
argument, which makes anything lIke true causal interenae imposaible.

The imagination, not the understandIng, habIt and not

reason, custom and not evIdence, are at work.

The nature ot the

transItion or interence tram past to tuture experience 1. sImply
the work ot assocIation of perceptIons In the Imaglnatlon.
But the conscIousness ot necessIty in the causal connection stlll remaIns to beexplaine4. "What Is our Ide. ot
necesaity when we sa1 that two objects are necessari17 connected.' IS
Hume'. dlttlculty oan be expre.sed thus.

W. ascribe real exis-

teno. to the objects ot our impressions, not ot our mere Idea••
Yet we have no

~ediate

causal conneotlon.

Wlq,

impressIon of the nece.sity in tee
then, do we thtnk that It 1. real and

objeotlv.'

.

Hume'. answer I. brIefly thl1'.

The Impre.alon corr•• -

pondlng to the Idea ot neces.ity results from the trequent repetition ot constantly conjoined events.

81 this impression the

mind Is determlned to go trom a pre.ent object to Its usual
attendant.

Thi. impres.lon ot determinatIon la the source ot

nece.slty.16 Or In other words, through cu.tomar7 tr.n81t~on

IS Treatl.e, I, 111, 14 (155).
16. IbId., I, 111,

14

(156).

1)

between two assoclated objects, the connectlon between the.
become.

80

torcible, vivid, and lively a. to .eem an impresslon

and not merely an 1dea.

The customary trans1tlon betwe.n the

resembling instances thus produces a new impreaaion In the mind.
"Necesaity, then, ia the ettect ot this observation Cot resem.lln
Instance.) , and Is nothing but an internal impreSSion 01' the
or a d.termination to carry our thougbts trom one object to
another. ft17
Bume adds that this internal necessity 'a conjoined
with thlngs. 1S Juat a. we link secondary qualitles to objects, so
we suppose necesslty to be 1n the objects we consider, not in the
mind that considers them.

Actually, nece.alty, instead ot being

an objective donnection discernible by reason, has became a
psychologlcally de.ermined bat 10g1cally unjustltlable proce._
whereby we pa.a tram a pre.ent object to the Idea ot Ita usual
attendant.
The teeling with which the latter 1. regarded i. oalled
bellet. 19 This aubject brings ua to one 01' Hume's important pos1 w

17

Treatl.e, I, 111, 14 (165).

18

I, l1i, 14 (16·7).
-Ibld.,
thi. polnt that a principle llke causality in-

19 On
volve. beliet rather than knowlidge, Bertrand auasell makes a
rather startling comment on Kant's philolopbJ. It true, it would
brlng out even more the klndred (IIlement. in Hume and Kant. Rus.ell lays. ~That prop081tions may acquire truth by belng belleved
[00n8tltute~ a large part ot Kant's Copernican Revolution."
Philosop!l ~ Leibniz, London, 1937, 14. Rus.ell admlts the

tive

contri~utiona

to philoaophr.

The Humean theor1 of bellet

may be summarized thus.

Belief does not consist In the addition
of anJ tresh idea to that already entertained b1 the mind. 20 It

names the manner In whlch the mind apprehenda an object aa exlatent.

It involve. three condition.* a preaent impresaion, a

livel1 idea, and an aaaociation between them.
ft

It ia derined aa

a li ve17 idea related to or as.ociated with a pre.ent impreaalon "2]

To believe in an Object aa existent ia, then, to accord it the

aame value as the accomp&n7ing aense impreasion.

The latter i.

of its nature sutfu.ed with the reality reeling.

Bellet ia thua

a certain feellng with lh lch the idea i8 conceived, a reeling
best described as a more v1vid, lively, foro1ble, tirm, .teady
manner ot conceiving an object .a existent. 22 The idea aohieving
unorthodoq ot the atatement. But hia g rounds tor it would aeem
to repay investigation. See the Orltique ot Pure Reason, trans.
N.X. Smith, 29'~I have found it nece.sarr~o-aiiJ knowledge in
order to make rOGa tor t alth." Italic. inC the oJ:'li1nil. Kant
1. here referring more £0 the practical reason. That Kant would
deny speoulative reason the knowledge ot principles applylng to
phenom.na i" ¥ha~ .Rueaell muat prove.
20 Bume U.t1nguishe. between conceptual content and
belief-qualit1, • ramiliar dlchotomr with parallela In the
a~holaatic diatinotion between concept and Judsment, esaence
and exiatenoe.

21

Treati.e, I, 111, 7 (96).

22

-

Ll/1d •• Appendi>: to Book III, (624).
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the status-of belief haa been ushered, aa it were, into what we
believe to be an external world systeM of continuing independent
bodiea.

23 Upon entrance into that system, it i8 enlivened

through its relation with the naturally live17 and forcible impression that customarily precedes it. 24 From the impreasion,
the idea borrows its belief quality or vigor.

Thus we believe

not only in existing bodies but in their necessary connection
also.
In the psyohology of habit and belief, then, Hume
found the explanation tor causality.
had become of oausality?

But in the process what

Causality was now a question, not ot

necessary connection in objects, but of an instinctive response25
to the fleeting, discrete, but customarily conjoined phenomena
that make up the systematio cOherenoe of perceptiona we call
experience.

In Hume'a phenomenal world, causality, tar trom

23 On Hume'l theory ot the external world aee Treatile~
I, iv, 2 (181-218>1 allo H.H.Price, lume's Theo17 .2! the Externa-.!
World, Oarord, 1940, espeoially 11-31. Hume maXi I mucn-or 00nerenoe as well as ot constancy as baaes ot our beliet in an
objective world as oppo.ed to purely subjectIve phenomena. !aRt,
agaI~made nece •• ity the main criterion. His vindication ot
causality depends largely on the argument that the distinction
between the subJeotive and the objective already implies real
causal nec.asit,.. See Chapter II, PP.'i.-G.'1and('7-11.

24 Treatise, I, lli, 7 (97) and 10 (119).

25 "Experlmental reasoning • • • i8 nothing but a
species ot 1nstinct or meohanical power that acta in us unknown
to ourlelve •• " Hume, An BnqUi~ Concerning Human Understanding,
Chioago, 1935, IX, 113:a~o Treatl •• , I, Iii, 16 (119).

s••

16
sbowing ant objective and necessary connection. can 0017 polnt
to t be s tat1atlcal tacts, this or that haa happened so

lU.Dy'

tim.s

In the past and so it can be b$11eved as more or leaa probable
tbat, given a similar cause, a simllar event w111 happen again
1n the tuture.
This.desplte the objections or his common 8ense26 and
despite the tlaws 1n the argument 27 was Hume's philosophical
posItion regarding causalit7_
B. THE RATIONALISTS

In turning trom the British empiriolsts to the rationa-

26 "I dine, I plaT a game ot backgammon. I conver•• ,

and am merry with rq friends J and when after three or four hours"
amusement I would return to these speculatIon" the,. appear so
cold, and strained, and ridioulous, that I cannot tind it in mJ

heart to enter lnto the. ~ tarther." Treatl.e, I, lv, 7. Aa
h1a letter ot Bebruar1, 1754, to John Stewart shows, Hume never
denied causalit,._ He denled on11' that our bellet In causallt1
can be logically JU8tl.fied. See The Letters of David Hum... ed.
J.Y.'1'.(lrels, Oxford, 1932, I, 18,.--..
. -

27 Thus it ma,. be pointed out that unusual rather
than usual occurrences 1mpr1n~ on our minds the consoiousness ot
neoesslt71 that the judgment ot causal connection which must be
distinguished, it on17 as a psychological fact, t:rom the mere
teeling of it, implie8 a 87ftth.aia ot perceptions, this s7nthesia
is not possible for a mind that is itseli' nothlng but l::1. 8 eries ot
separate perceptiona, as we usuallJ look at an Object at disconnected momenta and not continuously, the number of times in which
we oDaerve the ettect wlthout the cauae 1a probabl,. much greater
than the number ot times we observe both; again. we often know
the connection between a caus. and e ttect through a aingle instan •
80 that no habit has been formed by nepeated experience of conjunction; same things, such aa da7 and night, are always tound
conjoined without our ascribing any connection of cause and
eftect between the••

11
lilt philosophy in which Kant was educated2B a new atmosphere i.
at onoe evident.

Though we are primarily concerned with the

rationalist view of causality, some prefatory remarks on the
rationalist logtc and theorl of knowledge are in order as they
were in our study of the causal doctrine of the British empirioi.ts.

Hume's contention that experience cannot by itself jus.

tify general prinoiples by any process of induction forms a
brIdge OYer which we

c~m

pass to the viewpoint of Lelbniz.

For Hume, induction must be regarded as a non-rational
process of mere instinctive anticipation, "the tendenoy to expect
repetitions of what has repeatedly occurred."29
Dt!r~eY"

Foreshadowing

s naturalistic, instrumental view of thought, Hume t s

epistemology considers thought merely as a practioal instrument
for the convenient interpretation of human experience, for the
expression ot "a comfortable feeling of of-course-ness."30
Thought h_s no objective or metaphysical validity of any kind.
In hts logic, again, HUlTle treats the fundamental principles of

28 Martin Knutzen, who had effected a oomprmdse
between Wolftlan ~atlonallam and pieti •• and who tried to harmonize Newton and Leibniz, taught Kant a Wol£fian version ot Leibniz
29 .D.B.C.MacNa'bb, "Hume on Induction," Revue Internationale de Philosophi., Bruxell•• , VI, 10. 20, Fa.clcUl. 2,

1952,

19~ ..F11.

)0 a.a.Prioe, "The Permanent Signifioanoe of Humets
PhilosophY'," Philoaopar. London, XV, Januarr, 1940, 22.
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human

expe~1ence

as purely 87nthetical judgments In which no

necessary relation between subject and predicate 1s discernible.
For Leibniz. on the contrary. thought is self-leglslatl e.
Sense experience reveals reality only in proportion as it embod!.
prinoiples derlted trom thought itself.

"Knowledge of the nature

ot things i8 nothing but knowledge of the nature of our mind.n)l
Consequently, all princ1ples are analytic.

As sueh. the, can be

justified by pure thought.
Leibnlz' phl1oaop~32 was a continu1t7 of tne rationall
movement st§rted by Descartes.

To .the Cartesian principle of the

rationality ot the real, L.lbniz joined the two postulates ot s*b
atantlal dynamls. and the monadology_

The wholl, intrinslc

"
aotlvlt7--"1.a monades ntont polnt de tenetres
par l.,quell.a
quelque ohos. y pulas. entrer ou .ortlr~33_-of these microcoams
tundament~17

eons1ats in the spontaneous settlng forth ot obsour

representatlve atate. or perceptions, eaoh monad representlng the

-

31 Gottfried Wllhelm von Lelbnlz, Nouveaux E•• ala, In
Lelbnlti! opera Philosophica, ad. J.E.Erdmann; BerlIn, 1840, I,
211 6. Se. a ao telbal. tne MonadoloSl and Other Phl1oaophioal
Writings, translated 61 Ao6ert Latta, LOndon, 192$, 234. note 49.
Xn hi'Eure refeNnc •• , ErdJIlarm t S work wtll be referred to as
Erdmann and Latta's book as Latta.
32 The following summary tollows in great part Marlena '.
analysts in La Polnt de oepart de la M'taphlslgue, Jrd ed., P&»ls

1944, III • .21'=35.
33

-

-

Erdmann, II, 70>.

-
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totality or the

un~verse

from its own point of view.

Only in

spiritual monads do j;hese vague peroeptions 34 approach the region
of apperception, that is, the lu.--ninous region of clear thought.
The process of cognition in experience 35 thus ..[holly consists in

devfllopment from the confused to the distinct uithout passivity
striotly so-called and without oxtornal aoquisition.

In this rationalist conception of cogn1tion, so radically innatlst, pure sensation can only be a confused state of
an innate idea.

The vague peroeptions became obJeotive knowledge

only through analysis whioh clarities the peroeptions and makes
them distinct. Now analysIs Is had by maklng JUdgments, by the
attribution of predicates to a subject.

And every true judgment

Is founded upon the 10g1oal identity, whether

to~al

or only

J~ Por Lelbnlz, as tor Desoartes, peroeptions and
ideas are not essentially distinguished but only gradually
ditterentiated.

3S Por Hume experience consist. in the systematio
coherence of our perceptions of fleeting, discrete, but customarily conjoined phenamena. For Leibniz, again, experienoe is
the harmonious and pre-established development of the monads
trom yague to eyer clearer peroeption. At the stage ot apperception (clear and distinct knowledge), experience reveals the
Belf-evident nature of the innate idea8. These latter are thus
said to be a resuttot experience, even though that experienoe
is purely internal. Thi. experienoe, though lnternal, i8 objectively real tor it consists in a representntion ot the whole
uniYerse 1n aooordance with the pre-established har.mony between
sUbstances. Human knowledge is thus at once a priori and a R2!ieriori, innate and experientiall Latta, l26~
-

20

virtual, or"the predlcate .1tD. the aUbJect. l6 BYea In emplrlcal
(Lelbn1z calla 'he. oontinaent) Judgmenta, an Intelleot whioh
could penetrate to the bottom ot the 10glcal subject would aee
theree the predioate.'7
The log10al IdentltT ot all true Juclpent., even ot
tho.e con.emins oontinge.t "truths of tact," point. to tbe tirst

ot the two tuDd. .ental and irreducible principle. ot the Leibn1slaa 10110.
~pon

!hi. 1. the priuiple ot oont.a410t10n, whateva.

aul,._la imp11e.

&

oontra410t1on 1n It. denlal le tna.

_lnee, in the ca.e ot eontlnpat truths ot tact, on17

But

the 1J:Ltla1te

analy.l. possible to God oan .how the denial ot tbe propo.ltlon
~o

Involve a contradlotlon, another princlple ls nec •• saP,J,

prlncipla ot .urticlent reason.

~

It ma,. be noted that the root

.eanlng ot Lei'bni.' prlnolple ot aurtictent re.son Is to be tcuad

.n the 10aloal postulate trGm wb10h his whole phil.sopa, tollows
~.

a

eOJl'olla~f

~uaUJ

••er,r true proposltlon 18 eIther

to~all,.

or vl.-

14entioal, tbat 1., eva., tPQa propo.lt'_ .ust 1a it.el1'

··)6

tAu all '.ue propoaltlou

llental17 ua17'10.
.ubJeot.

aft

tore Lelbrdz tunela-

live", ,.edloate 1. aom.ellow contalned In the

)7 ·Verl'ata. contlnsente. intlnlta Del anal,..1 IDd1qua. aolu. Deus t.anslre pote.t. Unde ab 1,.0 1010 a prlor1
~. o••t. oOSDoacuntur • • • ,al.lque lunt ORne. qua. voco Yerltae. taotl." De Selent1& Un1val'.all •• au aalouio Phl10'O*hl~
~&aann. I, r.r; I.a alao Xilia, ,o:or--aaa Dot. on pase o. ·
~.nt,
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be demonstrable bT a reduction to a

tion.

£o~allr

identical proposi-

The principle or suffioient reason atfirms this rightful

l'educt1billtJ. l8

Each or tne •• two principles i8 conoerned with a spe.
olal kind ot truth.

In thoae ca.e. whe.e the truth tollows tro.

the law ot contradlctlon, we have neoes.arr truths or rea.on.
The.e tl'Utha are .xp•••• lbl. In analrtlcal prop081 tiona.

tho•• ca••• where the truth doe8 not ao follow

an~1n

In

tact,the

oPP081t., .a tar aa tinlte lnt.llisenc •• are concerned, Is po.-

.1ble,we have cGQtins-nt truth. ot tact.

fhel' are expres8ible

onl)" l.n p"po.ition. wb1ch Kant was to call erathetlcal.
!he eld..enc7 or oU%' aa.ent to oontingent truths i .

explaln.e4b1 the prlnc1ple ot auttlo1ent .eason.

Eve17 ob J.o'

known mua' bave Ita Intell11lble .eaIOR, tt. ratIonal

Ju.tttl~

cation. fbi • .atloaal Juatitioation of the attrIbute. ot &DJ
subject 1. the--

6 •••n ••

from whioh .••,. _anate.

It" tb1s es.eno.

1. the infinit ••••••• , it 18 Ita own juatitioatlon.

PoP 004

1. 14.nt10al17 \h. pJ,eu,,,,. ot ••••••• and of exist.no..

It It

1. a 8N&teet ••••M.. tMIl 1 ts .utfiolent Nason, both •• regaHa

1ta po•• lbl11. al thi.

OJ'

tbat tJ'P. ott ••••n •• and l.tl . .t1.1al

p.al1aatlen through extateno., Iluat ultlllatelJ 'be • ought 1n an

13S.
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exempl~/

and

efficient cause. 39

according to Laioniz there is no
finite monads.

This cause is no creature for
tr~lsitive

causality among

The sufficient reason lies in the universal cause,

God, who willed that out of all tho logically possible worlds, the
best one .hould exist.t~O

Actually existing finite beings and

their states or attributes, e.g., that I am sitting now instead
ot standing, are what they are not because

their~posite

is selt-

contradictf)I7, but because anything different llould be incoIllpa ...
tible with the goodness and wisdom of the deity_

In another

world system ot possiblea--a system which has not been chosen by
God beoause it was not the best possi'bl.. one·-I may have been
stadding now instead ot sitting.

But in the world whioh God did

39 Laibnia, Origination of Things, Latta, 344.
Kar'ohal points out a .erious difficulty involvea In the relation
between the Lelbnizlan principles of contradiction and of sufticient reason. On the one hand, no object is a rational object
exoept in so tar as it i8 identical with itself or not intrinsically oontradiotol"'1_ On t he other hand, no objeot is a rational
object except tor its sufficient reason. But in finite objects,
thes. two rational exigencies exclude one another .ince the sutficient reason ot a finite ea.ence is e xtrinsio to it. The log!calconclusicn, then, 1. that either every finite objeot is
essentially uninnelligible and lrratior~l, in opppsltion to the
general postulate ot rationa11sm that the order of being and that
of thougnt are parallel} or that the sufticient reason is fundamentally identified with the finite object. Inthe latter eaae,
the rationalist postulate would be safe but the question aris ••
whether Splnoza's monism would not be the result. See Point de
Depart, II, 2.3-26.
•
-

40 This Lelbnizian doctrine ot optim1sm involves that
of oompossibility, that is, in the best possible world demanded
by God' IS wisdom all the best possible essences which ean exist
side by side must necessarily exist. See Monadologr, nos. 53 ... 55,
Latta, 247-248.
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as a matter of fact creat., Hia goodnees and wisdom demand tha~
I b. si.ting here and now.

thus the

wo~14

i& ultimately-and

essentIally a systom of tinal cause., a system which 1. the ex-

pre.8ion ot an all-powerf'ulWl1l whioh knows and decr••• tbe be.t 41
A

turthe~

diacuasion ot the relationo! the possible

to the actual and ot the sufficient reason of essences and
act. of existence will

t~ow

or

mol'. light on the preceding matter

as weU aa Intro4uce the Lelbniziandoctrine ot causalit,..
The po.slble tor Leibniz is that which does not impl,.

a contradIction

w.n.n

it is conceived bY' the mind.

pos.ibility.t being that ot
nec •• sarr existence.

It

In God, this

nec.ssarily existing b 8ing, 1nolu4e.

As regards other beinga,

the·in~lnite

per-

tectton ot the divine 8.S8nee demand. that eve17thing which 18
not tntrina14al1Y' eon. tradictory and extrinsicall,.

contl"'adlcto~

(through laok of compo8s1bi11ty) be a possible term ot tne crea-

41 Latta, lOT. Seo Bu••ell, PhilO.op~ of Leibniz, 34.
"The law ot aultlclent reaaon, aa appliea £0 ac~aY-.iI8t.Dia,
reduce. Itlolt definitely to the alsertlon of tinal cause• • • •
In ordor to inter actual exllten.e • • • the notlon of tbe aood
mUlt alwaY'S be emplOY8d. ft
Latta, 238, note S9. polnts out an Inoon.lstencJ whioh
ar1s8s regarding the inter-relation ot Lelbnlz' two fundamental
principl.a. Oontln,ent beinga are sa14 t 0 demand an etfioient
cause as the1r suffioient reason. then Le! bntz &petAka ot the
.utfle!.nt realon as 111ns In the order ot tinal Gau.... Apparent17. the etticient and tiaal cau.e eamb1Be4 make up the
luttlelent .eason. leither ls enough b7 It.elt.
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tiv. act. 42 - Otherwise something extrinsic to Gtd would. hold th.
divine omnipotence in check.

~h. divine

I.sence is thus the

.f\mdament. the Grund, of the possibIlIty of .very finite object

which is not logically self-contradictor,..

What Is the relation of these possible finite essences
to actu$lexUJtence?

Unlike God, theyao not; of themselves

Involve.n.o •• sary and actual existence.

Why, then, do they .:118,,1;:;1'

in plaee ,ot till eternal vold,4)
. The suffieient reason for the existence of finite
be1n~8

la. accorling to Leibniz. the cre&t1ve wl11 of God. But

the actlvlt,.ot the divine w1l1 must also have e. sutric1.nt
reason.

!his reason i8 nothing other than the exigenc7 tor

existence which 18 the propel",. of ever)". poss1ble being or tUBsaaoe.,

W. D'JUat observe that

frO:';i

the very tact that there

42 . Latta, 243.

not.

75.

.

oall. the r.lation ot God to

.

the otb.r monad. "the orux of Lelbniz' pb,llo.op!l7." Le1bnlz wlshed
to maintaIn both the In4iv1duallt7 ot the monad. and the els.niial
unit,- ot d.pendent Ol-...tues wlth 004. fhus he .peaks or the 1110nael. aa b.lns "cont1nU&l. tulgurat1ou" of the d1vInit7 (Mona4oloIf:l.,no. 47, Latta, 24). th••• tulpntions are appax-.ntl1y a .
irddl. te~
n el-••tlon and .manatlon. A tulguration ma7 b.
d.sorib.d .. a po•• ible e •• ence tending to realIze 1ts.lf In
aotual existence, yet requiring the wl1l of God to s et it tr.e
from the countera-aotll'l8 influ.nce. of oppo.lt. po.s1b11itl •••
Glven God'. choi.e, the .xi.t.nce of the monad ari.e. 801.17 fro.
the liberating of It •••••ntlal activiti... This .&ho of the
•••• • •••ntia. theory and a lack of a doctrine of analogy contFrDute to Lilbntz l p~obl •••

,.tw••

4J W. have already aeen that th.ir existenc. as thi.
or ~hat particular t7P. of ••••••• ls due to the doctrin.. of
optimism and co.po•• lbll1t7.

I

exists something rather than nothing, it follows
that in pO.Bible tbinS., or in possibillty or
eBsence itself,there i8 a certain need of existence or, so to apeak, a claim to .• xlst J ip.a vord,
that essence of itself tends to exlstenoe.44
teeordlng to Kar••ha14S the passage means that the
world, conSidered in itself, oan without contradiction be thought
as

not e xistlng; and. that the d ivlne power, also consldered in

itselt, is free to create or not to oreate.

But the pas.age

also means that the world, oonsidered in relatlon to the divine
perfection, demands exl.tencs.

Por the infinite wisdom of God,

proposing to Itself the greatest good, cannot remain Indlttepenu
to the aot of creating.
For although the,world 18 not metaphysically nece.8.17. 80 thAt 1t. oPPOlite iavolv•• a ooatradiotion
or 10810al abaurdity , it 18 nevertlleltUJIPh781oa11r
n8 ••• sU'1 or '0 cta,erained that 1•• ,. ~p•• l te 1JaYolye.
1mpel'tection or moral absurdity. And a8 pOlllblllty
1. the prinoiple ot e.lenoe. so perteotion or degree
of essenoe (througb which aore things are compo.alble
the greater 1t 18) 18 the prlnc1ple ot ex18tenoe. 46

44 Brdmann, I, 147 J Latta, 340. the latter points
out that po.alSillE, or potentlality 1a never an empty capacitJ
fop Lelbniz. It la alva71, In however ...11 a degree, a tendency
to realizatlon, which Is kept baok only bJ other sim.ilar t endenciel. Optim.iBm and compo •• ibi11t,. ar. the prinoiples aooorttng
to v hioh Gee! dec1des what tendencies are to be actualized. Latta,
240, note. 64 and 67.

nOI.

,

4S

POint!! Depart, III, 26.

46

ErgT-'
I, 148 J Latta, 342. See ala. the Monadoan
• Latta. 241 ana not. 65.

S)
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An infinitely wise being, then, seeing that combination of' possibilities which constitutes the best of all possible worlds,
necessarily cl'eates that universe as a

C

and not because of

By means of this conoep-

tual bl"ldge,

til

LeIbn.~.z

lack of liberty.

onsequenoe of Hi. wisdom

passes by pure .! Eriori thInking from the

logioally possIble to the actually existing.

Pure 10g10al

thinking be60mes an 1nttrument whereby ultimate realIty can be

defined in a valid manner. 47

It unoovers to us what no experiOD.o

can reveal. the Wider universe whiohe1:ists eternally in the
mind of God.

Pure"thought is essentially speculative and meta-

physical.
~ing

to the rationalist doctrine of oausallty, we

Qan see trom the preceding pages why l'ationallsts in general tria
to make causality

til

sub-spacios of the logical relation

ground and consequent.

b9twe~n

It was only natural for a philo8ophr

which 1nherited such Oartesian problems as the mind-body relatldo
and whioh stres.ed the rat1ona11tr,y of the real to turn to the

logic ot the possible. In order to find there some parallel to

47 See the pasaage in Bume t 8 ~u1!2 where he d eplcta
a belief, fals. as taxa aa Hume himself 18 concerned, but the
truth for Leibnlz: "Bothing • • • mal seem more unbounded than
the thought of man, which not onl,. escapes all hUJ:1&ft pover and
authorlt1. but i8 not even restrained within the 11Ddta of natue
and. reallt7 • • • What nevel' was seen, or heard ot,
'Jet be
conceived, nor is ~thlng beyond the power of thought, except
what implie. an abaolute contl'adlctlon." !nQu1rr. II, 1$.

JIll.,
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.' actual existence.
the world of

Thus Lelbnlz, though he cannot be accused ot the exe.asive l'atlonal1stla formalIsm of Wolft, ultImately rounded the
ea.usal concept upon a real connectIon, not among the mutuall,.
independent and self-fulfIlling monads, but among the thought,s
of God.

The testimonJ of experience notwithstandIng, my WIll-act

is not really the cause of the elevation of my

a~.

By a harman,

pre-estab'11shed from eternIty bY' Ood among the best posstble
beings,the two actIvities are synchronized without any real cannection. 48

As tor the
BOS,fUll,

c~usal

princIple, teIbnlz, writing ta De.

says that a power of determining oneselt without any

cause implies a contradictlon.49

In another letter to DeVolder,

he says that to conceive the ossence of a substance, nwe pequi"

the conception ot a possible cause; to conceIve its existence

w.

48 "We may indeed say that although this body may not
be an effIcient physical cause of these effeots, its 1dea is at
least, 80 to speak, their final, or, if you 11ke, archetypal
cause in the understanding at God • • • in an ultimate analysis,
the agreement of all the phenomena of the various substanoes come.
only trom thIs, that ther are all productions ot one and the same
cause, to wit, God." Letter to Arnauld, Die Fnl1oaophlsehe
Schrltten yon G.W.Le1bnis, edIted by C.G.~arat, BerlIn, 187518~O,

tt, OS; - -

49 Gerhardt, II, 42il.
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require the conce~tion of an actual cauae_"SO Now it Is a rund~
mental docttt1ne of Lelbn1,; t phl1o.!ophy that a.1l the px-ed1.c8.t ••
of

~

gubj~ct

It,

must be included in the notion of that sUbject.

then, to conceive any actually exIsting fin1te object, we must
oonoeive its cause, the causal principle 1s necessarily analytiC.
Afte%" Leibnlz, v101rt deseJ"ves mention since it was 1ft

h1s ph11osophy that "ant was educated.

The Wo1rrlan philosoph,.,

though modelled on that of Lelbn1z, toned down or el1minated the
most. ol'iginal and striking suggestIons of the latter, like the
dootrine of the pre-established harmony.

Wolff defined cause as

"prlncipium aotual1tntla" with "prInclpIum" understood al logioal
ground. S1 He explained partIcular causes as those thIngs ~om
which the

et~ects

might be logically deduced. Sa He allowed the

pre-establIshed harm.ony to f£11 into the background, practice.ll,.
confining it to the relation between soul and body, whereas

Leibnlz had postulated it as true for all the monads.

Woltt al-

lowed real interaction between physical objects, at least as a
more probable hypothesis.

He also attached more

~portanoe

to

the prinoiple of contradiction than to the prinolple of suttIeien
reason.

br

He made an attempt to prove t be latter trom the r orlllfU"

arguIng thatnothing, ainee it has no oorr••ponding notion,

$0

Gerhardt, II, 22$.

Sl Ohrlatlan

-

W.l~~,

S2 Ibid., 870-880.

Ontologla, 881.
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cannot be said to cause or account logloally for something without
contra.diction. 53

This is practically the same ar~i.UUent aa t.b.a~

used by Locke and haa a1read1 been discussed.
change must be cauae4.

It

ass~es

that a

The cause is eIther 80mething or nothing.

Since nothing can be a oause only at the cost ot

selt-contradlctlo~,

the argument concludes that something must be the cause.

But

that a change must be oaused is just what the argument was IntendeJ
to prove.

54
Por Woltf', the notions or suftioient Peason (Grund) and

of oause (Uraache)
.
. are convertible.

Echoing Descartes, Wolff' thus

made God, whose divine essence 1s its own suf'f'101ent reason, causa
I

~.

In all being the logical reason (loglscher Grund) is the

ontological oause

(ontologi8~her

Grund, Ursaohe) and Ule cauae 1s

the logioal reasoo.
This excessivel1 rationalistic viewpoint was fleroel1
attacked in a lecture delivered at Koenigsberg by tne

anti-Woltti~,

protessor, Crusiua. 55 Cruaiua denied the convertibi11ty ot the

53
54

Ontol06ia ,

50-70.

Hume'. refutation, seems purely verbal. .For
nothing to be a cauae i8 the same as a.ying that there is no
cause. Thua it the d.il,emma read: either change has or haa not
a cause, Hume would not have found it so aasJ to refute.

55

If one may judge from Kant 1 s inaugural dissertation
at Koenigsberg, the Nova D11uoidatio, this leoture of' Crusiua
made a profound impressIon upon film.

l

)0

.'

10,1.al pea.on and the peal ca.e hllPkllchkelt••JI"fUl4).

Be aa1D-

taineet that the 10110al rea• • ot an ob jeet do.. not alva,. •
• xp.e•• It. oau.e, although knowledge 01' the oaue ot the 0'0.1 ••'

n••••• arl17 tu.Jm1ah•• tbe lo.loal pealon ot the ObJeot.S6
hi.

In

lova Dlluoldatl0,lant 'Would .&7 the .... thins when, .ub.tl-

tlltina tor the notion or suttlelmt peas. that ot Aete. .inlq
"alOn, he voul4 diat1np1ah the anteo04••t "eterm1n1q ...a • •
(patio ••••n41

.!!!

ti.~l! t".011

.eal. . (ratio ooeo._..41 )

tbe con.equ.nt de'ers.11l1ns

_-'1

.AR4,..t, Kant was not a Whol17 ta1thtul exponent of
Cl'U8i u. •

thoup. he diatinguished oause and. 10Sloal.

held on to the a.at twl4a.mental plnelple

".8on,

or patlonal1•• ,

he

the

principle whio. . .duo.. all l'atlonal j •• titleatlon u1tl_'.17 to
•••••• aJlf 14eatlt,.
.u~J •• t

Aooopdlng to Lelbn1., ... we have a.en, the

of a true jud. . .nt oontalna La Ita late11111ble aot ••

. . .tldq whloh 1& bo\h the exi.en.. ot the predioate and the

exolulon ot the ocm.tNdlotol7 of the lattep.

lubje.t alone ...
41oat..

tuas. ••

AnalJ.i. of the

the Ntlonal juatltloatlO1l ot the pre-

Con••quent17, the truth ot an objeot suppose. ne.e •• arl

th. 14eftt1t7 ot, M. o j••t Vith 1ts

.xp~a1n1n,

"a.on, with 1ta

)1

logioal giound.

.Kant would never abandon this Lelbnizlu con.ep-

tlon ot the "pure ratlonal" reduced to the "pupe ",17tl0."$8
"o.nla

nost~a

ratloc1natio in praedloatl oum aUbJeoto, vel tn ••

vel 11'1 nexu apectato. 14elltitat•• detegen4aa "solvitv."S,
But '10 maintaln ,hat e.,.er7 :rational dlellon.trailon ls
had b1 anal,.sls, op that the 10gloal peaSOn 1. Identified w Ith

the object whose ground 1'1 18 in oonsciousneas, ..... to be

ent1"17 ap1nst the t h.sl. ot O:rua1ua, namel,., that the Gaua.
ot an objeot 1"u:rnlsMa Its logio.l Na.on.

In taot, • •t .....

to have .eJecte4 Cl'U.tlua altos.th.%' a ahort 1tb11e late:r when he
1.14 that 1me oause, 1.e., the ontological rea. on extpina!. to
tbe ...eo., 1. net

-17 not oOllv.l'tlbl. w1th the 10poal :reasoa,

but can n ...r be 14.nt1fi.4 wl th 1t •

Pol' the los10a1 peason d e.l

wIth the Identl'7 ot an obj."t and Its expllcatlv. Naeon.

.A.

oaus., on the other hand, 1nvol.,.•• the oppos1tlon between an
.rre.t and Ita , __ loal pl'1n01pl..

A ...us. 1& b7 deflnltion

som.thing o1;he.-.t, 4D4.pea.-than tM • tt••t.
Thia HlU.l'Jc60 plu Bua.'. upaent top the s1D.thetl0

,
S8 I . . . . . .' .hal, .It!. 'otnt !! Delart,
Ill, )).

S9 J.••~ D11••14a'1,~1
.£;

~45••.
...

X, )91 •
,:.

I

,

vO ....obal oalla 1t ·~eui-.~~. . . . . pr8m1a.. 4801al••
4e 1. phil•••phie art t1qu.· Point de De." XII, 33. the whole
pa •• a.e In whloh the ~lr oo.ups I i .{ . lioani in view ot 1[an' •
lateJl Cpitloal teaohing en oau8alltl1 "I ••• very well how a
~ound acoopdlng to the law of
14entlt" nam.1" beoauae it 18 41800v.J'ed through anal,.s18 ot

oonsequent is d.duoed fpa. ita

32

.'
or causality

eventually led Kant to the perplexina problem
ot the synthetic,!, EJ:lI0ri. 61 At the t 1me Ktnt made the remark

nature

(176), he anowed tbat thoulB he was a convinced
believed 1n t he value and nee •• al

ratio~al18t

who

t, of anal,.81., he waa neverthe-

le.. tree ot tbe illuaion wnleh decelved both Lelbniz and Wolrr
as to' the tranlcendent i.,ort

or

the pur-lJ anal,t1e method.

coneepte to be contained in tne ,round~ ThuB neces.itr i8 a
around ot i . .utabil1tJ, oomposltion a around of dlvi.ibl11t"
intlnitl a ground 01: omai •• lenoe, etc., 8lld I oan 01e&1"17 underItan4 t hi. bond ot unloa between poW1d. and aonleq uent, • iDee 'bu
oonaeq_nt iSI-eallr l~nti.al wtth part or the conception or tbAt
pound, and inaa.uGh. _ it ia alreaq Gonuined therein ia p•• lto,
with the ground aecord1.n; to the law or Identtt,.. But hOlf aomeoan tollow fNm 10_ thln, el.e oihe",i.e thaD'1ii i'iioR"iio.
~ne-liw
laen¥ll!, £6at l.-.emeISln, I anourd~i. to &i••
• ao'iTiaTl'o"iiie. I 0& 1 £6i -tIP.1 ilii4 0 iroUid th..-rolI'ia~
iiiUnd. Seoa,ui""Tta relatloD to tkw cenaequent is 10gloal, 1 ••• ,
oan be olear-lJ reasl1 ••4 a. tollo_ina tro. the law ot identit,.
the .econci 1dndo~ g1'Ound I oall the aotual lP'ound, beeauae,
wbl1e thi. ~l.tlGD beloDS- to ., true conoepta, there 1. no
Ju4pent po••ible about 1 t. nature. Ji.v v1th "lard. to thi.
ontol.si.al "a.oa C...iual srou.n41 and Its bond vi th a real eon.equent, he... 1. the .!ap1e quatteD I uk. how . . . know that .
b....... _ one th1aa la, anothe. thiq auat be' 'eptl.en Gl'oa ••n,
li!4em1e II, 202. Itall •• not in the origlnal.
a.e pp.fO--YOl.ot the pre.ent .tu47 where it i. ahowa how
lant t • recognitlonot ~e taot that the cauaa was etwa. Andere.
and hia pe.sl.tent a.ceptance of the rationali.t principle or
14entit,.aa the 801e
tor .cientific Jud....'. intenaitte.
t~ problem ot the 8Jatb.etic III il'tortebeQUeaUbe4 at.
hil
phi.10.ophieal progenl tor..
ana:
tbnl ••

it',1

or

.0...

.e

P

b,

6" In It. hi.tOI-lo context of caUlal!tr, the ppobl_
oaa b. put thUl. Bow can we la'1 that all thinsa aust have III oaUI4
when DG . .ount or ana17al. oan .how tha"
Be.i4e., auae has CODclua1v.l,. proved causalit, to ba synthetic. Is the .7Uth•• la due
.8r811 to cuatoDl8.l'J coniuctlon, •• Bume clai••4, Ia the vaunted
neel.sit, and universal
or the principle purel,. subjective' Or
1. tne oauaal 8Jftth•• laQbJ.etivel,.. validated, 1.e., ow1l'lg to
lomething.pecial about the tblaga we know and the waf we know
the.'

t,

.33
In the preceding pages we have dealt with oertain per-

tinent dootrines ot the empirioist and rationalist .chools of
the 81gb'aanth centUX7' •. The empirIcists maintained that a111de.
can. be accounted tor b7 aensa impressions.
was thu.

p

educed to the peroeption of mere

Tha aauaal Ilonoept
uCla.saion and :the

S

caula1 principle had no objeotive universallt7 and
It vas rounded on an inltinotive

~

:-.spo~e,

neoess~t,..

acoompanied 'b7 a 1"••1

called: belie1", to the cuatoma:-i17 oonjoined phenomena ot s ena.

experIence.

the rationalilts, wMlerightl, Npu<l1ating the prtil

clp1. that all 1dea8 oan be accounted tor 'b7 aense Imp.N.slOllI,
tailed to realize the neoeasit,.

ottbe~plrioal

real, aa oppos.clto pUt-el, tormal.knowledge.

the cau,a.l oonoept and prIncIple

b.~_epart

element tor

ant

In teloniz" banda.
01" a 87st•• 'ot pOI ..

• 1ble.vbare pUt-a thouabt and Ita prlncipl•• held 8wa7.

fne

teaob.1na ot Lelbnta, protound in 08:-taln reapects I was .na&eJ'toio

at84 01 Weltt into
combat.

aua.'a

~. ro~al18tl0

rationalism that Kant was te

lot that Kant ever wholly abandoned ratlonalisa.

Undep

devastating attacks and 1118 own phil •• ophieal study, he

M)uld'rleld certain points, such as the analytlc nature of the
eauaal principle detended 07 rationalists.

recurrenoe of the

t

But the conotant

el"ll ·poealbllit,." .1n hia philoaopllJ' aarka

lant ••• ontl~.d belief in the Lelbnislan view ottbougbt.

!he

34
we GaD hop. to achle•• b,.

~ea8on,

a881i~

when all the material and

tanoeor exper-Ienoe a:re taken .w..,.."02 Obviousl,. that i8 posslble

on17 by.eans ot an a

prio~l,

depapts fro. the e.t:rem.

pure thouSht

by

purel,. oonceptual method.

~ationallst

But Kant

posItIon when he denie. that

ita.lt amount. to knowledge.

Yet lant 1nalsts,

as will be polnt.d out 1n therollwwlng ohapt"er, that only througt

pure thousht i . knowledge po.aible at all.
JrwIle and Lelbnlz are thus the two

p~otagoni.t.

that

dwart all other. on the eighteenth centurr philosophioal atage
prior to iant.
ter·.

.Dt~ano..

thought.

!helr competing claims were the cue for the latBach .ailltaineet hi. view of the f unctlon ot

Thought'" ala1m_d .II.ume, la a practical instrument

the cODY.nient Intel"P"tat1on ot our human experience.
objecti•• or .. tap~.lcal valld1t1.

ro~

It has no

Thought, Inslsted Lelbnlz.

legt8late. ut"enally. reveallng the wider universe of the

eternall,. po•• lble and, prior to all experienee, determining the
lunda..ntal eon41tlon. to which that experienee must contora.
log1cal teNls, . .e held that a .tundam.efttal principle

or

In

exp.r1.nc~

like oausallt7 1s • 87ftthetlc judsment 1n which no necessary
connection between subject and predicate 1s discoverable and
whi.h ccn••quentlr caanot be justified elther

-

~

prIori or b7

62 Cl-ltl~"., A xiY (11). The letters A and IS In rut~e
l'c.t'erene •• to t6erltlque wlll indlcate the firat and second
editiona r ••pectl.eIi or-Ene Oritique. The numbers in parenthe •••
live tbe pates 1n '.X.Smith'. ~ran.lation.

)S
Lelbnlz held that sueh principles are analyt1c,

expe:rienoe.

either formally or at lea8t virtually founded on the 1dent1t7
of Bub,Ject and pl'e41eate.

!'heJ can there tore be Juatitied b7

pu:re thought.

fhe pr~bl.m of lant's Orlt1aue, broadly stated, conslsts in the alta_nation an o:ri tleal .stlaata ot
theae two opposed
~atlonall8t by e4ueatlon, temperament, and oonviction, Kant's probl..
was to :peoonol1. 1Albn1z f vIew of the tunctlon of
thougbt with Buma's proof of the .ynthetic characte.
ot the oauaal principle. Be strive. to determine how
muoh ot t..lbnlz. belie:r in ill. legislative power of
pure thouSbt can be retained atter full Justice hal
b.en done to a_•• s damagIqcrltlo18.. the tUndamental prInciple. upon which all experience and
all knowle4g_ ultimately r.at are !lPthetI~ in nature.
how i . it posaible that theY' shouldaIso tie a prIori'
Such 1a \he p.obl. that vaa ltaBt
tro\lbloua lnherltance tt-a b,1* philosophical present'ora, Bum. and

Vi... . . .

t.

Lelbnla.o,J

What vas .lant

t.

an.wer to the problem inherited trOll

the two .tre... ot "plrioi'. and rlltionali••,

In the next

chapter, ve ahall .e. h01f )tan' anawered the probl. ot the

87ft'hetle

~

Erlor! 1a .e,.rd to

~

p1'tae hi.torieal and logioal

lnatanoe ot the .,..'11.'10 .! 21"1 ••1, p.bJ'aloal • auaa11t,..

6) Salih, Omaeft'i_ij' xxxiii.
S•• alao ibid •• App_JlHz II,
-606.

-

:r

Ita11cs 1n the 01'18111&1

CHAl"1'ER I:::

PHISICAL CAUSALlf! IN XAIT'S

mE

OaItIgn 01

Historically,

ot the 8ynthetlc

~

ca~ality

was part ot the larger probl..

2rlorl which resulted in Kant's mind. trom the

rusion of t.he Leibnlz1an view
causali ty.

REASO.

or

thought and Hume' s analysis ot

The following pages Will therefore briefly trace

Kant'. reaction to the general problem of' the synthetio

~

prlort.

Attention will then be tocussed on physical causality, the prIme
historIcal and logIcal example of the synthetI0 ! prlori.

ThIs

latter section will be divided Into two parts: Kant's treatment
of the causal conoept or categor,y In the "Transcendental Deduo-

tion of the Oategorle8;- then his treatment of' the causal principle in the "Second Analogy."
A. to PROBLEM OP 'lBB SD!HETIO

Hum. awakened Kant t

! lUORI

r011l

hls dogmatio slumber 'b7 ahowlq

him that the prInoiple ot causality 1a srnthetio, not analytiC a.
LeIbnlz and Wolff' had held.
rea111 truittul judgment5

a~.

Hume further claimed that the on17
arnthetle

~

E•• terlo~1

judgments.

AnalytI0 judgments are mere tautologle. and so of' secondary
value.

They can only clarity the existing content ot knowledge,
36

37
never extend it.
Whether 1t \-Ia8 by means of Beatt1e t s criticism or b,. a
rereading

or

the En~uirzl that Kant became ao~uQ1nted with Hums t •

argument for the sy-nthetic nature of' the principle of' ctLusallt7
and the correla.tive Humean view of thoueht. that acquaintance
came at a significant moment in Kantts philosophical development.
As early as 176), Kant he.d been seeking waya to tree metaphysics
from the contradiotions with which it Has fettered.
letter to Marc'us Herz., da.ted Februa17 21,
independent metaphJslcal

re8e~rch,

1772.

shOl<rs

The tamous
that this

predominantly rationalistic in

tenor, graduall,. revealed to Kant a serious dift"iculty in the
rationalist theory of thought.

This was the mysterious character

1 Kant, it is general11 argued, could not have been
acquainted with Kuma'. Treati.e of whioh there was as 1et
no German tr-ansla t10n berOl~e 11~O. Therefore, his r efer-encss
to Hume must reter to the latett wottk the Bn,Ulg, ot vh1 ch
Sulzer's translation appeared in 17S4-6.vanlnger (in his
c:omm.nta~, 344) .etends the theo1'7 that Kant became aequal. nted
with Hum~s destructive analysts ot the causal principle through
.eattie'. B.S~ OR the iature and Imautabll1t~ ot Tttuth, a
scathing denuri:litlon ot lUme'a-irgument In ~e~reaiI8e. 'eattle'.
esaq was ttJan81ate4 lnto a.raan around Baa,er, rt12, the t 1_
when lte.nt's wr1tlniS seem to indicatesom. knowledse ot the
Treatlse. Pollov1ng V.lbina•• , .orman Xe.p Sa1th bolda that
lant was a omehow aC:"i,uainted, it on17 through .seattle, with BUJIle'.
Treat i ••• But; he 84m1t. aa ~obabl. th. t~ that 8 Hr.8dl. .
or Eli. lniu1!2 in Sulzer tranalation or e. recalling ot 1 ts
ar~.n£ suggested to IAnt the central probl.. ot the tirst
Critlgue. See Smith, aommenta£l, xxviii.

t.

r
,38

of ! prIori knowledge 2 of the Independently real.

Thus, granted

that HU1I1(1tts empirIcal analysts of causalit1 and his oorreeaponding
theo~

of thought greatly

In~luenced

the development and formu-

------ ----- --

lation of Kant's Critical problem--ohne Bume keln Kant--Hume's
-..-.

influence should not be divorced from Kant's

Ot~

profound

questIoning and study.)
The letter to Harz olearly shows that Kant arrIved

or

himself at the problem of the objective validity ot thought, at
least in Its first form. 4

The:re Kant speaka ot t wo poas! hle

kinds ot intelligence, an intellectus archetl2us, or creative
intellect, on whose intuition things themselves are grounded;
and an Intellectus ectlPus, or passive mind, whioh derive. Its
conceptual data trom the sensuous IntuItion of things.

OUr

understanding is not the tiret kin1 of intelligence s inoe ltd 0 • •

not cause the object by representing It.

Nor Is the object the

cause of the Intellectual representations.

Hence the pure eon-

cepts of the understanding, Kant goes on to say, oannot be abstracted from t he data of the senses.

They have the1r origin

01-

2 !be ba.l0 •• aning ot the Xantian a fr1or1 18 that
\J'h1oh 1s independent of experience as regerds crt gIn and .-.Ud1t7
It ••alld c~lterla are neee.altT and unlveraalltT. Ita OPPOSite
1s the empIrical. For more en the Kantian a Rric.rl, s.e SlI1ith,
lomaent!£l, 54-8, or Paton, Kant's MetaPal,Te ot ~e~leDo., I,

1lt-~O.

-

, --

- -

3 S.e Aloia Riebl. Del" Phll0S0 hiSChe !rlticismu8.
Leipzig, seeond edition, 190~,-Y; 308; an Iuguato ouzzo, lint

!~eor1:.tloo,

a

TurIn, 1924, 13.

4" S.ee

Smith, Commentarit.

46.

-

)9

.ouroe 1n the .oul. Bow Kant a.k.
one wb1ch he admit. he

p ....d

~.1t

over In the

the turthe. que.tlon,

!!!!

DllU014at1o,S

.ow
eaR ,uoh
•• wh14n reter to an
''OJeot and Jet are not the .e.u1t ot an aftectlon
~ep.e.entatlon

4ue to that object, be

po•• lble' I bad maintained
that the .ense pa,H,entatlone repre.ent tbing' a.
th.,. .ppear, the lntll.l•• tual ...p.r••entatlon. thinga
aa the7 are. But how then are the,. thin,. S1 y••
towa,lt ••, b7 the aazmer In Wb10h the,. att•• t us,
And It ,ueh int.lle.tual "presentationa are du. to
ovoW 1_8" aotl Y1'7, wlumo. c••a the al1"8...nt
Wh10h the,. aM .uppo••cl to have vlth objec'., which
,.et are not *help
.0" ..... i ' \hat the

'"4u.•••,

ax.1... ot pue poa.on about tbo.eo'Ojo.'. aP'.' w1'1l

... ·l&.tto", . vb..n 'bhl. a ......nt hu not been In 8.aJ'

v&7 ....l.t.a Of .xperl.nceft>
What rlpt, III

wh10h a.

!

otur vord., have we to think that concept"

11'10p1 orl",,, h _ wlt111n, aN valldot the Incl••

,.n4entql'eal t
It should b. Doted that knt. d•• pl te b.1, doubt' and

41ttl.ultle., •••'1" d.nle4 the ! »1"10.1.

OIl the oontrU'J', he vu

oonvlno.ct tbat the arow1ns .uooe., ot the oonte.pora17 pbJ",loal
and .athematl••l ,ctenee, va. the ...,ult ot their !. Rrlerl natve ~1

S Witten 1n 1110, .111, opu.oule JUJ'ka the bepnnlD1
ot Kant'. ¥Pe,'Una witA the probl. . ot how the ,u'bJeetlye ooa41tloDl of our oepitl0. are l'e1a1;.4 to objeotlve 8.,er1e••••
6

Quoted. b1 Sal'h, C. . .n'!!'l_ 220 .•

7 s•• the Prefac. ot the ••CORd. ealtlon ot the

L

arltlqu~.

This aa.urano. of the val1dlt7 ot

~e ~

Erlor1 In aoienoe an4

mathematics led him to In•• attgat. Ita poa8ibl11t7 in m.taplQ'al ••
ala..

1

y.t that assurance dId not remove the question how the

Irlo~l

was po.alble.
Swept along b)" the two a treams ot h18 own stud)"

paradoxloal

~

or the

Epler! and BUme'. argument tor the synth.tIc nature

ot the cauaal prinel,l., Kant Immediately found hlm•• lt in 7.t
d••per vater.W.11 oould be ret.r to Ruma aa rousing hi. tr_
M. dogmatlos1UDlb.r.

l1p to th.n,all .7nth.tio judgment. were

.! poet.rlo;pl, or .plriea1, vAlle mal),,'loal Jud....'were r.8U'4•• ! 21'108. Karlt • a Cplt1 ••1 ppob1. . uo.a tr_ tlle
oonal.dere•

all•••d dl .......17 ibat the !
exclude OIl. aDOtMr.

p.10zt~

.8D4 the apt_ttc 40 not

Bot 0Dl.7 1... priDe!pl. like the .au.al

axl_ 0\)v10-.17 .! e;plorl' but ala., . . . . . . pPOY•• oonolualve1J
d•• pl'. rational1a' 01a1m"

..... to be

DO . . . . . . tlon

it 18 I,.tbetie.

POJ!'t In It theM

ot ..,. kind betwee. the a ub jeet (the

coneeptton ot • •veat .1 lometbing happ.niDS in t1l1_) and ille

pred1 ...te (the eonoept1 . . .f another .vent pp.e.dlns It aa an
or1g1natlns o.US.).

.An4 7et we do not ••re17 .aorlbe the pradl-

oat. to the .ubjee1; but .....1'1; that the,. are neoe •• ul17 oonne.1;e •
ht pan'ed tha' the tun4amental prinolpl.a upon whioh
aU experienoe and all Imowleds_ ul'i.ate17 :r.at are aJ'l1thetI0 ill

llatUP., how can thq 'be !

2,,~oPl

alao'

Bow explain their ..pPanrl -

41

.'
17 eontradleto17
nature' What 18 that "x,· that third something,
b1 which, Independent17 of partlcular and continpnt sense expel-i. ~
en.e whlch can nevep give the univeNality and nee8881t,. that
oharaoterlze the !. E~10P1,9 the synthesls ot 8ubjeot and ,"4108ta

In .. s,nthetlc ~ Erlor1 prOPo'ltlon'!S aohieved,lO
lant's probl... wal Intenslfled because he clung to the
ratlonallat prlne,lple

or

Ident! tr as the sole nol'm for •• lentlt10

Juclpenta ,11 alm", at the 8ame t1me abandonlng.. .s we have •••a,

the rationalist doctrine that the Haloau•• ot an objeot a4 iM
.utti.ient
18

br

Ol'

10g10al "a.a ot the objee, aN 148ntlo&l.

A ••u..

dat!altiall .om.tlUng other tlum Its ette.t, PNm1 •••ct KIult.

Thus In pPopo.tttan. that Inyolve4 a causal 1"81atlO11, lant coul4

not call'll,.. the J'atlonall.t pl'lnclpleot ldentlt7 to explaln
the oonna. til ton., ot subject au p1'e410ata,.

ret he cletended agalu,

luae the raal OODbe.tlon betw.en the subject and prettl.at., ev••

thoup he oould not anal,..e the ecnn8etlon In the subject.
what bast.,

t~n.

Up.

ooa14 the subject aDd predioate be joIned In

proposltlons ot this sort'
Kant .toJlmulate4 hi. d.11emma 1n the opuacul.

9!&!t11l'

!9. •• et1".

-Wlth .eaar4 to tb1. ontololleal 1"ea80n and ita bond

wlth .. Hal consequent, he.e 1. the slmple question I aut how ...

9 !hIs ls a rua.....ntal p1"e.upposltlon, ne.8. luttle18 t.
17 examined 81 ther 'b7 B.e or 07 ltant. S.e 8a1 th, O...enMI7.
XXX111,

21, S99.

10 Crltlq~,.A. 10-B 14 ($1) ~
11 See ....ohal. lolAt de t>Cltpan. III. ),3.

1

42
veknow that bedause one thins Is, another thing

mUlt be,·12

Wbile not agr.elng with Bum.'. ooncluslon that tb.
llnldng in the case ot causall.ty sprang trom an 1nner habit

topged

by experienoe.· knt paid Ilume the cOD1Jllment that he had

•• en the .problem ot the arnthetlc:l !. pl"ljClpl_ thouSb not in 1ta
unlyeps.l1t1.lJ Had he 40ne 80, he would haYe llraedlatel:y pecog-

-

nlzed that 'PP8 ..thel1lat1oa and soience validly involve an a
pr1o!'! .7ftth•• l. no 1••• than metaphysio..

goo4 aen•• would haT.

eavea him,,14

.,.n~b.etl0

"hl.[Jl'WD.e.-a

tfa. denying the posal'bll1t)r

ot mathe. .it.al &ad p.,..loal .clence.
ow "1004 aerule"

aertain17

ltaDt makes use of" his

and \lIlln!'aal grup o:f the problem po.ed b1 the

!. 21"1,01"1 t. examine the .!. EI'10r1 jUdgments ot ma.thematl( I

and .cleno., whos. 'Yal1dlt,. wa. top him unQuest1on&bl.,15 to •••
whether ••cb judgaenta oannot have a alm11ar va11dlt,. 1n .etapbJ12

AJca4em1e, II, 202.

13 q,rltl!\!!_. 10 (SS).
14 Ibit.
If On thi. aattep er the va114ity ot the. ynthetlc
! Erlort in sol.nfu~ and aathematics, Kant waa perhaps too .an~n. and overat.pl1t1e4 the case. 8clentlst. and mathematlcl...
do emplOJ' a Erler1 aeil:t.od.. But they diaap•• among th•••• lv••
aa t 0 the Tmp;'t ot the a
op1. flhu., It 1 t 1a tl"U. that "Jtarl" I
Crltioal probl•• tlrat b.l~a. with thla presuppositIon ot valldlt,
tot the ay.ntbetie a p:rlorl 1n solenoe and mathe.atlc.l and doea
not exl.t aave t hpwp. It" (bith, ooaaent!:fl' 477), then the
aope aautl.us sclentifio att1.u4e
toaa7~ke8 some ot ~.
wind out ot Iant'. lalla.

fri

or

l

a1cs.

In the
passage 1n

~IOh

Prol.gg~ena,

there occurs ..other Interestlng

Kant attrIbutes to Hume a part1al insIght 1nto

the general problem of the 81nthetic .! priori.

'the pas.age 1a

worth quotIng in full,

Row!a 1 t possible, sa78 that acu.te man, that When
a conceptia given me, I can ,ob.,on4 It and oonnect It "With inotMr whS.ch 18 not contained 1n It,
in 8uch a lU.Mer ..s it the latter 'teoes.apill belonged to the tormer' Wothing but experIence can
furnish ua with such oonneotions (thus he conclude,
trom thed1tr1cultr which he took to be imposslbl11t7.),
and all tbat vauted necesaltl or, what Is the ....
thing, knowledse assumed to be 1 friorS. i.nothlng
but a lonl habit ot aeoeptlng .omethIng aa tJtue. and 16
hence of mistaking 8ub.1eotlve nece.slt" for object1ve.
Kant, who held the objectIve neoesalt,. or the s1nthetlc !. 21'101'1,

was all too conscloua of the etrect of Hume ts ugument on .clenoe
and mathematlos, no l •• s than on metapbJ8Ic..

Be set out to

explaIn and establish the natupe and objective validlt,. of the

synthetic !. 27101'1, with speelal rererence to e au.alit,..
POl- about twilv8 1eare, Kant wrestled with the probl•••

In 1780, teal-tul lest an untimely deatb--he was tittT-six ,.ear.
o14--ahould overtake him in the mldst of his labors, he set down
In the all too briet pel'1Gd of 1'1 ve to 8ix months the thought.
that had occupied him top more than a decade.
~ritigu.

!! ~

Thus was born the

Reasoft.

In the work, lant develops a complex theory of cogn1tio
16 Akadem1e,
. IV, 277 •

r

-

in anlvel' to the tamoua .entral que.tlon. how aN synthetIc a
21'101'1 propositions po,.lble'

In the Pretace he glyes an impor-

tant clue.
lji)taaon hU 1n.lght onl, into that whioh It produc ••
anel' a,lan ot Ita 0VIl, and • • • 1t ... t !lOt allow
1t•• lt to be kept, .a It were, in natuN 1 1 leadlJl8atriasa. but .ut 1'.elt ,bow the ..,. wi 'h ,1"lJ101,l••
ot Ju4pent b •••ct upon fixed lawl, eona tn.lnlna na tuN
to &1ve .aw... to que.'lema ot .eaa.'. own detepainIne • • • Reaeoft, hol41na in one band 1 ta ppinelpl•• ,
aoool'41natCl which alone oonoordant .,peuaoe. o. be
a4m1tte4 u 4tClulvalent to lawa, anel in the othe.. band
ezpe.~t

tba

wbi.h It ba. 4e.i••4 1n oontor.m1tT

w1~

the.. pnne!,l•• , . ., app:roaoh nature in 0l'48r to be
'aqbt 'b7 1". Xt . ., ne'l bowver, 40 •• in She
Obaraoter ot a pupil Who 1 .tenato .v.~th1nl that
the teacher ohoo... to la" wiet an .,po1n'.4 Jv.4se
Who oOl1p.l. .the V1 tn..... tg ana..J* qUI.tlona vb! ell
be bluelt baa toat.llate4e 1 -,

lant 1. h.N .em.......

"1~

HUOll 1n Ita applloatlon to .xpel'l-

Be not.. that ~" 1. auoh 1n all iaquil'le. whloh cannot;

ellO..

be _tl01pat.ct !. l1'1ert. -.Iaaon • • • auat approaob nature 1.
01'4e:ra t. ... • ..... .,. 1'.·

•.t..

&aD, *118 l11d.'a the !. 21'101'1 or

e.n..- p.il_lta'a 11k. Wolrt.
Sbe

a.I..on.

que.tlon. l' alao

lu' in a. tal'

410'.'..

tbe

to~

U

1"8UOI1

or the anaweP.

lant augp••a, 1. oono..... with the prlnGipl••

41tlou a •• oNil1a to wbl10h Shin.. oan. b. UIl4I"'oo4.
01pl•.8
ob J••

O• •on41tlona aN

t.,

other

410-

OJ'

~ ••

p.la-

aot a'.temente about ... nat\U'e of

but p.lnelpl.a or th. poaaiblll t7 of .xp••lenol.

'tif'Ot-c1a.

ooa-

In

"UOI1 II not; • _*b04 ot ob •••viq obJI.t. a. the,

••allJ' exta' but Ie 41..0'l.r .on.....4 -17 with the va, we

17 £ritlg_. B xili (20).

4S

.,

understand objects.
and ratlonnlistn, Kent

Compromising the principles ot empirici. .
SA1'S

that reason in its sl'eculatd". or

theoretical use is legislatIve for objedts ...,.e., but

on17

the danaln of possIble, t.e., emplx-1cal, mowledge.

"!hue the

withlD

order and regular! t;r in the appeattflnc es, which we entItle natur:!.

we ourselves Introduce.

We could never t1nd them in appearanc •• ,

had not we ourselves, ot- the nattnte of our mind, ora1gtnall,. ••,

them there ...18
'!hIs new att1tude towat'd reason 1. ltant's Oopern1caa

Re'V'01utlon.

Copernlcus

ot the heavons

or

~vet-s.d

the usual viewpoint em the aotl0 il

sugi;estlng that the eaJllth moves a.round the s\U\

and not vice versa.

So alao Kant propo••• to explain the appU-

catton ot the mind' • .!. 21"101"1 prlnciple. to objects by ."'Igeatifta
that ob3ects conto~ to the mind and not .10e y.r8a. 19 Beholns

hle
e.

r.ma~

!!!. ~41~

IUGh

in

'h. lettep to Her., Kant belle... that there i .

between the Intelleotus eetl,E!!, or· p... l ve

m.n4,

aa the English 811lPl:rlclatl l:wd dereneSed. anet the tntell.o1nla

u ••

tze.,

or ore.tlve 1I11nd, ot Le1bnls.

And where... euller

thinker. had held tbat bJ thought ve get fro. bow things appeap
to how they are, Kant holds that "e get tl'ODl hew things appeal'
to how the,. wl11 appear.

18 CrltlD!' A 126 (147).
19 p14.,. ul (22).

ItaUcI 1n the ori,inal.
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!be pUPp.se

.t tbe

aevolutlon to .. tapbrat.a.

~ztltlque

1. to' .pp17 the Copernican

lant hoped 1n thla .., to' o1arlt,r

the naturo and cap••tty .t the human Intelle.t in Ita .neoretloa1
u))Oot. 20 ae al•• hoped to show, b7 a .tud1 .t the ooultlema
.f kDovle4ge, the 00300tl"e yallit7 ot the ..,atbetto A

erlo~

principle. ot knowl.... , tau. br1ns1ng about the oonstructl.
ot an 1mmanont (aa opposed ,.

,he 0.1'1 tlgu 11 nO"

in Wbioh

~

&

ltOJi'k

&

tranloonden') aetapbf'aioa.

on ps,.ch.olo81 dealing with the aanner

raoul'i.a vopk.

Emt t. toouaa1aa at'entl. on _

.plat_clopoal pl"obl_. what Is 1 t that

Uk..

CUI" expeplenoe

obje.tt"e, tbat la, the knowledge ot obje.ta !netepen4ent ct
••1......U

'.r

7:b.ua

c:ntP-

'hi.

20
l:an:t
upect of the Dd._ 18 Interior to Ita
practical or _ ..al ...peot. "I bav. found It n.••••• a17 to UDJ'
mowl.... In order t. aake r0C8 tor taith." Srltl<tu. B XU (29).
flill ••~ \he orla!nal. fbi. oomplete dlcholom,US.twe.n tbe
theoretical and mo~ .apecte ot human lnt.ll•• tu~ act1v1t7 1.
one of the root. of Kant1an agnos'lele. But Mazteohal bellev.a
that tMe agnutlol •• oan b. ayo14ed even wl$hln ltaDt- ••,..t8Jll
and atanlns .tPoJa hilt'. pztlnclpleat. Such an attempt 1. Marechal. •
theo..,. ot the .t1nal . _ 1 . . ot tb.e lntellect. a..hlat 4. ~
~, V, .33. Pa'. al. . . . . . .U8b or ... _latlon
apii'ulatlYe and pMotical "aeOll' "I belleye It Is ot areat apoS'
tanoe to ••• opt.. that aU OUl' wl1110g, and ••peclall1 oU!" DlOl"al
W1111q, 1$ cond1tloned bJ' thoupt Ott reallonl but I .t1D4 l' b.a..P4
to or.41t that the oonneotlon bet.een reason and action 1s so
.xternal ae It 18 OaaBonlJ 4•• cplbed to be ••• It s .... that
Apl.totl. va. rllbt. wb&tOY~ hi. error. ot 4etal1. in epeaking

'.i"eerG

ot?'pOCtlP~O'LC;

Deteno4!

.a

.!! •••• on,

op£I<TII(OS"

"ou~

.1' :f£~lS

blO("~'1rUul.·

J!

LOn4on" 19$1, 16.
21 Smith belt.v•• that even ttlousb ltant eUmina.es as
non-••••ntial to the .ent.al inquiry ot the Cp1tique all P87chologloal questions pertaln1ng to the mental powers, atat.ments ••
to their conatltutlon are atill impl1.d and lnvolved 1n hia
opiate.o1ogioal der. .e of !. iptori knowledge and ordinary expe.1

L
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A"brief summa17 of the theory of knowl.dge22 pres.nt.d
in the Critlg.ue will show Kant's answer to the problem of the
synthetic

~

Erior1.

1) In thft absence of intellectual intuition,

human knowledge presupposes the reception of data.

2) The

immediate elements of this sense reception are only crude representation., not as yet objective knowledge.

)

Only the

~

ertori

synthesis of these crude representations constitutes them into
objects in and for consciousness.

This 8yntnesi. ls effect.d

according to formal conditions of unity, the form. and eat.gorle.,
through the schemata.

23 These latter are transcendental functions

of the imagination which m.diate the functions of perception and
und.rstanding.

The categorical synthesis refers the objects or

appearance. to the supreme condition of unity, the transcendental
unity of apperception.

This form of selt-consciousn.ss (self-

22 See the tigure on p.1 37 of this thesi. showing the
logical element. postulated, by Kant tor ~ erior! knowledge.

23 The schemata have not as 1et been tully evaluated.
B.It.8mi th, Comment!!7. 334, declares them to be an unwarranted
tertiwa
EliIng, Xant s Treatment of cauaaliti' 61, thinks th ~t
Elie s-nera ettect ot Ine .chematI.m Ia~o dlmI.I. the importance
ot the cat.gories. In tacti aal. Ewing, "It ia the sch.ma (not
tha cat.f0r,), the validity ot whioh i. proved in the .eoond
Analogy_
For Daval, La ~eta<h1~iq~ de Kant, 8, the sohemati.m
"eonstitue bien la ole~4e toute 1a phl!o.ophi. d. Kant." For
Paton alao "the chapter on Ichematism i ••••• ntial to an understanding ot the Critical philosophy." lint's Metap~.ic ot E~eri~
enee, II, 21. But h. admit. the gr.at
ttlcu!tIes nvoliid n
YOIIold.ng Kant's acoount ot the 8chematlsm. Ibid., II, 50.

<l1!ta.
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.'

identity) is the nec.ssar" correlate of consciousness of obJeots.
Cogita, ergo res sunt. 24 4)~. oategories are thus susoeptible

ot a legitimats, objeotive

U8&

in so tar as tney enter into the

constitution of objects of experience.

Otherwise, they are empty

torms of our understanding. 2S unable of themselves to represent
any object whataoever. 26
~here

5)

Besides the categorical 8ynthes1s 27

are certain metacategorical principles ot unity, the

~ranscendental

Ideas of God, the World, and the Soul.

Being above

sense experience, the.e ideas can tind no corresponding content,
rhus, despite the1r subjective necessity,28 they have no objective

24 ~ile Boutroux, La Pb1loso~h1e de Aant, Paris, 1926,
The torm ot .elt-ldentity-r. iieate more-fUlti 1n the dis·
~us.ion of the "Transcendental Deduction."
See Pp.St-Llot this

~4.

~hes1s.

~lthout

25 "Thoughts without oontent are empty. intuitions
conoepts are blind." Critique, A 51, B 75 (93).

26 The Aantlan theory ot the cat8go~, or concept, i.
who111 oonoeptualistio one. Unlike moderate realists on the
~uestion of universals, Kant gives the categories no foundation
n reality (nowmena). They are wholly a 21'101'1 and the subjective
ronditions ot the knower. Bence Aant'.-pro1)tem. ot determining
~ow subjective conditions of thought oan have objeotive objective
ralidity. The only objective validity that he can--and fInally
~oes--give them ia that belonging to a~p.,~anee8.
27 Paton, Kant's MetaSRIRiO of Exeerienoe, II, 44,
otes that this 1s no£ ane
a
ole series of syntheses tak1ng
lace at different time.. There is only one synthesis which
ombines the given manifold in one time and space. But that one
yntheais has different aspects and imposes dIfferent characteriales en the objeots combined.

or

28 The mind is neoessarily impelled to these ideas
o complete its synthesis ot experience.
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use 1n the theoretical order.

6) Negligence of the.e Orltical

rule. leads to the "Paralogta.," the "Antinomies J" and the
"Theological Sophistries" of pure reason.
Such was Kant's solution of tho problem of the synthetic
~

er10rl which Hume's analJais ot caua.lit,. plus Kant'. rationalia

view of the rwtctlon and nature of thought oreated.
tere.ting pas.age ot the

~rol.gam.n.,

In an In-

Kant evaluate. hi. solutlon:

fhis complete (tnougb to its originator unexpected)
solutlon ot Bume t • problem rescues tor the pure
concepts ot the understandIng theIr ~ *~lorl origin
and for the universal laws of nature tell" valldltl
as laws of the understanding, Jet in such a VaJ .s
to llm1t the1l' use to experlence, beoauae t hell" possibllit.1 depends solell on the reterenoe ot ~e understanding to ~erl8fto., but w1th a oanpletell rever••d
mode of conneotion whIch never oceMrred to Bume--the7
do not deriye rr.. exper10noe, but experienoe derive.
from th_.2'1
Nature, 1n other wo1'Cla, 1n i t& uni vera.l contond t,- to law, I1U8t
be sought in the condi tlone ot the posalbll1 t,. of exper1ence
which lIe 1n the .enslb111t,. and the understand1ng.
In this wal Kant eatablished rationa11sm upon a new

and altogether novel basta.
and emphas1zed the importance

Like L&1bnlz, he st111 belIeved 1n

or

the .! pt1or1, but now it waa an

! 21'101'1 Which could net be sh.own to be more than relatl ve.

Hume'.

argument tor the 8Jnthetlc oharaoter

oausa11ty oonvlnced Kant that the

-

29

-

Akademle, IV J )12.
(

~

or

the princIple

priori baa no inherent

or

so
ab,olut. content

t~oa

Wbich clue.

b.a~lns

on the .uppa-a.natole

oan be obtalne4.It 1, thue Incapable ot a LeIbnlalan Ind.pen-

dent or .etapbJ.lcal proot.

It 1. In.tead

~elatlve

to an

en•• whlch 1. capable ot f1elding onl,. appearanoe..

e~epI

the.!

2Jlior~

1. . . . tr10t17 taotual a. the experi.noe whieh It oondition••
the .isnitle.... and .oop. ot thla eoaolustoD om
ha.J'4l,. be ezagp,.atl" ••• With 1t the _In oon"qu.ne•• o.t
Orltloal teach1ng are 11,,11.'0.lub17 bo.4 up. AI ,~~Elno121e. wh10A l1e at
tbe bul. of our }m'iiil:.~ are 'HGelIo, ih.e-y tii....
• 0 In'Erlii8ti .1.e••11;J', and'OirmY po..... me
'is.oluEe au£hOn_z; "'_Ol'l'DR !! tKhl1iZ !§! 'iii101lall.t••30

Jtan.'.

lot la4uoe4

r...

or intuited In. . . . . . expepienoe, tb.••• 87Jl-

pr1Relpl.. are imposed upon experi.n.. b.J the

tbetio

~ 1~10~~

mind.

Although aao),tlb•• to huaum "a80n,

to b. 1Dherent17 rational 1n the
ot that teN..

th.,.

~atlonali.tlc

a..

oannot be .bo'Nll

ab.olutl.t ••

tb., oan be e.tabll.hed 01117 .s brut. oondltion.,

v.rltiable in tao., though not demonatrabl. In pw-. tbeorr.
are eondltlonl of know1na ..n •• experienoe.

to t h. lmowl.qe ot appearanc.. a.n4

oable In the d.clph.rlng
oont_t t thq

&1'8

or

aN

ultimate

'A.,.

'thus, thq appl;y

neve. lesl 'bla'el, appli-

~eallt7.

Without

1Dbe~ent

valld -17 Wi thin the realm of • ena. experience

Where the oontent 1a .uppll.d b7 the manitold of. xpeJileno••

The,. are o Oll. eq uentl1 \1881... tor t be eon.truetlon of a •• taplQ'aloal tm..o17 ot tb.1ng' 1n Ul....l....

1s extr1n.l0.

-

!helJ'1' nec.aalir, m01'.over,

the,. oan be poatulated onlJ It"

and 80

long a.,

';1

..

the ...urrea•• , aotual or at l.a.t po •• lble, or .enae .xperlen••

i8 a._.04.
thUti tar kat'. dootrine ln the Crttlg:""

J!E.

lV! ba....

u. been p1'e.ente" a. an auwer to the goneNl probl_ ot
'ptmetl0 ! 21'10:.1.

~e

fU Pl'obl_ muat now be 4ellm.1ted to oaua-

11t." Ai.torl.aU, U14 10110&111 the • • t

tbe qntiletl0 .! 21'10ft. alD.e I8J1t"

"'p~iant

exaaple ot

vlrull.atlon ot th. ,1'ln-

el,le 1. ba.e4 upon the .oneep' 01' oateaoP,1 ot oauae, \he lao7.1nth ot the "ft-an•• en4ontal Deduction ot the CatoS01"i.', tt wh....

IaDt ...1. vith tbe obJ.otiy. va1l411, or

~.

tir't b. 'NY'1'••4.31 JIv1ll1 and 'a'o. rill be

oategol'l•• ,
0Ul"

~t

APiatlne.)!

I. !JIB !ftAI'SODDlIftAL DBDVOtIOI OP fBE CADGOltIBS

~ · '....oen4.niat D.ductlon ot the Cat.sorl •• • l ) 1.
31 Jaith, O_entarz, x1lt--xx1v, d.r.D4a Taib.i....""
pai.h-vork theoJ'7 a.ooRIi. 10 "hiGh the "tran•••dental D.duotl••"l •• baat, .~~.'1' ot ..auaol"lpt. wrltte. at v.piou 4at••
throu;bout 1769-1780. • •••• It. oontra410tlona and 1.oon.l.t••'aton ,t..-.17
tb'OJ7. a•• hi. 1. l)eteao. ot .4
a.a.on, 69-90, ... lU .....t'~ NetapbJ.lo !£ !!I!rliicu" I, 01-49\.
32 Bw1q, J~'" ba• •ent .t CaQal.lt{j 40-71, 'atoa,
hD.t'. ",ap)g-.lo..!! SXM.l. . . . . !, Ji;S'7";SIi. Di hi. th.ela,
idSer EiiiTolt." 'IDA . . .ua.a. 01'd8" ot bat" ar. . . .t. a. tound.
1n .1'AeJ' tb. ti•• , .r •••oad .4111GB .t the O..ltlque, ~. 1011oal or4e.. ot the ar.....' ...rglnS f,pam both .ati!ona vll1 b.

01.,.

P"'•.

48D1.. 'A.

.» the "banl••ndental Deduotlcm." tall. uad.... the
dlvl.lon ot \be O.l'll-~ oall84 the ·,.ana••n4ental Anal,,! •• "
The eub-t1tle .flit. 11.1.108 1. "An&17t1. ot aonoeptlo..- 8tR••
lt olal.1 to di •• o.e. aal .ln41.at. the .&11d1t7 ot \h. o.t ••orl•••
It 1. 41.ttnguiahe4 tJt_ the ......17t10 ot ht1noipl•• ,· Whish alaa
to 4a'e1"ll1n. the \18e ot the oatesopl.. 1. Jud.pent. JIoP' vl11
b•••id a'bout the latt.p when the "Se.on4 bale .." le '.e.,.4.

r
perupa

.'

~.

heaPt ot th. Orl,lill.. thia w1l1 be ...a

oleuq 1t one ..e ••ll. that the

GeJ'!JUn

SOH

rat10na11.t. and. the

h&ll.h .p1rlo1••• hat tail.4 to expla1B the ."e'1!7 po•• 1bl1U~,.

ot aoqutl"lnS tI"e.h knowleda' ..o,po••4 to partloul.1" unoonn••te.
exp.rienoe. • I'h1lo.opbJ' •••••el lneapabl. ot &nJthlna othe". tbaa
tONUlating anal,.,!. 3u4pent., vh:lch weI'"

oon.14."..4 nothlns

aOl"8 tban 'autolog1•• , or ot In....nt1118 IIJ'Dth.tlc 3u4• •nt.
which .,•••d unJWltltl.ble.

P.bJ.lo.op!q va. blook_d "7 oontl"a.

41ot;lona at '.'l'J 'tuN . . bad no all.p.. ot a .ethod which
could '1"0.1. . .."•• a po••lbl. ehano. ot pr0sP....

No. .o.".".,

philo.opher. talle. to ,up,l,. a ratlonal Juatltloat1on ot .ueh
fundamental be11.t. .. the eXi.tenoe of a world

~d.pen4.nt

the ln41 vidual con.ciouan.s. 01" t he '1'lnol.1. that every

ot

,117.1••1

ohlm&- au.t hav. • ••ue.. • ..... '. theol'J ot oausaUt,. had. ut'.r17
4.tlat•• all .uOh .""" •• t Justltlea'loa.

argumen' top a d.lt7
That

ap~n'

01'

BYen .erkel,,.,.

.p1rlt va. wlthout 10110al Juatltl.atloa.

al.o p••supp..e4 tbe prinoiple of caueallt7, a

pplnclple prove. b.F .... to b. iDcapabl. ot .e.onstratlon b7
known •• t1\o4.

&Dr

How, . . ., Juatlt;r the tund.am.ental pr•• uppo.l'lcma

ot .01en.e and or41na.J7 lite, Bow sf..e _.e explanation ot 'he
\Ul4oubt •• lac. tba1; we diatlnsutah be tv. en the subjecul "Ie and
the obj •• tlve, b.'veen the .pher. of our teeling_ and lel••• and

the world of Obj ••'"

lD the unl.".r.a1 darkne •• , lant"

otteN4 a albae%' ot hope.

Oritlque

It ola.... 4 to juatlt) in eme .tpoke

the tun....n'al pre.uppo.ltloft&ot .oleno. and OPdiD&P,J lit. aa4

..
'0 41800Ve%-

S)
a 'otall,. new .ethod 1n ph1lo.opAJ I a . .thed. o1*leb.

1t would be poaalble i
pr1nelpl...

ot

0

PJtov. a a,.8te. ot real17 arnthetlc .! Pl'lQlt

thl. . .tbot th. toundation 18 th. tI!pana.endental

])ftdueilon ot the Oat.&O.l.....34-

KNit'. ma1n taak 1. to a:t:aow that a cat.gor,. 11ke that
of o&\1.8e,); which 1. a
u.nct.r8tIU141n~h

tON

of aJl1tlwala belonaing to th.

hal an obje.tlv. value.

nothing .1.e ct....

pUN

l'h1a explain• •xp.~l.nc.J

Pol' 1 t la the n8.8.8.17 expl'e8.10ll otille

unit,. o~ thO\J.8b,16 Ua pela'lon to th. . .n1tolcl ot aen...

Without

the oate.o.,., the lUJ11tolct Gould not 8i ve r1s. to tho oonaolotla-

n••• ot the wo.14 of objeot ••37 Without the .,ntbe.'• • tt....4

l4

Ib..'e,. "MM••nelentalti 1. prbaar1q 0.pl0704 "1
lut to .e. . thokaovleclge ot the aature and condltlon. ot ow:a 2pl0r1 .oPt'lollot obJe.t.. Po...eoond.aJ7 .ean1np ot ~e

te..., ... ' a.itll.

C~.ntm,

14-16.

)$ Aoiual17. the pUl"e oatesol'1 pertalD1na to 0&.&11t7
1. thatot eO\Ul4 .cd o• •efUlillt. When the pupe oat_,,01'7 1.
appl1e4 u.4pe.ir'lol•• 10 t •• orNapcm41ns aoh_, that 01' .......
aar,. suece •• ion, it b •• ome. the schemati••d oate8017 of 0 ..118. an4
ett•• t. lut hat ,.neraU7us.. tM. term tor the .0b_atI••1 ca;e,017 even when he ... rera to the pure oat8gol7. fhua in the
It.etaplQ'.leal Deduotl0.... the oat.gol7 "op1ve4 tl'oa the h7Potile.
tleal t.... ot Judament i . oalle4 b,. antic1patlon, not tbe cate.GI1
ot ground and oonaoqu.nt, 'Out the oat.sOl'J" ot oauae and erre.t.

Kant t a usa,e i* tollolle4 1n the great •• pap, ot th1. theal...

%11

Ohaptep III, the critiqu. ot Kant'. clODtpine ot oau.a1it, oalla
tor- great.r ppe.laioa.. POP aore on thi., se. Paton, Kant' a ••ta-

.!! !!pepl.no.;

II, 41.
.
)6 xut has jut .13.0'" 1n the ",panac.ndental Ae.thetle" that apace and tim., the a tr101'1 toras of. enaibllit,., ape
the nec ••• arr condltiona of InTu lIon and ao are objeotlvel,.
va11d tor appe~anc.s. Bow h. wants to .how that the oategorl.a
are the nee •• aa..,. eODdltlo~tor thlnking the object.
31 "!he object1ft ...a11411;,. ot the categorie. a. a
~Jllol'l oon.epit. Nst. th.ntoN on th. taot tbat •• 0 tap ..-the
&al&

I.

-

by the

.'

eat.go~ie8,

1n other worda,

imPNsslona ot senae .ou14
and uneonne.ted one.

,he consc1ousness to

st". l"1.e

S4
wh1ch

vould be 01117 a .oatterect

There would be a BUIl.an wor14 ot rle.ting,

isolated impression. in whlch the

ao-call~

knower vaa himselt

but a bundle ot per.eption••
But a tl'&n8cen4enta1 deduction ot the oategorle. pre •
••nts a problem whioh va. not present in the deduotion ot the
tOl"ll1. neces.ary tor Intui tion ot ap'pearance..

The foraa of

.pace and t1ll.,a.,1 knt, nece•• arily relate to objects aince,
onl,. throuF them can objects appear to ua in pSl'ceptic>n.

fhe

oat8gov1•• I' howen" j do not reppesent the condltlona ua4er wh1*
,

obJ ••'s ape gl.en 1m 1ntuit1on.

.."p"01.e1,. be.au. the o.t••

aor1.s ha.... _thilll to 40 vi tb an ob j •• " . being g1 ...en, there
leema to be no reUOD vb7 given obj:ec:ta

~ul4

contoN to th_.

Inaninter•• tlng passapltant 01 te. the o•. usal catego17
a8

an examp1••~X:; aignln.. tor him the ."nth••i., wher.o,. upon

.omethins, A."oMtlt1ng quite 41t.t'e.M11t, I, is posited acool'dina
to a rule.

Jow

It1s not manite.t ~ fiIrlort vh1 appearanoe. should
contatn an,rtbinc ort • Hnd (exp4tl'ienoaa camot
be Cited in Ita proof, for what hal to be established
1a the objective .al141t7 ot the c~cept that 1. a
Epiorl hand 1 t 18 there tore a ,ptGP1 4oubt.t'ul whi'thezaueli a coneept be not perhap.-a eogelher -»t7, anel
h8:". no ob j.ot anJ'where amonS appeaz-ance •• )0
tors ot thousht 1. concerned, throush thea alone 40e. e&paz-ienoe
beco.e poaaible." C:r1tltue, I 126 (126). See alao A 97 (1)0).
38 • 90•• 12) (~).

'

r
Kant goes .'on to p01nt out that the J-egularlt7 among appeuance.
1n experience cannot glve rise to the causal concept.
cept must either be grounded coapletel,.

~ pr1o~1

the con-

1n the under-

standing, or must be entirel,. given up as a phantom of the brain.
To thesynthe.is ot oau.e and ef1"eet there belongs a
d1pl t7 whlch cannot be emp1rIcal17 expressed. namel,.,
that the .treet not on17 aucce.cts upon the cau•• , bj~
that 1t is posited throuse 1t and arl.es ~£! It.
Kant here talls back on hls Buaean presupposition that the un!versalit7 and necea.1t7 vhlch characterize the
can In

DO

~

prlori concepts

va,. be explained b,. recourse to experience.40 "The

unfolding ot the experience wherein the,. are encountered 1. not
their deductlon; It la cm17 their illiiatratlon. n41
Locke and . . . . cont1nue. Kant, ta11e4to appreclate
thia to the tull.

Com1ng

Up01'1

pure concepta 01" the understandlna

In .xperlence, the tormer deduced the. trom the experlence In
whlch he tound the..

fiuwougb. the., he tb.en 111081oal17 trtedto

uri ve at knowledge whIch taJ- tranlc_nded experience.

Kuae.

agaln, did not reallze that the underatandlna Itselt m1sht b7
means ot the.e oon.ept. be the a uliheJ- of the experienoe In whiob
obje.ts were pre.ente. to 1t. !hus he derlved the concepta tPQR
exper1ence, l.e., fro. a eubjecti"e necesllt7 born ot habit. anel

-------

)9 01'1t1su., A 91-. 124 (125). Ita11c8 In the orlginal

40 1Jp1cal stat..ents of this presuppo.llilon are, "All
necesalt,., wl~out exceptlon, 1. srounded In a tranecendental
condltlO1'l.tt .l 106 (US). "The oonoept ot a caUBe 1Dvolve. the
character or nece •• lt" which no experlence can 71e14." A 112 (1)

)~

r
,6
declar.d tliem. total17 confIned to e,xperI.no..
deatrQ1.d the

A 21"101"1

Like Locke, aUDle
th.~ebl

nature of the concepts,

contra-

-

dicting what was for Kant the 1ndisputable pr•• ence of the a'

,21"101'1 in pur-a mathemat10s and general ph7alca.
To Bum.e" who had spoken ot the succession of

rep~esen

tat1on. a8 the only datum In our consciousness of causalit"

Kant

tries to .how in the "transc.ndental Deduct10n ot the Categori •• "

that, 1) mowleds_ 01 aucces810n 1Dlplie••elf-identity; 2) kl'l9wledge ot auoe ••• lon tapll •• knowledge also of objects; 3) s.lfIdentit,y and knowl.... of Objects lik.wi.e impl1 one anotherj

4) un!. t7 1n both dependa on necessa.PT lava of oonnectlonJ and;)
thea. law. are therefore the Ind1apenaable oondltiona tow 111oh,

all ob jete:i.or ,experl.nce mua t cont_••
4.41sousalon of these varloQPo1nta-·th. fou.th and.
f1fth will lea4 .1nto the "Second AM.IQ&T"' vliflre tbelv1ll,.~
,

!

:,'

,

.....

:

.

full, d.velopM...it111 bJtlng out Katl\'apoal tlon regarains
"

• '"

'.

,

objectlve yal141t7 of the cauaal

:'1";';'

'(., j ;

concu~P.
,'-;

,

.~he

and the universa11tr

and neoo •• l " of the eaual p:rlnolple •.
Awoen... of a manifold In t11l10 18 bnt I a pr1ma17 dat_
'

ltant reallz•• emat no one ean

exlsts.

J

.'

,

.81"101311 doubt whether sOIIleth1:as

the very doubt 1s something.

Por .lant. too. there is

undoubtedl,.' sucoe.sion in our cognitive exper1enoe. 42 But aU.•• ea,

,

,

,

'

42, Iaplled here 18 the lfumean atomio tneol7 of p.~.p
tion aa oppo•• 4 to Gestalt pa7cholog or the soholastic tbeoJ'7
ot forma.

,

r
S1
slon impl!es plurality, a manifold intlme. 43

Consciousness ot

succession, then, means cansciouanesa of a manlfold in tlme.
)low we cannot be consclous ot a manifold 1n time a.

such unless we combine and unlty in thought the .uccessl ve contents ot conscious. .a •• 44
neceasa17. 4S

por this a thPe.told. synthesis 1.

Pirst, trun~. is the syntheSis ot apPl"ehenaion In

It deals With the pure

intuit1on.

or~

2rlor1 manifold round 1n

individual apace. andt 1me., 1.e., given.!!!!, weaN conscloua

-

ot abe together. !hen there is tn. 8Tf11;heala ot l"8prQduetlon 1n
.

imagination.

It erteeta the pure synthesi. of the slv.n mal¢told

-

'or we oould not be conaclous ot abo together ltb1 the time we

-

-

reached b, we tor got a.

ones.

lIaoh peroceptlon _U8t ...eoall the pl"eced111 t
'"
Bence the need for thi. second .7Jlthe.la. the thlJ'd a1D-

theai8 i. the ..,ntheaia ot recognition in a oancept.

In It,

t~

under8tandingbJ.1lings the synthesized manifold undeJ.1l a conoept1on,

43 !he p ••ol.e meaning ot -manifold in time" 18 a d1tfioult question. Doe. 1t involve consoiousness only of physioal
objeots or alao the eoncoaitant oone.louane •• ot a eltt 01" 1. it.
1n keeping with IAntt. peppesentationalist (medium ~aod)POsltion
inherited trom Deeean.e, conaoiouaa••• at a ii@I:to
of per••ptions aUGe.e41ns each ether 1n t1me' This l . . . .':yte. 1. suppor'.d bl Ewing .. the view upheld -b7 general conalderation both .f
the text ot the tJllanseerulental d.duc tl on 'And ot the main prin- ,
<sipl •• of the
4
5.,

44
4$

oritioal phil.oaoplq." ..antta Treatment

·

. _.,

-or

Cauaal1tl

-

Oriti9,\\f, A 97 (llO). ,
'
499-10) (lll-3). fillsa.ction oonstituteathe
chlet part ot the "aubjective deduction" Which waa emitted .a non~
.a.ential in the a.cond edition. The subJeotive deduction seek.t~
detel'lUlne the subjective oonditions lIh10h are neo.asarJ to make
knowledge po.sible. It i8 to 'be aoted 'that there are not three
Ivntheses
here
taklng .~.
nlace at difterent times, but one quthesi.
~~\:
."
..... '1 A...

r
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by

means or Its pure or !. prior1 conceptions, the oategorie••

It would be usele.s to r.member,!, #Of we were not oonSOiOU8

1t belonged to the

SaJ'fte

process a.

B..~o

go on oountinlh we Jl'U.$t

be aware that the various un1ts belong to a

'Ibis

etc _

~t

11~sl8

proo.s., abo4.

is ettectedb,.tha,third synth.a18. wi tb., the oategorle.

serving aa the principle. ot unity_

~I

\hreetold

sJnth~lls

showa how,all oognition, even it thlll opject ot oognition be a
plurall.,ll1!o.l••• con.ciollaneaa of, _related d1vers,ltT(Wli,t7

Ir1 the next atep, lant sbo"s. how, to .be oonsc10ua or

artathin, u oon.atltutH. by a relat$.M.of d1vers. el••enia.,we
muat be eonlcrlout-, ,ot
,

theaeel_ntl.s~ t.d.

.in~#i

.,U-1dentlfled co.olouanes ••

j

be

i~

a

,

','

•

i.8.,.

thq-..1i

The tb;ol,lght that th,e representa$i(ma given in, intui.
tion one and all belong to me" 1s therefore equivalent
to the.t hougbt that I unite them,.in one .elf-consciouan •••• ~ can at least so unite them, and although this
thou;ht1~ 110t Itself the con.cioUlln•• a ot the IHthe.lla
otth. l'epre,8ntatlons, 1t presupposes the po.srItE,.
ot tbat. .•ptht 81a. In ot.b.er lfo1"4., on17 in 80 far as
I oan gl'aaJ> ~ man:11'old 01' tb,eiJ.epr8.ent.tIons 1n one

con.o1.ousne •• , do I call them on. and all mine. Po~
othe",1 •• Iahould bav. as many-colored anT"arver.e a
lelt ••'Illav. ~".entation. ot which I am conscious
to.,.elt.~ ,
,

'

fhi. unitT an4.1alt-14entlty addat, .the.• flua ot repX'esentat1ona

is call~4 by Kant

the

t~oend.n'al unitT ot apperception.

It

1, to be noted tha.t th1. 18 not theempiX'leal conaolouan•• s

nor-

-

46 Orlt!g.ue,

B 114 (lS4). ItalIc. in the original.

.' ego.
the noumenal

59
It is the purely.! E:rioz:i logical f orm of the

unity of the ego which 1. required for the unitY' of experlence.41
Thus tar, lant bas proved his first point, namely,
that knowledge of succession implies selt-identl:tY'. or the
transcend,ental upity ot apperception.
tioned an object ot knowledge.

He has not as yet men-

Th.ts 1sthe ,second maIn point ot

the "Transcendental De4uctionn and introduces the 80-called
objedtive deduction. 48
We have •• en how knowledge ot JUGcelsion involves
knowledge of a related diversity_

Bow this knowledge of a

related diversity has the note of necessity.

For example, the

dIfferent :representations of the ehanglng posit1ons of a ship
tloating downstream follow a definite and necessary sequence.
The

representa~lon

that of pos1tion A.

ot position a lower down the.stream follows
Bow an object, or the objective, i8 pre-

ci8ely that whioh compel. us to think about it in a certain way.
The Object 18 viewed as that which prevent. our
mode. of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary.

47 B 133 (153), -Pol' the empirical consclouane •• ,
which accompanies difterent representationa, i. in its.lf divep••
and without relation to the identity of the subject." By the
transoendental unity of apperception, agaln, 1s meant, not that I
merely accamPanJ each representation with consciousne.s. but that
It I conjOin one repre ••nta1don with another. and am oonscious of
the 8rnlbes18 ot tbaa." Italios 1n the original.
"Apper<)eptiontt 18 a term 'borrowed tJtoa Le1bn1z Who used
it to designate consc1ousnes. ot objeots and oono01ll1tant seltconsciousness.
48 unlike the subjective d.du~tlon, the objective .
deduction deal. with objeotive va11dity, not with psycholosical

60

and which determines them ~ triOri in same definite
fa.ahion. For in so far as t e'1 are to relate to an
object, the'1 must nec.a.arily agree with one another,
that is, must posaesa that unity which constitutes
the cone.pt ot an object.49
Kant has thua proved his second point, that knowledge of succes.
aion implies knowledge allo of objects.
But if knowledse of objecta carries with it an element

ot neceaaltJ, then there muat be some tranacendental condition to
explain it.

For "all neoeasity, without exoeption, il grounded

in a tr. .acendental cond1tion.">O

This brings Kant to the proof

of the firat halt ot the third major point of the "Tranacendental
Deduction", knowledge of objects implies aelt-identity.

For the

transcendental condition ot knowledge ot objects 1s none other
than aelt-identitJ 'or transcendental unltJ at apperception.>l
~owl.dge

oonslata in the determinate relation at
given representations to an object; and an ObJect
1a that 1n the concept '. of which the manitold o? a
given intuition ia united. Now all unitication at
repreaentationa daman!s UnitJ ot conscIousness 1n
the aJntheais at them. ConsequentlJ it i8 the
unity at consoloulness that alone conatitutes the
relation of repre.entationa to an obJeot, and theretore their objective validity and the tact that theY'

49

A

>0

A

104-105 (134-135).
106 (US).

51 WhY' not some other transcendental condition? Kant
would probably replr that, a8 was shown in the first main part
ot the deduction, aelt-identitY' is the transoendental condition
whereby the manitold i. not only syntheaized through categories
but is alao reoognized aa part of one and the same .consciouaness.
In a fleeting, atomic,conacieu.nesa, th.~e would be no relating
of the manifold in time--and 80 no knowledge of objects.

61
are modes of knowledge. 52
But just as knowledge of objects implies self-identity,
so vice versa self-identity implies knowledge of Objects.

For

self-identity i8 possible only because it is conscious of accompanying given representations and, more importantly, of synthesizing the manifold through the categories for one and the same
consciousness.

"For this unity of oonsciousness wouldbe impos.

sible it the mind in knowledge of the manitold oould not become
conscious ot the identity ot the function Whereby it synthetlcall
combines it in one knowledge."53

ot

itself, selt-identity (like

the forma and categorles) is an empty and purely formal trans.
cendental condition. 54 When, then, there exlsts selt-identity.
there must also exist the synthesis ot a manifold through the
categorie ••

,

But as was. hown in the first and second points of

the deduction, synthe.is of a manifold through the categories
involves consciousness of objects.

Selt-identity thus im,lies

knowledge of objects.
The fourth main point ot the deduction, namely, that th
52 B 137 (156). Itallcs in the original. Kant.s
position in the tirst edit10n 1s not as olear. In A 104 (134) he
se.ms to say that the objective in experience is determined by
the non-empirical objeot. Then in A 106-7 (135-6) he argues that
the transoendental unity ot apperoeption acoounts for the necessity involved in objectiv1ty. In A 109 (137) he more or less
unites the two pos1t1ons.
53 A 108 (1)6).
54 Thus 1n a later passage Kant speaks of it as "thing
that thinks," "a transcendental subjeot-X." A 345-B 40) (331).
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unity involved in both our knowledge of objects and in selfidentity depends on necesBarr laws of connection, follows
the

p~eceding

three and directly brings up causality.

laws of combination or

neoessa~

f~o.m

Por of the

connection, causality is the

most imporlant. Of the seve~al lines of approach possible in tht.
section SS we shall conoentrate on the argument which i. introduced in the secondedltion of the "Transcendental Deductlon"S6
and developed in the "Seoond Analogy."
The point of the argument Is that all jUdgment57 and
cognition imply a distinotion between the objective and t he subjective.

Kant suggests that this objeotivity implied in judsaent

would be impossible without principles of

neoes.a~

connection.

Thhs in the judgment "bodles are heaVT," we do not assert, says
Kant, that t hat the representations of "body" and "heavt" necesaarily belong to one another in the empirical intuition.

55

Ew1ng, Kant's Treatment

~

Causality,

53,

We

gives

thre~.

56 B 141-2 (158-9).

57 In this passage Kant defines judgment aa "the
manner in which given modes of knowledge are brougnt to the
objective unity of apperoeption." The copula .erves the purpose
of distinguishing between objective and subjeotive unity. Be
defines objective unity aa "the unity througn which all the
manifold given in an intuit10n 1s united 1n a concept of the
object." It must be distinguished from the subjective unity
"through which the manifold of intuition for such (objectivel
Oombination 1s empirically given." B 139 (157).

63
assert that they belong to one another

tt..!!!

virtue

!:.!.

~

neces-

!!£l unltl of apperception In the synthesis of intuitions, that
is, aooording to principles of the objeotive determination of
all representationa."58
Thus to 8a1 "The body ia heavy" is not merely to
state that the two representations have always been
conjoined in mJ perception, however often that perception i8 repeated, what we are asserting is that
they are combined in the ObJ~ot, no mateer what the
state of the subject mar Se. 9
This remark indicates that objectlvity implies necessary determination in the knower's experience Independentl,. of t he rep•• sentationa of the manifold, which are merel,. the knower's aubjective states.

Since It foreshadows the "Second An'logJ" the tinal.

proof of the fourth maln point of the deduction must walt W'ltll
the treatment ot the "Seoond Analogy."
The same is true of the flfth main point: the necessary laws ot connection are the indispensable conditions to which
all objects of experlence must conform.

But the direction that

Kant's proof will take in the "Second Analogy" can now b. pointed
out fram the following passage in the "Transcendental Deduction
of the Categories."
The order and regularity in the appearanoes which
we entitle nature we ouraelve. introduce. W. could
never find the. in appearances, had not we ourselve.,
or the nature of our mind, originally set .them there.

Treatment

S8

!!

B 142 (1$9). ItaliCS in the original.
Causalitl, 54, sa1S this refers to the

s.

64

.

For this unity of nature has to be a necessary one,
that Is, has to be an a priori certain unity of the
connection of appearanoes; ana such synthetic unity
could not be established a priori if there were not
subjeotive grounds of sucn unIty contained a priori
in the original cognitive powers of our mina, and It
these subjective conditions, inasmuch as they are
the grounds ot the possibility of knowing any object
Whatsoever in expe enoe, were not at the same time
objectively valid.

60

Kant's an8wer in the ·Second Analog" to Hume's challenge ot
causalIty will be tounded precisely on this indispensable
objectlvating role of the mind in its consciousness of objects.
The vindication ot the categories in the "Transcendental Deduction ot the Categori.s" can now be summarized.

Starting

from the fact that we perceive a succeeding sensible manifold,
we find that the thought of objects involves a synthesis ot the
mAnitold according to neces8arr prinCiples, t he categories.

To

deny, theretore, that the manifol. i8 so connected b.1 the categori.s is implicitly to deny the tact that we apprehend objects.
Either accept the onlJ POIslble6l explanatIon ot the taot or

-Aut 4.e&ar -aut ......nullul. We oan also start from the

deny the tact.

;;.;;;;.,;;;.;;,;;.

equally obvioua tact that we must be aware ot our own identity
throughout our apprehension ot the sensible manifold.

Here again

is involved a combination ot: the manitold according to the
categories.
60

B

Kant

b.1Ie~.s

A 125 (147).

166-1 (173-4).

that he

h~s

now established the exil.

Italics in the original.

See also

61 That Kant's 1s the on17 poscib1e solution is ot
Course dIsputable.

r
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tenoe and ~bjeotive validity of the categories. 62
C. THE SECOND ANALOGY

We have dealt with the "Transcendental Deduct10n ot the
Categories" at length because it is the basis ot the "Second

Anal~gr."63

This latter section tram the viewpoint of logic i.

as interesting and important as the seotion just discussed.
Historically. it ia even more ao.

For it i. Kant's answer to

Hume's denial ot the objective validity ot the causal principle.
Hume had maintained that we can never be conscious of anything
but mere succesaion; Kant hopes to prove in the "Second Analogr"
that consciouanesa ot auccession is only possible through consciouanesl ot a nece.aity that determines the order ot the

62 Se. A 128 (149).
63 In it. clear.at meaning the term "ana18SJ" •• ems to
mean the tollowing tor Kant. We have in the law ot cauaality
something in experience which, though not identioal, i8 parallel
with the logical relation of ground-consequent in the hTpothetlca
judgment of tormal logic. Thus the connectlon ot reason and
conaequent in the pure h7pothe~lcal judgment, when applied to
auc~eaaive events or change., appeara a8 their nece.sary •• quence.
See A 181-B 224 (212). ' Paton note.: "Kant is not arguing tbat
because we must be able to judge any object under the torm tit A,
then B,- there tore every object must be goveraad by the law ot
cau.e and ettect. (Such an argument would be manitestly invalid
8ince the hypothetidal form of judgment involves no reference
to time.) on the contra17, the hypothetlcs.l t orm or judgment 1.
for him an empty rorm awaiting an object; and what we now have to
prove 18 that all objects given to us under the forms or space
and t1me must have a charaote~i8tic whioh enables them to be
judged by the hypothetIcal form of judgment. That cha~acterlatic
1s necessary successIon, and the proof of necessary succession
must be a proof independent of the form of judgment." Kant'. Meta
8ic of E erienoe II 223.··
-

r
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succesaive events.
The importance of the "Second Analog" may be the reaso
whr Kant has so multiplled the prool's. He glves no less than
slx separate arguments. 64 It seems best, given the limits of
the present studT, to take up the central argument which Kant
gives In the proofs.

In the spirit of Paton, an attempt wl11 be

here made to present the Kantian argument in as favorable and
consistent a llght as posslble.

Inesoapable proble.s, 800ted

interpretationa, presuppositions, alleged een:ttradiotions, it
mentioned at all, will tor the most -part be relegated to tne
tootnotes.

From these the more important objections wll1 later

be resU1?rected and added to other diffioulties in Chapter III.
patonts comment should be kept in mind throughout the followlng
pages,
Untortunately there is a real diffioultr In understanding some of Kant's statements and a stlll
greater d1ttloult7 in understanding the relatlon ot
bis statements to one another. To un87l1'1pathetI0
oritl0. It mar easily .e .. that he 18 one ot those
ph110sopher. who conceal the weaknes8 ot their argument under a alOUd of word.. I be11eve, on the contrar,r. that hi. obscUDity i8 due to the tact that he
1s 8truggling with new and difficult thought.. I
believe also that, even it he is in error, there ls
.mueh in his view that 1s worthy ot se.ious consideration. 65
64 The arguments are, 1) B 232-4 (217-19); 2) A 189-19 ,
B 234-239 (219-222), 3) A 194-5, B 239-240 (222-), 4) A 196-9,
B 241-4 (22)-$), $) A 199-281, B 244-46 (225-6), and 6) A 201-2 1
B 246-7 (226-7). Paton, Kant's Metap~.io ot ~erienoe, II, 224
believes that the arguments Involve a evelo-pm.n: of Iaeas, whatever m&1 be thelr dates ot composition.
65

laton, ibid •• II. 222.
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The starting point of Kant 'a analysis is our consciousness of an objective order in time. 66

When we apprehend any ver.y

large object, such as a house, though we do so by successively
perceiving the difterent parts of it, we never think of regarding
theae successive perceptIons as representing anything successive
in the houae.

On the other h@nd, when we apprehend successive

events in time, such as the successive positions of a ship
sailing downatream, we do regard the succession of our perception
as repreeenting objective auceession in what is apprehended. 61
Kant use. these illustrations to make olear the fairly obvious
tact that while in oertain easea the order of our perceptions i.
aubjectively initiated, in other cases we apprehend the subjectiv

66 A 189-194, B 234-239 (219-222).
61 Paton, Kant·s Metap~sic of Experience, II, 239,

regards this as a crucIal statemin: on tne part of Kant, one
which it is "absolutely vItal not to miaunderstand • • • Kant is
not arguing from the observed irreversibility of M7 senseperceptions to an objective succession. He is on the oontrary
arguing trom an a •• wned objective succession to t he irreversibilit7 of M7 sense perceptions. Be is not aaling that I find I
cannot reverse the order of my sense-perceptiona, and then conclu
that I must be dealing wIth an objective auceeslion • • • Kant
starts with the assumptIon that we are aware of an objective
auccession and asserts that, if so, our aense-perceptlons must
occur in a partloular order." See alao ibid. 239, note 3:-wr-am
not denying that on Kant's vIew the irreViriibility of our .enaeperoeptions may entitle U8 to aasert objt ctive succession, if we
already aSlume that we are percei.ing objects whose atates must
be either successive or coexistent. I de!l'1 o!:lly that such an
observed irreversibilit7 can by itself give us necessity." Italic
In the original. Prichard, however, disagree. and argues that
Kant is prooe.dinf trom awareness of the subjective to knowledge
of the objective. This 1s the central matter on which my interpretation d1ffers conSistently trom Prof's.or Prichard's penetraIt
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order of oUr perceptions as corresponding to, and explioable
only through, the objective sequence of events.

Consequently,

Kant feels justified in taking as fact that we can distinguish
between subjeotive and objective succession, i.e., between
sequences which imagination can contro168 and sequences which
are given independently of us.

This fact affords a precise

manner of formulating the problem of the "Second Analogy": how
is consciousness of objective change, as distinguished from
subjective succession, possible'
Formuaated thus, the problem demands careful definition
of the ter.. "objective."
[~

is a question for deeper inquiry what the word
"object" ought to signlfJ in respect of appearances
when these are viewed not in so far as they are
(as representations) objects, but only in so far as
they stand for an object. 6 9

To apply the illustration mentioned on the preceding page, the
house as apprehended i. not a thing In itself but only an appaarance for the mlnd.

What, then, do we mean by the house, as dis-

tinguished traM our subjective representations of it, when that
house ia nothing but a complex of representationsf 70

The questi

68 See. 201 (226).
69 A 190-5 235 (219).
70 A 191-B 236 (220). In a ve~ subjectivist line,
8eems to equate that whioh appears in consciousness with the act
being oonacious of it, "The appearances, IDso far as they are
objects of consciouanesa simply in virtue of being representation ,
are not in &n1 way distinct fromtheir apprehen.ion." A 190-B 235
(219). Prichard, of course, inolude. the passage in his attaok 0

r
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..

and Kant's answer to it are stated in the subjeotivist fashion.
To eontraat an objeot with the representations through which we
apprehend it is posaible only if thes. representations stand unciel
a rule whioh neoessitates their oombination in some one partioular way and

80

distinguishes this particular mode of representa-

tions from all others as the only true mode. 71
Kant means that objects and objeotive succession, being
in space and time, are as much in oonsoiousness as are subjective
states like feellngs and representations. 72

Both are alike

objeots of consoiousness, using the term "objects" in the moat
general sense as anything present to our oonsoiouaness. 73

The

diffioulty i4 that if all objeots alike are in consciousness, how
do we distinguish--that we do distinguish is a fact--the a equence
of our subjeotive feelings from the sequence of real events,

The

old distinction, that subjective sequenoes are in the mind, and
objeotive sequences are outside the mind, does not hold.

The

origin, therefore, of our distinotion between the subjectively
and the objectively successive must be due in the one case to the

Kant's subjectivism. Se. Chapter III of this thesis. But may
there be a groping for a representationalist version of the verbum
here, Or is Kant trping to say what scholastic philosophers mean
when they say: senaibile In actu est sensus in aotuJ 1ntelligibll.
in actu est intellectus in aotu1

71 A 191-B 236 (220).
72 See A 197-B 242 (224).
73 See page B7 of this thesis.
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presence ot a :rule compelling us to combine the events in some
particular order, and in the other to the absence ot such a rule.
The mind, far from s imply

analy~ng

what 1s already given in our

knowledge of objects, as rationalists claimed, must make that
knowledge ofobjedts possible. Application of a rule is the
method.

Apart from such a rule we would never distinguish

objective trom subjective sequences at all.

At most, we would

hav. a play of representations which came and go.74 We would
have no knowledge of objects as connected in ttme.
Our apprehension of the house, for example, may proceed
in any order, from the roof downward or vice versa.

Since the

order may always be reversed, the mind is not compelled to regard
the order ot its apprehension as representing objeotive sequence.
In our apprehension ot an event B in time, however, the representation of B tollows upon the representation ot a previous event,
A.

We oannot reverse the order.

The mind is compelled to view

the order of Bucce •• ion as necessitates, and therefore as objective. 75
But is there not here merely a necessary order of
representations?

74 A

No, for not only would that be a contradiction

26a

-a 247 (227).

75 Paton considers the proposition that objective
suocession must be n~cess,ry succession as "the inner core of
Kant's argument." Kant's Metalhzsie ~ Experience, II, 273.
See also ibid., 292.

-
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for Kant (the purely subjective would be obJective because
objectivity, Kant has just shown, implies necessity), but also
it was shown above that representations following a definite
order stand under a rule which distInguishes this particular
mode of representations from all others as the only true mode.
In other words, Since events A and B are only appearances to

USI,

the, are in this case identical wi th the representations of A and

B.76 Such an identification would, of coul'se, be impossible if
A and B

considered things in themselves.
admits thia. 77
we~e

Kant readil,

Kant' s a.rgurilent hfire, it should be noted, bears a
resemblancf:"l to an argument alrea.dy seen in the discullsion of the
"Transcendental Deduction. tt78 There he asserted that when we
have knowledge ot an object, r.ece88ity i8 always impli.d.
object is

r.ga~ded

The

as that which prevents our cognitions from

being arbitrary or which imposes upon our cognitions a necessary
synthetio unity.

He then argued that we are concerned only with

our own representations and that the concept of the object is
simpl, the concept of the necessary synthetic unity of representations, a unity which has for its necessary transcendental
condition the transcendental unity of apperception acting througb

76 "The succession or perceptiona and the succession or
events are in this case not two successiona, but only one. I can
se. no other way or interpreting the argument." Paton, Kant's
MetaeAT-ie £f Experience. II, 264. Priohard disagrees. See db. II •
17 A 190-B 235 (220) •
.,A

lit

,
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the catego;les. 79
Kant would have us believe,then, that the order of
B is a necessary

o~der

A

an

not in the sense that A must always pre-

cede B, or that A 1. the cause ot B, but that the order,it we are
to apprehend It correctly, must in this particular case be conoeived as necessary.SO

In other words, the sucoession need not

be conceived as a causal one, out in order to be conceived as
objective succession it must be conceived as rAndered necessary
by connections that are causal. 8l

79 "In so tar as they [our representatlona] are to
relate to an object, they must necessarily agree with one another
that is, must posse •• that unity which con.titute. the concept of
an object." A 105 (134). See Paton, Kant's Netaphysic .2!.Experi-

~,

II, 265.

80 WhJ necessarf' "Such thinking may at course be
tob.cure'; perhaps we snou d say that we ~consciously or unconsciously) 'assume' or 'presuppose' B nece~sarily tollows A."
Paton, ibid., 228, note 5. Paton obviously is proposing a solution he-nImSelt does not accept. For him, no doubt, B nece.aaril
follows A because apart from our consciousness of it, it simply
does not exist (for ua). In other words, Kant is conceraed with
th$ conditions of experiencing events. This, as will be brougnt
out in the text, involve. one common homogeneous time. This ttme
ia continuous and irreversible. Now we could not, says L\&nt,
experience events in such a tIme unless appearancos conformed to
necessary succession. See A 199-200, B 244-245.
81 Though the example presents a difficulty for the
Kantian categor,r ot causality. we can illustrate the above statement as follows. One event, the lighting of a Cigarette, 1s followed b7 c other, a peal ot t nunder. Now through exp eri.nce we
learn that the first event is not the CQuse of the .econd. Yet
we know that the sequence is objective. That can be the only
reason for its irreversi.I11ty (this 1s Patonts view, i.e.,
irreversibility ~r~sume8 objectivity; Priohard's is: irreversIbility eroves ob actIvity. Depending on which view is taken, Kant
beoomes a pHenomenalist or a subjectivist). Being objective, it

r
73

.

Having in this general fashion shown the bearing of

Kantfs analysis of objective experience upon the problem in hand,
we can proceed to deyelop from it his proof of the principle of
causality: all alterations take place in conformity with the law
of the connection of cauae and effect.

The schema of causality

is necessary succession in 'time, and it is through thiS, its time
aspect, that Kant approaches the princiPle. 82
is, on Kant's principles, necessary. As
be due to the schematized category which
necessary sucoesslon, aamelY,oausality.
the peculiar nature of Kantian oausality

ae

Will show that

such, its necessity must
deals with objeotive and
More will be said about
in Chapter III.

82 Se. A 199-201, B 244-246 (225-226). ~Kant'. doctrine of time forma a strand Which runa througn his whole discussion • • • but it finds its clearest • • • and its most difficult,expression in the special argument which deals with the
oontinuity and irreyersibility of time." Paton, Kant's Metaill'gsic of !!perienoe, II, 273.
--- -The roIe of time in Kantts dootrine of oausality is
briefly as tollows. Our perception of suooession must become a
conception of sucoession beoause one without the other is no
knowledge at all. Row the pure conceptions or oategories ot the
understanding are entirely heterogeneous to empirical intuitions.
But in all subsumptions of an object under a conception, the peroeption ot the object must be homogeneous with the conception,
In order, then, that the oategories can be applied to perceptions
there must exist a third and mediating factor, homogeneous with
both. (The phantasm presents a not altogether dissimilar
problem for the Thomistic theor1 of ideation. Ita clasalc solution is the agent intellect). This homogeneous factor i8 the
aohema, a generalized form of temporal existence. Time, aa a
torm a Erlor!, is homogeneous with the a Erlorl categories of tn.
understanarng. As a form ~ senSibility, Ii Is homogeneous with
the appearance. in sense lnasmuch as every empirical intuition
occurs in time and lasts throughout time. Consequently, a
category of the understanding 11ke cause can be applied to appear
ance. through one of the.e transcendental functions or qualifications of time called sohemata. The particular schema involved
in oausality is that of necessary succession.

r
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a necessart ti.e-order in the appearances Is the condition ot
a necessary rule ot apprehension. 83
To be conscious or change, says Kant, we must be
conscious or an event, that 18, or something as happening at a
partIcular point In tIme. 84 The change, in other words, must be
dated.

It cannot be dated by rererence to time In general (time

Eer !!) sInce we are not conscIous or time in general. 85 Time 1.
not sa.ething that can be observed but a torm that comes into
knowledge only In relation to known objects.

The change, then,

83 Paton, Kant's MetaFbl.ic or ~erience, II, 238,
admits the ambiguity 01 ihi pErase ficonO[t~ of a rule." Be
thInks it means the transcendental schema. "It Is • • • the
transcendental -Oke. . ot relatIon [necessary successIon Is the
schema ot relatIon tor causality] which Kant must show to be
present in o~ect., it he is to prove the truth ot the AnalogIes.
Indeed, he haa to show that an object exists as an object only
so tar a8 there are present in it the transcendental schemata."
It is per.naps tor this realon that EwIng, Kant's Treatment ot
causalitS' 61, belIeve. Kant proved unlversall£y and necesslTy,
not or t e category, but or the transcendental schema or nec.ssarr succesalon.

84 For Kant an object may be laId to exIst and so to
be a real or actual object only It it has a determinate position
In one common .aBogeneous time (and space). The same doctrIne
applies to the case ot change, or successIon, in the object. It
a succession is Objecti __ , tn.n tn. changes must have a determinate position in one common homogeneous time (and space). See
Paton, ibid., II, 273 •

...........

85 B 234 (219).
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must be dated by rererence to other events.

In this case the

events are preceding ones,86 in contrast to which the event in
question is apprehended as change.

But according to the resulta

of our analysis of what constltutes objective experience, the
event can be rlxed in its position in objectlve time only if it
be conceived as related to the preceding e vents according to a
necessary law. 87

And the law of necessary oonnection in time i.

the law of causality.

In order, then, that something which haa

ta.ken place may be apprehended as having occurred, that is, as
being an objective chan.. , it must be apprehended aa necea.arilT
follOWing upon that which precedes it in time.

And since neces-

sary sucoession in time is the schema of causality, the objeotive
change--any objective ohange88 •• involves causality. All alterationa, then, take place in confor.mity with the law or the connec-

86 That there must be precedlng events Is insisted
upon by lant. For othe.rwise there would be an empty time. But
"an event which should follow upon an empty time, that is, a
coming to be preceded by no atate of things, Is as little capable
of being apprehended as empty time itself. Every apprehension
of an event Is therefore a perception that follows upon another
perception. n A 192-13 237 (221).

87 A 193-B 238 (222).
88 Kant proves the universality and necessity of the

causal principle in his system precisely because he limits himself to appearances, 1 ••• , objects which can exist for us in
consciousnesa only it our mental forms have been applied to them.
All objective sequences, then, must be causally connected because
WIthout the causal category they-srmply would not be objective
aequeneea.
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tion of cause and effect.
Experience itself--in other words, empirical knowledge
of appearances--is thus possible only in so far as we
subject the succession of appee.rances, and therefore
all alteration, to the law of causality, and, as likewise follows, the appearances, as objects of experience'8
are themselves possible only in confommity with the law. 9
The prinoiple of oausality thus oonditions consciousne.
of Objective succession. No~an Kemp Smith points out 90 that
Hume, in asserting that we are conscious of the succession of
events, had admitted all that Kant needed to prove the principle
of causality a8 he interpreted it.

Kant's contention is that the

apprehension at change as change, i.e., a succession of eventl,
presupposes, and is possible only through, an application of the
category ot causality.

The principle of causality is thus appll

cable to everything experienced, for the sufficient reason that
experience is itself possible only in terms of it. 9l This conclusion finds ita most emphatic and adequate statement in the
passage of the Critique entitled "Methodology",
Through concepts of understanding, pure reason does,
indeed, establish secure principles, not however
directly from concepts alone, but alwa~s only indirectly through relation of these conoepts to something
altogether contingent, namely, possible expertence.
When such experience ,that 1s, sometHIng as oBject

89 B 234 (2+9).

90

CommentaEl, )69-371.

91 Kant's proof of the principle of causality is thus
a particular proof for the fourth and f1tth main points of the
"Transcendental Deduction." See pages'I-,f.
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o~ possible experienoes) is presupposed, these
principles are apodeictieally certain; but in
themselveB, direotly, they can never be known a
friori. Thus no one can acquire insight into he proposition that everything which happens
has a cause, merely trom the concepts involved.
It is not, theretore, a dogma. although trom
another pOint ot view, namely, trom that of the
Bole field of its possible employment, that is,
experience, it can be proved with complete apodeictic certainty. But though it needs proof, it
should be entitled a principle, not a theorem,
because it has the peouliar oharacter that It
makes pos.ible the very experienee which is its
own ground o~ proot, and that in th1S9~xperienee
it must always itselt be presupposed.

Summarizing Kant's central argument for the objective
validity, and hence the universality and necessity, ot the prinCiple of causality, we see that it deals with the connection
between objectivity and necessity.

Kant starts with consciousnes

of objective sequence in time, a point which he

l~d

already

established in the "Transcendental Deduction" and which he
proved independently, but with special reference to causality,
in the "Second Analosr."

He then asks how can we be oonscious

of suoh sequenoe and distinguish it from the merely subjective
sequence of our perceptions. The distinction cannot lie in the
actual order of our representations.

For these are always

successive, whether they deal with objective or subjective
sequenoes.

yet there must be some distinctlon_ tor conscious-

ness of objective sequence as distinguished fram purely subjectiv

92

B 76$ (592).

Italics in the original.

sequenoe

.
is
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a faot.

On further study we find that whenever we

regard two events, A and B, as o'bjectively successive, the order
in which we perceive A and B is irreversible.

Whatever the sub-

Jective factors involved, our experience of A and B must have
this order.

Sinoe A and B are nothIng for us apart from our

experience of them, thia is the same as saying that A and B are
connecte4 b7 a necessary law of the mind such that under given
conditions B can only succeed N'and not vice versa. 93
In what sena. has Kant suooeeded in proving causality?
In answering this question, we must remember that Aant accepts
much ot Hume'8 oriticism.

The principle that evel'1 event must

have an antecedent cause i8, Kant concedes to Hum., neither
intuitively oertain nor demonstrable by reasoning trom more ultimate truths.

It cannot be accounted for by analytiC thought.

Like all synthetiC judgments, it oan only be proved
to the contingent faot ot actual experience.

b7 reterence

Kant thU8 admitted

that, sinoe the oauaal connection 1s synthetic, we can have no

! priori inslgnt into the connection between particular causes
and eftects.

But he dittered vitally fram Hume in that he claime

to prove the general prinoiple of oausality whereas Hume held
such a proof to be impossible.

Universality and necessity simp17

93 A and B have a noumenal eXistence, Kant would say,
but the nature of that existence Is for us unknown and unknowable
For all practical purposes, then. A and B can be treated wholly
trom our knowledge ot them as appearano •• , presclnding tram theIr
unknown na. ture as noumena..
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could not be explained by experience, .dume had maintained.

Kant

tried to meet this criticism by showing tha.t while particular
experienoe c:mld not fOI'm the basis of the proof of anf strictly
necessaryprlnciple, yet experience in general, 1.e., experience
considered under the important aspect of experienoe of
tive order in time, could do

80.

o'bjec-

For what is implied in all our

experience must be admitted to be necessary.
could be no experience of the

IUl

~nd

Without it there

we know.

It can no longer be said, as the empiricist doe.
8ay, that we cannot go beyond the general proposition,
that all the events we have known were uniformly
sequent; for a8 no sequinOi could have been known
as uniform apart frum the ac£!vlty-or-lntiIligence,
SOrDne ~ ~ known a~4uniform except in relation
to the aame activitf.
Secondly, Kant never attempts to explain the nature
and possibIlity of cauaal connection from the natuz-e of the event
themselves.

For him no analrsis of effects will show whf the.

muat be preceded bf cauaes. 9S
Thirdly, the principle of causality, as deduced by Kant
and shown to be necessarily involved in all consciousness of
necessary sequences, ia the quite general principle that every
event must have aome cause in what precedes it.

What the cauae

may be in each special ca.e oan only be discovered through

94

John Watson. Kant and His English CritiCS, Glasgow,
Italics in the orlginal.--95 See Critique, A 207-B 2$2 (230). See alao Chapter
III tor the role neoessary oonneotion playa 1n Kantt. analysis
of causali t •

1881, 225.

r
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experience or study.

80
These particular causal lawa are discovere

from exper1ence not by means of the general prinoiple but only
1n acoordanoe with it. 96
Causality, as proved by Kant, has lost a good deal of
the content which it has in ordinarr usage. What Kant
proves is Simply that all succession is necessary--the
cause of an event 1s that event or events on which 1t
succeeds necessarily. Se makes no attempt tp prove
causallty in the sense ot dJnamic activlty on the part
ot the cause or ot intrinsic logIcal cormection, but
tends to relegate the intrInsIc connectIon or dynamio
activIty to the noumenal sphere. Cause and ground are
very sharply distingb1shed, the ultimate logIcal ground
ot a cauaal connectIon is for Kant to be found in the
non-temporal.97
Consideration ot these and. other poInts will take up
our attention in the following ohapter.

96 For diffioultles regarding knowledge of particular
cauaal laws In Kant's system, see Chapter III.
97 Ewlng, Kant's Treatment of Causalit! 102. Smith,
Commentary, 374, auggesta the so-caIlea-phenomena fat view ot
lantIan cauaality. According to thia view, causality is not a
mere analogy of logical relation of ground and oon.equent. It
ia the representation ot genuinely dynamical activities in the
object. apprehended. These objects are part of an independent
order wh1ch~in the form known to us ia a phenomenalist transcript
ot the deeper real1ty ot the ~own and unknowable thing In
itself. But Just what it means to have a world which is made
up on17 of appearancea that somehow dis,lq real efflcac7 or
dynamica15uaality ia hard to aee. SmIth himself aa.lta--and
the ooncesslon is generally interpreted as weakening his theor,r
(see EwIng, ibId., 173; Paton, Kant's Metaphlsic ot Experienoe,
II, 282)--th~he vIew of cauaalIty outlIne above Is on17 a
poaslble development of ~nt'8 philosoph1 whloh receives no
quite definite ~o~ulation In the Crltlgue.

CHAPTER III
CRITIQUE OF THE KANT IAN DOCTRINE
OF PHYSICAL

CAUSAL~TY

"Cont~a~iwi.e," continued 1'weedledee,
"it it wa. so, it might be; and if it were
so, It would be; but as it isn't, it alntt.
That's 10glc."
Lewi. C~roll, ThroUSh ~ Looklns Glass

Tweedled.e'. attltude t

owa~d

logic may quite reasonably

be one's flrst reaction to the preceding pages.

Lumberlng under

the weight of its architectonic and the difficult problem with
which it is struggllng, the Kantian juggernaut presents an overwhelmlng spectacle.

But the following pages will show that the

Kantian argument for causality ral.es theoretical difficulties
no less stubborn than those whioh it attempts to resolve.
not all involve contradiotions.

Perhap

But the,. do point up inoonsls-

tenoies or ambiguities whioh it is the duty ot those who support
Kant to resolve or to explain.

These diffioulti.s will be treat.

under two beadings, Kant's subjectivism and Kant's phenomenalism.
A. KANT' S SUBJECTIVISM

Among the diffioulties under whioh Kant's doctrine of

81

82

.

the causal ooncept and principle labors, ane ot the oh1er ls Ita
more than ocoa.lonal subjectiviSM.

Thl. subjeotivis. plague.

lant even in the aecond edit10n of the Crltique, written preo1sel,.
to counter-attaok the charges ot Ide.ll.. hurled against the
flrst editlon.

Thi. subjeotlvl •• caused Kant to develop

a twotol~

vlew ot that most paradox1cal element 1n the Kantlan system. the
objeot of knowledge, 1.e., the phenomenal object (appearanc.a)
present In oonaclo'usne...

When the sub.1ectl viet tendeno,- 1. 1n

the ascendant, he resaNs all appearanoe., all emplr10al objeot8,
as repre.entatlons or modlfications of the
modification.

a~

••rely aubjeotlve.

8

enalhI11t,-.

The.e

When, an the other hand,

hls thtnklng Is dominated b7 the phenomenalist tendeno,-, appearanoe. aee. to sain anextstenoe independent of tne individual
mind. l
The roota ot Kant'. subjeotivism la7 in oertatn unwarranted pr.suppo.itions whioh ~t borrowed tram the age.

Pirai,

there vas hia representatlonalls., according to which Ideas and
peroeptiona, not th1ngs, 1f tnte held to be the immediate objeot
ot knowledge.

Knowledge ls vlewed as a process entire17 internal

to the In<11 vidual Idnd, and as oarrying

U8

,further on17 in vlrtu.e

ot same additlonal supervenlng pro.es., tnterentlal, conjectural,
1 See Smlth, Oommenti¥1t 83. Paton, ltant t • MetaFAO
of Exeerienoe, I, S83, preters ~oall the two tendencles A ransOinaenta! Id.allam" and wemplrlcal reallsm."

r
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or instinctive.

From the subjectivist, representationalist

point of view, the various synthetic activities described in
the preceding pages orten seem to be nothing lea8 than the
cognitive processe. of the individual mind.

The given manifold

consiats of the aensations aroused by material bodles acting
upon the special senaes.

Part and parcel, ot course, of this

denial ot the mind's intentionality is the Lockaan pre.uppositLo

ot the unintelligibility ot real substance.

This, again, was

due to the presupposition of senslsm, namely, that
had to be known torma1ly by the sense8.

eve~thing

A tourth presupposition

was the atomic theory of sensation (in contrast to the Gestalt

theo~ or the soho1astic theorr ot torms).2

According to thla

theory, objects .re to be viewed as compounds ot succe.ding
representationa, each ot which haa its place in a temporal
sequence.

The.,atlal world wblch we come to know consists In

a multiplicity ot related elements.

The isolated data ot sen-

sation oonsequently have to be combined somehow and untfied,
it we are to know the world.
Owing to these presuppositions, Kant got on the subjectivist tack that so imperils his causal doctrine.

In his

doctrine of inner senaeitor example, Kant formulates his positl0

2 See ~enry Baboock Veatah, Intentional Leiie, New
Haven, 19$2, 81-11$.

J This dootrine plays an important role in lant's
causal doctrine sinoe it involves the achema of necessary success onl

.'

from the extreme subjectivist point of view.

He does not draw

any distinction between representation' and its objeot, between
inner states of tne selt. and appearanoes in space.

All repre-

sentations without exoeptiD~, he sa7.,4 are states of the inner
sense, modifioations of the mind.

Some exist on17 in time, 8a.e

exist both in apace and in time.

But all alike are modea of tne

identioal 8elf, mere represen.ationa (bl08s& Vorstellungen).
Though appearanoes may exist outside one another in spaoe, spaoe
itself exists only as representation "in us."

But if ,pace is

in us and if appearanoes are in spaoe, then appe8.Panee. must
also be in us.

Previously, in. treating space, Kant said that

"what we call outer obJeot. are nothing but mere representationa
of our sensibility, the form of whioh is apace. nS
In an interesting and import.nt

se(~tion

on "APpearanoe

and IllusIon" (Brach.Inuna and SoheIn)6 difficulties ri.e once
again from Kant'a subjectivism.

"It would be mJ own fault, it

out of that whioh I ougnt to reckon as appearanoe, I made mere
illuaion. n7 Well and good. But how distlngulsh the two' What
we pr6dloate of appearanoes, Kant answers, oan be ascribed to the
objeot itself.

Thus when we say that a rose is red, we ascrlbe

4
S
6

A 128-129 (148-149).

1

A

)0 (1.3).

B

69-10(88.89).

B

69 (89).
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redness to the rose.

But

What is illusory can never be ascribed. as predioate
to an object tor the sufficient reason that we then
attribute to the object, taken by itself, what belongs
to it only in relation to the senses, or in general to
the subject, for instance th8 two handles whioh were
tormerly ascribed to Saturn.
While redness, then, can be ascribed to the rose and is a genuine
appearance, the two handles which Galileo attributed to Saturn,
or t.he roundness of a distant tower, the curve on a straight
stick in water are mere illusiona.

Yet is it not t rue that in

a certain position Saturn necessarily appears as possessing two
handles'

A square tower viewed Jlrom atar must look round.

stick in water cannot but appear bent.

A

If Kant still insist.

that these are not appearances, then his onl1 distinotion between
appearancea and Illusion seems to be relative to the varying
nature of the conditions under which observation takes place.
It the stiok, tor example, is removed from the water, the empiric 1
objeot will appear more in harmon, with experience. 9
of observation Is all that distinguishes illusions and

It the mode
appearance~,

then Kant hardly answers the oriticisms he here protesses to meet 10

..
8 B 69 (89), note.
9 But it such i& the case, a science lIke astronomy
or chemistry deals only with illusions. For the telescope in the
one and the microscope in the other certainly modity the ordinarr
perceptions of the senses.

10 HI. critios objected that it bodies In space are
representation. existing onl1 wi thin us, as Kant so otten assert..
their appearing to exist outside u& is a complete illusion.

!'
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-In the very heart of the Critique, the "Transcendental
Deduction of the Categories," the argument is weakened by subjectivism.

There is the passage:

~en

we consider that this nature is not a thing in
itself but is merely an aggregate of appearances,
ao m~y retresentations of the mind, we shall not be
surpr sed -&at we can discover rr-only in the radical
faoulty of all our knowledge, namely, in transcendental apperception, in that unity on account of whiCh
alone it can be entitled object of all possible
experience, that is, nature.l l
This subjeotivism is not confined to the first editicn

of the Critique.

No lesa a oommentator than SmIth admits this,

thougn he minimizes its importance by insisting that nan alternative view more and more comes to the tront in proportion as Kant
gains masterr over the conflicting tendencies that go to oonsti.
tute his new Critical teaching.,,12
And yet, even though the second edition was to have
been a revision of certain idealistically tinged expressions in
the first, the subjectivist tendency finds expression in very
important section..

Thus in Section 16 of the "Transcendental

Deduction,"13 a seetion which contains perhaps the most essential
part of the Deduction, the word "representation" (Vorstellungen)
occurs constantly, "object" (Ob3ect) never, aegenstand only once,

A

11 A 114 (140). Italics not in the original. Se. al8
104 (134) and A 109 (131).
12

qommentarz, 295.

13 B 132-136 (152-155).
ilil
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and then only In the remark that combination (Verbinduns) cannot
be given in the objects (liegt nlcht

~ ~

Gegenstanden) but

must be contributed by the understanding.14
Smith attempts to minimize even more the subjectivist
tendency by saying that Kant
entirel,. new war.

interpre~ed subjec~ivity

in an

Unlike Descartes and his followers, Kant did

not oppose the subjective to the objective, but made it a subspecies within the objective.

For subjectivity could be an obaee

of knowledge (the data of inner sense, for example) and in this
war it was "objective."
objeotive

and

Whereas Desoartes had a dualism of

subjeotive, Kant has one of appearance (both

subjective and objective, 1.e., pertaining either to the empirica
ego or to "nature") and reality.

All subjectivist modes of statIng the problem of
knowledge, such as we find in H~e and in Lelbniz
no I ••• than in Descartes, Looke, and Berkeley, are,
Kant finally concluded, illegitimate and questionbegging. Our so-called subjective states, whether
they be sensations, feelings, or desires, are ObJjCtive in the lense that they areobjeots tor conso OWl-

iiiii.15

Smith believes this to be a striking element of Kant'. revolution
16
in the theor,y of knowledge.
However, there are Revere objections to the benign
interpretation of Smith.

-

Prichard mainta1ns17 t~t Kant's

14 B 1.34 (153).
15 Commentarr, xlvi.
. 16 Ibid •• 313 •

•

Italics in the original •
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subjectivism has led him to prove causality, not even or the
appearmce. (phenomenal objects) of which he wished to prove
It, but ot repre.entations .olely.

The same repre.entations

are related both a8 physical and as psyohical events, 1.e.,
as our repre.entations or apprehensions and as parts of tne
objects represented. 18
Yet there mar be a way ot extricating Kant trom this
difficulty_

If the phenomenal world is only an appearance to

human minds, why should It be impo8sible that a succes.lon ot
.tates in a phenomenal object should also be a succession ot
Ideas in RJ mind'

This would obviously be impossible in a

philosoplli 1h loh olaimed to know things In themael vea.
that is preclaely what Kant d18claima.

But

Then, too, a representa-

tion need not be considered as the act ot apprehending. It may
be that Kant ls ooncerned only with the oontent of the repre.enta tiona.

This interpretation;-would seem to tit in with Kant fa

Inaistence that he is primarl1y interested in the logical element
neces.ary tor knowledge of objects, not the psychologioal proce ••
According to this interpretation, a representatlon would be an
event in the knower'. mental history and an event in the world

'ar

18 "The appearancea, in ao
aa they are objects ot
consoiousness simply in virtue or being representations, are not
in any way distinct from their apprehension." A 190-8 235 (219).
Se. Paton, Kant's Metap~8ic ot Experienoe, II, 266: "To aome
this may seem suftlclen Bround for rejectIng hia whole theor,r,
but we must ask ourselves whether suoh a theory is selr-contradic
tory or impossible."
III

III
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known to him.

19

Dreams, again, though their content would be

part of a mental history, would be exoluded from the world ot
appearances.

For they would not fit into the

neces8a~

sucoes-

sion ot oontents which tor us oonstitutes the objeotive world.
But this interpretation is only an attempt to parry what seems
to be a decisive thrust against Kant, at least against his
subjectivist tendency.
Prichard aims another suoh thrust at the main principle

ot the "Transoendental Deduotion."

Hi. oriticisms are

it limited to partIcular points of Kant's philosopby.

But

Prichard may well be negleoting certain teatures of knowledge
redisoovered and emphasized by Kant in the uncongenial atmosp_ere ot eighteenth oentury rationalism and empirioism.

These

teatures can be ot great importanoe tor modern epistemology.
Thus in the neat few pages we shall briefly

present Prichard's

views, then weigh the. against those of Kant's profound soholasI

/

tic interpreter, Joseph Marechal.
Analyzing the main prinoiples of the "Transoendental
Deduction," Priohard oonclude. that though Kant is attempting
to formulate the nature ot knowledge, what he desoribes is not
20
knowledge.
Por knowledge, according to Kant, consists in an

19

See Paton, Kant·s Metaphy8ic

20

~ant's

Theorr

~

~

Xnowledse, 230.

Experience, II, 26 •
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activity

o~

the mind whereby 1t combines the

mani~old

of sense

on oertain pr1nciples and 1s to some extent aware that it doe.
so.

By theae principles, the mind gives the manifold relation

to an object.

The two leading thoughts underlying the view are

thus. first, knowledge 1s a process

WT

which representationa

aoquire relat10n to an object; and secondly, knowledge is a
proces8 ot synthesis.
Now, 8ay8 prichard, to speak ot a prooess by which
representations acquire relation to an objeot has no meaning
other than this that an apprehension becomes the apprehen.ion
of an obJect. 21 But how can this beT Apprehension i8 essentiall
relat1ve.

Pram the very beginning it involve. something whioh

1s apprehended.

Thus an apprehension which is not an apprehensio

of something is no apprehension.

Therefore, it is meaningl.s8

to s peak of a process by which an apprehension beoomes the
apprehen.ion ot an objeot. 22
21

Kant t • Theorz o! Knowledge, 230.

22 Ibid. Se. also ibid., 231-233, for Prichard's
criticism ot tno-proposal tha~r Kant a representation i8 the
representation ot something only from the point of view of the
thing in itselt. Muoh of the critioi •• i8 baaed on Priohard"
basic contention that appearances are nothing else than purely
subjective state. or mental modificationa which Kant tries
somehow to obJectivate. See Paton, Kant'. HetaP91aic of EXierience, II, 272, note 1; "This psychologts. is the central ma Eer
'O'ii""Wh1ch M7 interpretation difters consistently trom Professor
Priohard's penetrating analysis in Kant'. 'l'heoq of Knowledie.
He interprets Kant as 41 xplaining how expertenoe ortae oDJec£ive
comes to be, and I entirely accept hi. criticism ot tba view
he ascribes to Kant, but I do not believe that what he i. here
f

tt

!'II

I"
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As f'or know164ge.regarded as a prooess of' synthesis,

Prichard oontinues,23 this only identif'ies knowing with making.
Knowledge becomes the process of oonstructing the physical world
out of the elements given in perception.

Kant naturally rejoioes

Priohard adds, 1n the manufacture beoause it is just this which
makes the categories valid.

For if knowing is really making,

the prinoiples of synthesis must apply to the "reality" known.
It i8 by these very prinoiples that the reality is made.
But knowing, argues Prichard, is not to be equated with
making.

The very nature of knowing presupposes that the thing

known is already made, or-, .to speak more aocurately, already
exists. 24 Even if' the reality known happe~ to be something we
make, e.g., a house, the knowing of' the house is distinot from
the making of it.

Music

and

poetry are undoubtedly realitiea

whioh are in some sense made or composed.

But here also the

apprehension of them is distinct from and presupposes the process
by which they are oomposed. 2 S
Kant's Theotl ~ Knowledge, 233.
24 True, itspby'sical existence is already completed.
But may there not be the con8t~ction of an intentional counterpart in cognition? See the following pages for Marechal's views.
2$ If/knowing is so obviously different from making,
why did Kant apparently feel no difficulty in reducing knowledge
to making? Prichard, ibid., 238-242, gives a8 the reasons: 1) his
belief that we do sometEIng when we think; 2) his position that
we cannot know reality made him think that we can construct
appearances of' it; ) Kant fa Iled to hdiishtingutsh kniowin g t rom
the formation of the menta1 1magery w 0 aocompan es lm owi ng.
23

I,
II
I'
I

I.

I

.At

92
/

this point, Marechal'.

int~rpretation

throw some light on the question at issue.

at Kant may

Ma~bhal, though

he admits Kant's subjectivist tendency,26 sees in the Kantian
theory ot knowledge an attempt to trace the immanent and objectivating actIvity

or

cognition.

True, Kant tluctuated between

ascribing this activity to sense intuition at the manifold
(ultimately the thing in itselt, that bate noire tor Beeker,
Fichte, and others who dared go beyond the master) or to the
intellectual spontaneity ot the knower. 27 still, Mare'chal
believes, the attempt was there.
Thomistic theory ot oognition. 28

He even tinda parallels in the

/.

According to Marechal, the activity involved 1n cognition exercises itselt through or upon the sensible representation and brings to it aomething not exclusively ot the concrete
sensible, something which enters into a synthesis with the purel1
sensible diverlity.
and intellect il an

The prihduct ot t his cooperation ot • ense
~anent

construction oonstructed trom the

sensible data by lame orlginal intellectual principle, call it
an ~ Erleri to~ or a forma universalis. 29Thl. immanent object,
however, is not to be contused with the object known, or signltie •

26
27

as
29

"

~Depart,

IV, 106.
Ibid., IV, 101-112.
Ibid., V, 386-)87, 479-487.
Ibid., V, 480.
Point

-

-

r
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The two a~e related but not oonvertible. 30
/

Marechal' then a!llk. himself the obvious question.

In

this vital communion of subject and object, what is the object
known, the

His answer recalls the argument
he used in a p~eceding chapter. 31 Let us .ay that b.1 the object
~ 3u~~

cOgno8citur?

known we mean all the ele.ents of objective cognition, impliCit
and explicit, which the knower can recall by or in the cognitive

synthesis that takes place within him.

In that case, the compre-

hension (!tameleur) of the object known will reach out as far as
the external singular object which originated the synthetic
process and which became its first oonscious term.

But if we .

understand by the object known this first term itself (the object
expliCitly apprehended in the direct act of cognition), it Is
then neoe.8a17 to say that the object mown, the

II

suod, Is

nothing other than the ooncrete object offered by the sense.

But

30 "Dana un. intellIgence iiscursive, l'objet immanent
(le cognosclbl1e in actu) nt.at formellement connu quIa la
reflexion: il est la condition prochaine ~d quo), non l'objet
primitif (ld quod), de 1s connaissance. C'~st l'objet immanent
(et Eas son id guod) iui est declar~ fir ArI.t;te et Ear S.
Tnomas non moina i ue
!int, s;:ntlie que, constrUI't.
appartfe~a 18 p11a.e v a';;-preconaclente, sensItIvo-rationel1e
•• slmilante, de l'intelleotion; et la vie d'une intelligence
assiml1atrice est neoeaaalrement a7Oth.ae d'elements acquis."
!oin~ ~ D~part, V, 481, Italics not in the original.

2ie

31

Ibid., V, 439-468.

II
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this object has alread7 been operated on by a higher element
(deja
'" salai de plua haut).

It has been posited objectivel;

,

and aeen In tne light 01' a universal (vu a travers un

universel~

which cognition does not at tirst distinguish tram the s8nalble
representation in which the universal is individualized.
Direct intellection thus turnishes the mind on17 with
a physical object, corresponding to the material content 01' the
immanent intelligible objeot.

When rerlection has begun, the

metaphysical object begina to take ahape under the t ranscendental aspects 01' being, the true, and the good, then tormally as

--

a universal 1n re.
POI'

/

Mareohal, then, the 1ntellectual construction of

the immanent object ia a synthesia" and, b8 it noted, an ! prior1
aynthesia. 32 Mar'chal admit. that h. doe. not relish the term

"!

prio~i

.7Dthesia."

But he adds that it alone in modern

terminology connot•• the logioal and psychological process called
"abstractio totalia" '07 Thomists.33
In justification of the! Erleri, he argues that it
the! 2r,ior1 signified an inatinctive .. arbitrary, or subjective
production 01' idea8, then perhaps the theoretical justification

of its objective valtilt7 would leave us perplexed.

-

But the a

priori here aignif1es on17 the spontaneity 01' the subject in the

32 "La construction intellectuell. de l'objet immanent

synth~se • • • et est une synth6se a priori." Point de

V,

465.

11

Tbid

--

r
9$
experIence ot an external "gIven" whloh presents Itself to hlm.3 4
Does Mar.(chal,then, admit Kant's synthetl0 .! Eriori
judgments?

From the viewpo1nt of their validity, no.

For

I'

Marechal seeke to prove the metaphysical validi t,. of every ob jeot

ot thougnt.

The Kantian synthetiC .!

God, the world, and the soul.
structure, then?

however, excludes

Fram the viewpoint of their

In this oase, says Marechal,
he does admit
"

the pw,yohologlcal reality of a
jud~ent,

E~iori,

certaln~ind

of synthetic ! priori

namelJ, one which is oapable of objectlve Justitioation

because it pertains to the natural and preconsoious oonstruction

ot the immanent object ot cognltion of Which it is the neceasar,
oonstituent.

But Marechal
places the ultima te prinCiple ot this
"

8ynthe.ia not In the understandlng alone, as does Kant, but in
the human intellect regarded as tending toward an end.35

_

In hls booklet,

~

Seul1

'"
2 !! Meta@1s1que:

AbstraotlCln

ou ....................................
Intuitlon,36 Mar*ohal presents in summary form the theory ot

objeotlvity whioh he expounda in greater detail In the last volURe

\
34 "Le pr~d~it immanent de,cette experience participe
a la toia aux propriete. du sujet et a oelles de l'o~jet: objet
et sUJet y aont mieux que solidalres, 111 sont complementaires;
connaltre l'un modlti' par,ltautre, c'est conna!tre ce dernler
atrect' par le premier; l'a prlori s~thetlque, essentiellement
relatlt a une matlere extrlnaeque, r~v.le l'objet"lo1n de masquer.
On se aouvlendra, du reste, que nous avons expllque cette relati·
vlta abjectivante de i'. priori intellectuel par la flnalit'
necessaire d'un devenir asslmilateur." Point ~ Depart, v, 487.
35 ~, V, 488-491. This is Marechal's doctrine ot
the finalistic~amis. ot the intellect.
36 jaW.fn" ·i9!~.
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of his Point

I
!! Depart.

He argues that the characteristic

quality of our knowledge, its Objectivity,37 is due not to the
species of the object alone but also to the dynamism of the
knowing subject.

He points out in the fifth volume of the Point
I

~ Detart, however, that this Kant-inspired position was invalida

ted for Aant himself because he held that the onlT content tound.
in our thought 1. the phenOBenal given.
functional and fOnMal.

All the rest is purelT

Without the phenomenal given, the

functional and tormal is emptr.

Consequently, Kant fell back

in his conclusion to the formaliz1ng ot Descartes and Woltt,38
even though he had glimpses ot cognit1on as act.
We he'ttate to orlticlze the thought of a man who is
sometimes reterred to as the most profound scholast1c thinker ot
modern times.

The consideration ot his: work rightly merits a

stUdy ot 11;s own.

Apart, then, from Har$chal' a probing inSights

into Kant. suttice it to s ay that he agrees wi th

WI

aa to Kant' 8

subjectivism and ita fatal ettect on the Kantian argument:

37 Mar'chal 1nsiated that he was always a realist. In
the late twenties ot this century, he made a public statea.at
to that ettect, wInch surprised more than a tew philosophera,
among them Haritain, who suspected him of idealism.
38 "Aved une essence abstraite on ne fait pas de
l'existenoe, ni aveo d.u tormel de l.actuel, n1 avec du logique
pur du r'elJ bret, ~'avec de la puissance on ne fait pas de
l'aote." Point ~ Depart, v, $90.

r
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~

Et voie! maintenant la diffioult. inextricable ou
slembarrasae la philosophie kantienne • • • 11 ne
reste plus dans la conscience qu 1 une organisation
synthetique ~e phenomenes, que!!!!:.!!! rapport. !
ltobjet plutot qufau sujet.J9
After thepreeeding pages, some sort of synthesis is
necessary.

The figure below may help to bring out the elusive

nature of the Aantian objeot'.
l':raURE
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THE ORITICAL AND THE THOMISTIC THEORY
OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION

Since the appearance above i. all that we know, and since we know
it in representation., the representations are nothing apart trom
the appearance.

39

The7 are the appearance. 40

,

Point!! Depart, V, 591.

In view of the

Ita11cs 1n the or1ginal.

40 See Paton, Kant·. M.etap~.ic ot Experience, 11,21+2:
"It the event 0( and the eventA? werelngs=:fn-themaelves, it 1.
manifest that we oould never pais fram the oommon-.ense assertion
that, 1n perceiving the objective succession ~ ,sense-per.e.ti n
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difficulties aoon to be brought against the Kantian phenomenal
object (appearances), the following comparison may be giving
Kant more credit than he deserves.

Let us suppose that some

enterprising scholastic philosopher cuts off the cognitive process at the stage of the verbum. 41 It now becomes a •• dium in
It i. a synthesis of the content (Kant's manifold?)

d.r~ved

qUOi •

fram

reality (the noumenon) and the itrJInanent (now, of course, no
longer intentional) activity ot the knower (agent intellect-possible intellect: Kant's categories and transcendental unit,.
\.

a must be followed b7 sense-peroeption b to the quite dI1"fe:rent
assertIon that the objective aucces8Ion-~£is itselt causall1
determined. Kant appears to be arguing
since the event~
and the event /.3 are, on Cri tical prinoiples, only the conte~
of ••nae-perc'8p'tTons .! and h, the attribution of necessarY'
.
succession to a and b (on tne ground of the objectivity of the ",
succession q~-) is Tpao ~acto an attribution of necessary aucc •• ~
sion to ~ an ~. • • !Era contention seems to me to be the
orux or-Kint'ft argument."
It is to be remembered that Kant starts with objects
or objective sequences as alreadr present to oonsciousness.
Awareneas, then, means for him, not awareness of representations
except 1n the case 01" purely subjeotive states like dreams,
illUSions, and chimeras. It means the awareness of the objeot
kno~ in the representations.
Only bY' philosophical study doe.
he come to the cmolu.lon that the ol?jeot is a unity 01" representations made possible by the torms, oategories, and the transcendental unity of apperception working upon the manifold of experience. To apeak of oonsciousness of representations, then, in our
immedIate consoiousness of the phenomenal object could only mean
tor Kant somehow going behind the object present in oonsoiousne ••
at the moment of consciousness itselt. In the context of Thomiam,
it would be 11ke saying that we can be just as conscious 01" the
Verbum as of the object known in the Verb~.

41 ~he,1mplication of time here is unfortunate, since
the s.,.Dii'1tu:aJ.activity of thought 18 beIng considered. Think of
t~A stage as ~ logioal -moment."

r
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ot apperceptlon).

Thus cut short of realit7, the Verbum (Kant.s

representatlons) glves us merel:r appearances (compare St. Thomas'
te~

"species").

For us it would be the appearanee of reallt:r.

But how could Kant call such an appearance objective'
Granted that it i. an objeot for us, how can we distinguish it
from dreams, IllusIons, etc., Which also are objects for

U8

1n

a way?

Kant would answer that since the object1ve is that wh1ch
2
necessitates us to know it in a certalnway,4 and since necessity can in no W&7 come from experlence,43 the only expl~4ation
tor the objective is taat there exist certain apriori

fo~s

which render possible the necessity implied in objectivit;y.

Yet

one wonders whether Kant does not tall into a pre-established
ha~OD1

here whereby the forms relate the !lements given us In

the manlfold.

It aeema also, if utter idealism 18 to be avoided,

that the unknown and unknowable noumenon pla7s a more important
role than Kant give. it cred1t for.

Then, too, if appearance.

aile only In(consclousness, Just what sort of existence do they
have'

Kant's appearanoes would seem to be an elaborated version

of Berkeley t 6 !!!!.

.!..!i

pe rc Ipi •

True, the n01).menal Mount Ever.st

42 He takes for granted the validity of the dlstinctl0
between the objective and the subjective. That we do distinguish
them Is a tact. Kant's problem is how can we distInguish them.
In answering the fthow." he a180 answers the "why."
4.3 This pre8upposltion i8 prob.al:y Kant r 8 'lnortal sin u

1n philosophy.

r
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exIsted even when Aillary and Tenzlng were not present to aee It.
But 1 t was an appear..nce tor t hem all the while they fought to
reaoh its aumm.it.

Kant's world is the Critical version of Plato'

cave in which the imprisoned men are surrounded by reality even
though they are aware only of its shadows.

Plato, however,

8.110l.,s some of the men to eome up to the sunlight.

For the

theoretical reason of Kantian man, this 1s an idle dream.
At this point in our criticism, Norman Kemp Smith's
remark is

a~ropos:

Finding subjectivism to be emphatically and unambiguously inculcated in all the main sections of the Critisue,
and the phenomenalist views, on the other hand, to e
atated in a much le88 de.flnite and somewhat elus1ve
manner, commentators have impoverished the Critioal
teaching by suppressiop. of many of its most subtle and
progressive doctrines.44
Aocordingly. lest we also be guilty of thus "'impoverishing the
Critical teaching," we shall consider Kant's causal doctrine in
the light of his phenomenalism.
But here, too, loom difficulties.
B. KANT'S PHEHOMENALISM

First of all, the phenomenalist analysis of causality
adulterates the meaning of causality.

Kant never proves the

necessary connection or intrinsic dependence of the very being
of an effect upon its cause.

-

44

commentarz, 321.

In fect# we shall soon see that

r
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he invalidly

p~esupposes

it.

He can validly state at most that

causality involve. a necessa~y success10n or appea~ances.45
Thus in the

~angin8

positions ot a ahip moving down-

stream, positions A and B cannot be reversed.
aucceasiv~

ness

The

i~reversible

representations ot these two positions in conscious-

thus;parallel--o~ bette~,

sinoe we are deallng only with

appearanoea In consciousness--!£! those two positions.

The

representationa are the objeotive sequence present co consolousness.

Kant.s phl10sophioal analysis tries to show that the

objeotivity ot the sequence, and so our distinotlon of it trom
the purelysubjeotlve, Is poasible only by reason ot a rule
whlch necessitates us to conneot A and B in one speoitic way.
S must be apprehended a8 following necessarily upon A in time.

45 "IAnt only proves causality in the sense ot
neoessar, sucoession • • • As meanlng necessa~ sucoession in
time, it is undoubtedly regarded b,y Kant as the temporal sohema
ot the logical category ot ground aDd consequenoe, but that
there is any oonneotion ot the logioal sort between partioular
causes and etteots as phenomena such that the one oould ever be
deduoed trom the other a priori, he not only never attempts to
prove, but emphatically repudiates." Ewing, Kant'. Treatment ot
Causality, 189. Such an interpretation of necessary oonneo£lonIn whIch a particular ettect is claimed to be deduced a friori
trom its cause oan rightly be repudiated. But there is another
meaning ot neoessary conneotion, one whioh involves the spontaneous assent ot human reason when its meaning i8 understood,
namely, that a contingent being demands a oause for its existence
It is this necessary connection which hovers over the Kantian
argument, as will be brought out in the text. This may be part
ot the "dogmatism" (remnants ot a natural realistio outlook),
which Watson atDributes to Aant. See Kant and His English
Critics, 338.
--
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And .inee n ••••••~ .uece •• ion in time 1. the sohema of the
categolT ot cau.allt7, .. and B are .au.all,. oonnect.d.

)Jot

that A 1. her. and now the cause of B, Kant might add to avold
.uch an obvlous dlffloulty as the day-nlght .equence, but that
h.re and now the objeotlve .equence AD, If It la to be known at
all, must have B followlng A.
Grantins now that in hia Crltlcal s,..tem Kant has
'J

ahown

that obje.tlve ~.quenoes are n •• eaaarr and

80

cauaall,.

connected, 1. n.c •• sary succe.slon .11 that hls causal doctrine
la,.. claim to'

B7 no meana. For atter ana17z1ng objectiv., or

oausal17 oategorised •• qu.no. in the "Second Analogr," Kant • .,..,

In the tlrat p1ao., I oannot revers. the serle., placins
that which happen. prior to th.t upon whlch 1t follows.
And •• condly, It!.!!!. .tat. whloh preceded .!! Eo.lted,
.1.
thl. d.terminate ev.ni Poll ow. tnevitaSIz !!! n.cea.arl11.~

-

'Causalit7, then, tor Kant .eana two thlnga, first, that the
aucce.dlng ev.nt to110w. upon the precedlng event in accordance
wl th a rule ot neo.aslll'J a ucce.aloD, secondl,., ....t.-ha
.......
t_t!!!, aucc.ed..
in, event

!!!!. .llisround

1,!

!!!! 2re.edlng

event.

The f1rst part haa alread, been dl.cuased In aome detal •
)Jow the aeoond part ot Kant'. atatement, "It the atate whlch preceded la poslted, thi. determlnate event tollowa Inevltabl,. and
ne.ea.ari17," la one to 1Ihloh ltant hal n.o valid 01a1m.

For It

makes caulallt7 nece ••ar" oonnectlon. Paton'a comment Is 1n

46 ·A 199-B 244 (22S). Itall.a not In the or181nal.
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plac. h.ret
!ant clalmB to have proved that there 1. more than
n.c ••• arr, or unv&r,Jlng, Bucce.slon In accordance
wlth a rule. He clalm. to have prov.d that In .uch
a n.ce •• ary .ucce,.lon what prec.de. 1. the ground
of what .ucceed•• 47
The repetitlon ot the phra•• "clalm. to have prov.d" ..... to
r.tl.dt

80me

dld prove the

doubt In Paton'. mind as to wh.th.r Kant actually
va~itJ

ot applJing the ground-con.equ.nt r.latlon-

and the nec ••• ary connection it implie.--to appearance •• 41

It

i. quite true that "the plain man, and tor this purpose Kant i.
a plaln man, b.li.v•• that the etfect i. reallr ground.d in the
eaus., so that such a modification ot the !Antian doctrine

limi-

tatlon to neo •• aarr .uoceasion would mean tor him a detinite
loaa ."49
But what olaim has Kant to apply the ground-conaequ.nt
relation to appearanoe.'

Kia philo.oph"

as w. not.d in our

"

clo.ing remarks on Mar.chal, is not an existential pbiloaopn,
whioh .mpha.i.e. the distinction between contingent and nece.sar,
being.

In keeping with the tormaliam ot hi. rationalistic

47 1! Detence .2! _B.....a_.....o.-n, 40.
48 Ewing, Kant'. Treatment ot Cauaalltr, 110 and 111,
that Kant ..erISe. thl. oonneotIOn ABot to the cau.allJ

argue.
conn.cted appearance. them.elv •• but to their noumenal condition.
• • • It .om.time •••••• a. thougb tar trom r.al cauaalit1 b.ine
.xclud.d trom the noumenal sphere, it i. only t ound there and not
in pheno••na at all." Por the diffioultie. inherent in thi.
interpretation, .ee pagel/Jot \hi. th•• le.

49 Paton, Kant'. M.tap91aic £! Experience, II, 10.

r
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baokground, Kant's onlJ claim to the

g~ound-consequent ~elation

is hi. exceedingly tormaliatic view ot jUdgment. 50 Pe~hapa c~l.lc
ape too caustic when thel pOint out the extreme artificiality ot
Kant's method 1n the "Metapn,8ical Deduction."

17 di8covers the twelve--no more, no

less--catego~ies by

or tn. twelve pO.8ible kinds ot judgment. 51

ot

g~ound

There he allegeda review

There the categor"

and cans.quent 18 .ald to be baaed on the hypothetic.l

judgment. 52 But even Paton, who certainly cannot be acoused ot
belng unfair to Kant, cannot wholly acoept thls.
torm. of judgment in Pormal Logie as

g1 ving

U8

"To accept the

an infallible'

olue to the •• detinite kinda ot .ynthesis is oertainly a tritle
Ingenuous. u S3

One wonders whether the dispassionate logician

SO "When the whole ta.k ot philo8ophl' is summed up in
a demonstration ot the dependence of the objective world upon the
tONS ot intelligenoe, the oonnectlon ot the varlous elementa whl h
go to torm knowable objects cannot be represented otherwise than
.. external or .upertiolal. lant accordlngly neglect. what .aJ,
atter Comte, be oalled the dJna.ical aapect ot the world." Wataon
Kant and Hl. Enfol.h Ori tl •• , 342. Kant' 8 tormallam thus .eem.
~~Ittl. 0 otter tne d,fnamical theories ot modern pbJaic ••
$1 See Paton, In Detence ot aeason, 45, where he
de.renda ltant 'a di •• ove17 or a clue tothe oategorie •• p rinoipl ••
ot arntb•• la, 1n the torae of anal{tlo JUdgm.nt. Se recommends
at le.st • peconsid.ratlon ot liht a ~gum.nt.
$2

s •• page

,r ,

note

L3, ot this thesi ••

$3 Kant'. MetaP!l.lc ot Experlence, II, 75. Se. alao
1bld., I, 188t "fo Kant'. mI.tortune t5i doctrine of tne
oategorl •• la large17 baa.d on the 10g10 ot hi. ttm., which ~ln~.
then haa suttered ••rioua, and perhaps shatterlng blow•• "

r
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ot

Xoenig.be~g

attitude

va. not really falling baok on a common .en••
causallty whioh colored hi. view of the judgment.

tova~d

in fOl"Dlal logio.
:wi

'rescl~8

trom his formali .. , was Kant at all

Justitied in speaking ot grounds and cons.quents among appearane

,

Grounds and oonaequents tnvolye intrinsio, necessar,r .ann.otion
and It •• em. iapo_sible

to~

appearance. to be

.0 oonn.oted.

For intrinsI0, nece.sar,y oonnection indioates SaRe
in the things connected, a
ot the knower.

oha~acte~l.tic

ch~.te~i.tl.

'xisting independentlJ

But appearances of their very nature depend on,

are relatiYe to, a knower.
In an ettort to .aye Kant, one might argue that all

that appearance. d....nd 1s the appearance ot necess&rJ connectio
But vhat is this "app.aranc. ot n.oessar,y connection"'

It oan

•• an that app.aranc.. •••• tc--appear tc--b. connected 'ut are
not r.ally so.

or it can mean that nece •• arr connectlon is

it.elf an appearance.

!h. tir.t solution i.

me~.ly

v.rbal and

actuallJ denies n.ce.8ary oonnecti.n between appearance..

A.

tor the second, nece.aary oonnection i. not an empirical object

ot consciousne.s 11ke tree., birda, or dog..

Inyolving as it

S4 P.rhaps Paton has something s1m11ar in mind when
he aarsl "The tact that the world i8 on1r an ., pearance to human
minds ls no reason wl'q it should not appear to human minds as
made up of aubstances and dlsplaying real efticaor or dJnam1cal
causality." Kant-a K~tapbJsic ~ Experienoe, II, 282.

I
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does implication, nece •• aF,1 conneotlon 1. something intelligible
not senaible.

For Kant's theoretical reason, then, It 1. unknD

and unknowable.

We .hall soon study the posltion ot ane Kantlan

commentator who does in taot interpret Kant as relegating thl.
necessa17 oonnectlon to things In themaelve ••

»

There neoes.arr

connection can inspire our faith but never tncre.se our knowledg •
Even it tor the sake ot argument we suppo.ed that
necessa~

connection could be involved in the sequence ot appear

ance., we would have ditticult1 In explaining it.

Thus the

intrinsio or nece.Barr conneotion between A and B mlght be supposed to lie in the applloation o. tne causal

oatego~,

the

indlspensable tormal ele.ent ot the causally connected appearane
of A and B.

But why should the intrinsic connection ot A and 8

11e wholly In the mental form as applied to t he empirical manito
Whence this speclal prerogative ot the

catego~,

which Kant _qs

ls only an external form of unity imposed by our understanding
on a .eterogeneous and unconnected dlversit.1'

What just1fies a

concept that 1s empt7 ot 1 tself auddenlT to d iotate so tJ'rann1ca
ly to experience when applied to experience'
here'

Is there yoluntarl

Does the understanding, led on b7 the will,

Intrlns1c causality without suitioient reasan'
quest10n ot chanoe?

5>

Of tnstinct?

attribute~

Or 1. It a

Is the eat.sorf an elaborate

Se. also page 10), DOte

48,

ot this thesis.

,
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innate idea which introduoe. eonneotion into the appearances ot
A and B b7 80me aort ot pre-established harmoni6with whe empirica
manifold ot A and 5, or with noumana them •• lve.'

All this 1. a

tar ery trom the Intrinaic oonneetion or A and B.
It the solution does not lie in the

ro~al

element

ot appearances can it l1e in the material elem.nt, the emptrical
manifold?

If the intrineic, neoessarJ connection.lies in thi8,

two objeotions to Kant tollow.

Pirst, the empirical manifold i.

not as brute and unconneoted a. Kant sa,.8 it is.

Though it i.

the material elem.nt of the appearances which are pre.ent 1n
oonsc1ouaness, it must have aame deterMinat.ness about 1. it the ,
torma and oategoriea, eapt,. in th•••• lves, are to bring about
definite appearance. in oo~otion wit~ it.57

How else explain

that we .ee this object or know,thi. particular causal sequence
rather than anothe.'

And

vh,. i8 it

have o.rtain ktnde ot etteet.,
not cause it.

that certain k1nds of caus ••

Water can extinguish tire but

The second object10n ia that hhis determinateneS8

already present in the empirical manifold tells ua aam8thing

56 See Pierre Lathiez-Re,., L'IAea118.e Kantien,
.econd ed1tion, paris, 1950,:Aote, and lawartf calr!, 1$e Oritioal
Ph1lo.o29l £!~, seoond edition, Glasgow, 1909, I,~8-jjo.
57 "Did not sen.e Itself otter material irreveraible
e.quenees, the catego1'7 ot cause and. ttect would be null and
vo1d. it would never be called 1nto pla7 at all." Jame. Hutchison
Stirling, "lrate.aor Oalrd on Kant," Journal ~ Speculative
Philo.ORhZ, Hew York, XIV,

,8.

r
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a1)out the aupposedl" unknown and unknowa1)l. noumenon.
dlfferenoe between the appearance. that

&1'. known

to

If the
WI

aa water

and aa t1re are to be traced 1)ack to the emplrioal manltold, and
l t the manitold It.elf 1. grounded 1n the noumenon, then water-

In-itael! and tlre-in-itaelt are not enigmas to us, at least not
a. enigmatlc aa Kant ol&1m. the,. are. 58

But perbapa appearance. and their neoesaarr suocesslon

1n tlme are only tn. phenomenal correlate ot the sP0und-consequen
relation in 10glc.

Aa Paton ea78'

"

S8 Itl'o doubt It muat be due to something 1n things-bthem •• lve. that we .e. one:· 'able aa round and another as square."
8Th1. vIew ot Kant'. dootrlne 1. oommonl1 denled, but it a ••m. to
me the on17 view whloh oan make his tbeOl'J intellIgible." Paton,
Meta2miC ot Exerlence, I, lJ4" and note. Coming t"rom .
e ie.alng
tian odmmen£ator today, one who ls ganerallT
.,.pathetio to Kant, the ocaaent is all the more slgnltlcant.
Stl:-1lng, again, argue. that the empIrical manitold
must somehow oonta1ft noumenal obaracterl.tios within It.elt, ~u. ,
a. It were, blow Ita OMft prompt.r'. waistle ff 80 that the correct
oat.gorl •• are applIed."
to Kant, Edinburgh, 1881.
100-101. But he .e. ._ to
p ~tth!i"Or8anlzed manlfold exis •
apart tram and prlor to the torma and categor1es.
Boutroux 1. llOl'e tNe to Kant (a •• A 137-13 1'6) when
h. tnalats tnat there 1. neI~.r an organis.d manifold nor mental
torma but the un10n ot both, name 17 , the phenomenal 00 j eot. Tbis
i8 what we oan oall 01'Can1zed, not ihe empirical manIfold. S••
bla La Ibl1o.0~e 4e Kant, 191-195.
!.£~l1iis-r;-rIgbt 1n polntlng out that .a regard.
tbe 4etermtnatlan ot the phenomenal object (e.g., .a tr•• rather
than .. dog) the empirioal a.nitold must 1)e, to u.e a aCholaatic
teN, .tur~ 21'1\11.

wtt.

f;Xf;BOOk

'.1,

il
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We manltestl1 do not apprehend grounds and c onsequanta
by sense; but Kant believes we can find 80mething
correspondIng to ground and consequent in the Objects
ot our experienoe, it we consider that all objects must
be combined in one time. What he finels i. neoe8sarr
8UCce88ion; ...t 18, invariable .ucce •• lon in accordanoe
with a ~ule--.uoh that it A is given 1n time, B must
tollov.;;J9
Paton's

Inte~p~etatlon

1. questlonable.

The phenomenal

ot the ground-eonsequent relat10n Is much
successlon.

mo~e

co~relate

than neoe •• arr

It 1s nece.sary oonnectlon. 60 Though Kant'. world

ot appearmces has no

clalm what80ever to neces88.l7 connection,

as was shown a 8hort while betore, It hovers In the background
ot all Kant t 8 example8 and arguments.

Por whJ should the

phenomenal consequent B "inevltably and nece.8arl1y"61 tollow
its ground A, unless there were some nece8sary connection between
B and A?
Kant, then. atter .peaking ot oauaallt7 as nec ••• arf
sucoe.alon, a'-o.t In.tinollvely--"plaln man" that he waa--draw.

59 Kant'.

Ket!pSl.l~ ~

Experl.nee, 11,18.

60 Can thi. be what Paton under.tands b1 nece.saI7
succession? Note that be equate. It with Invarlable succession.
But Vhf invariable unle.. there be neoe •• aJl7 oonnection? Later
on Paton say•• "rlhether rightly or wrongly, Kant alwaya as.ume.
that causality implies regular succe •• ion; and what I calI 'nece.
sarr .uccession t i8 to be taken as meaning regular auccesaiorl."
Ibid., II, 54. Italio. not In the original.

-

61 A 199-B 244 (22)).
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on the gro~d-co~equent relatIon. 62 ThIs latter we have now
found to be the unjustified addItion ot necessar,r connection
to his doctrine ot causality, unjustified because presupposed for
a world ot appearances in whIch it can have no part.
Kant cannot be saved by being interpreted as saying
that !2!! event must tollow the posited anteeedent.

In that

oase, B (e.g., a lOUd noise) would follow A (the light1ng of a
Cigarette), but C (amote) would be the real consequent ot A.
Or, reversing the Situation, we can supPdse A as preoeding
but not necessaz-ily a8 its phenomenal gI'ound.

a,

This, however,

aeems to violate the ground-consequent relation in logiC, ot
which necess4r.J auccession in appearances was supposed to be
the phenomenal correlate.
B," excludes C.

The hypothetioal judgment, "It A, then

It C is substituted in place ot B, then B should

not have been mentioned at all.

C was really B all the while.
I

62 Watson makes much of the remnants ot "dogmatism"
in Kant, by which "even to the end the woz-ld loomed up betore
him as a thing apart, which by some.,means got j;rans.t"erred to
human intellIgence." ,ant and His ~liah CrItics, 338. ~In
regaN to Kant t I tinal positron;-is reveate(! In tue ~pud Poatumum
whateve:tt else be doubt:t'ul, two pOints at least azte a un antIy ' I I
clear: tirst, that he detini tely commits himself to a z-eali.t
~l l i
vIew of the physical syatem in space and time and 01' the manner
in which we acquire knowledge ot it} and .econdly, that he 1s
IJI I
wI1lbg to go to almoat &.nJ lengths In the way ot specula tins
Iii!
hvpotheses regaretin a the Iloumenal conditions 01' our sensee~perience, it onq °thez-eb7 the difficult1es which stand 1n tb.e
way ot th1s empirioal realiSM can be auccesa.t'u117 dealt with."
Smith, Oommenta17, 618.
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FUrthermore, Kant does not
event.

.ar

".ome" event, but "this d.t.rmtna

But wbJ doe. he say "th1. determ1nate" .vent unless 1t

be necessarily connected with the preceding event'
comment

or

Paton is no help here.

The follow1n

"I take it that it tthe event]

must necessarily be tollowed b1 an ettect which, it we knew what
to look tor, we could actually perceive. n63 For S, whether we
know wh.re to look tor It or not, i. still nec ••• ari11 connected
with A.
The invalid presuppo.ition ot n.e •••• ry sonneetion
between appearances Is again brought out in the followlng passage:
Were It not so, were I to poalt the antecedent and the
event were not to tollow neces.arll, thereupon, I should
have to l' egaI'd the auccesslon .s a merely sub Jectl va plq
ot . , tancYI and ItI atl11 represented it to myselt as
something objeotive, I should have to call It a .ere
clre ... 64

Thu. the actlon ot str1klng a match may precede ,thunder 1n a
liven a equen.e.

But Kant would say that tbe tact that when a

match 1s struck agaln, thunder doe. not tollow ahows that the
.ueee.sion must be regarded

a.~objeetlv

••

But Why can A be

po.ited and WhJ do •• not B tollow nece.sarlly?

The re.eon 1a

that tbe,. are not nece •• ar1ly connected.

63 Kant's MetapbJsic

~

EXperience, II, 244.

64 A 201-202, B 247 (227).

.......

~------------

112

The invalid presupposition of neoe.8ar.J oonneotion
betweon appearance. 1. fairly obvious in Kant's
particular cause..

He

~reat.ent

of

admita that partioular cause. muat be

discovered through experience.

This •• e•• to be an implicIt

admission, that causallt,. 18 neceslary connection, even though
Kant hims.lf ls entitled 011.1,.. to necess&rJ aueo.aaion.

Let u.s

auppos. tor the t 1m. being that partioular thing- and partlcular
cauaal!laws can be known without intrinsic contradiction to the
Kantian a7ltem. 6S Muat not the partioular phenomenal characterlatic. ot the objects be taHtD lnto aooount1

AnJ reaaon tor

the .equence ot A and B (flre and heat) mu.t include a reason,
derived from -the partioular qualitie. ot S, wlq' it, pather than
any other particular, i. &8soclate4 with A.

Eving o'blervea.

Even 1n modern pQJ8ical acienoe, we have the principle
that the ettect must be "contained in the cause," anc!
that &n7 prooe.s must be "oontinuous," i.e., that there
must be no breaka in 1t of such a character that there
1. at an,. point ot it a hopele.a di.parity betw.en
caule and e ttect. 66
But granted that neeesaar, conneetion in aE2earances
baa been shown to b. an invalid pre,upp08ition

tor Kant, ma7 not

the Kantian ana17sis involve 80mething else, namely. noumena?
As Ewing sa,..a, "Can we reall7 maintain at once that causality

involve. nec.a.ity and that it 1& merely an external relation?"67
6$

S.e pages 1.t~-IJ.fot the pre.ent st;u47.

66 Kant'.
67

Tre.taen~

Ibid., 179.

.2!

Causality. 178.
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\ihen we say that B must follow A, do
unintelligible fact?

we

have here a brute,

But "mustness" or necessity 1s not a

It Involve~ implication, a relation between raets.6

brute fact.

"We thus seem to have 8etTle ground foI" admitting that causality
(necessary succession) involves intrinsio cannection. ft6 9,
Where is this intrinsic connection?
cannot be in appearances.

We have shown it

According to Ewing, Kant too insists

taat necessary connection cannot be found by analysis
causally connected appearances.

o~

the

He then supposes the real

ground of this necessary connection to lie in the

~oum.ena\

sphere.
There oan be no doubt that he regards noumena as the
ground ot phenomena generally, and the differing con-tent "i.' partioular causal laws as due to nO\ll1lenal
charaoteristica, and, a8 "ground" tor him certainly
means "logical ground," tht. ia equivalent to plaoing
the Intrinsic, intelligible oonnection behind causality
in the noumenal world.10
But as

Ew1~g

himsel.t adm1 ts, this recourse to nOUll'lena involves

faith on Kant's part, not ph1losophic knowledge.
'dogmaticallY"

"He

decla~.8

.tor the existence cf a something, humanly

unknowable, other than phenomena, but Its ultimate intelligibility, as opposed to mare eXistence, 18 for him a matter of faith,

68 See D.J.S. Hawkins, Causalitl and Implioation,
London, 1937, 47.
---69 Ewing, Kant's Treatment £! Causnlitl, 180.
70 Ihid. S.e the OPltl<1ue, A 494-13 $22 (441)J and
critijUe ot JudS!ent, in Sel.etlona from Kant, translated b7
~o&n atsOn, Glas ow 1921 320.
-
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Kant, then, has not proved oausality as neoessary
oonnection, whether it be grounded in noumena, as Ewing suggests,
or in appearances.

AnJ attempt to interpret his dootrine along

such lines on17 leads to serious diffioulties.

If neces.arr

oonnection aomehow plaJ. a role in Kant's argument I it is onl,.
because he has illegitimatel,. introduced it.
But the rejectlan of nece.sar,. connection need not
involve allot Kant's oausal the 01'7 •

If we disregard the
diffioulties centering around the phenomenal objeot,7 2 causalit,.
as necesearl succe.sion 1. quite valid within the .,.st... 73
True, the schematized catesorf, now deprived ot the groundcon.equent relation, i. imp.verished.
is the transoendental sohema.

In taot, all that remains

Perhaps eome other pure category

of cau.e ma,. be conceived which, added to the transoendental
schema, will put the ne~ schematiaed categorf on it. teet. 74

71 Kant'. Treatment ~ Causalitl, 180.
72 See pases/l7-/~f this thesis. These diffioultie.
involve the problem ot how we know when to apply the categories.
73 "Xant's doctrine rests upon two main foundations,
firstl,., the forms ot Judgment. and .eoond17. the transcendental
synthesi. of space and time. It is possible that the second m&J
stand, even it the fir.t has been undermined." Paton, Kant's
HetaRhlSio !! EXRerlence, II, 77.
74 What that pure oategol"7 ot oau.e would be is not 0
task to declde. It should have 80me relation to necessary succes
sion, the transcendental schema of cau.alit,.. "We oan still
approach Kant's Principle. 1n the hope of discovering a proof
of the neoe.sit,. of certain oatagorial characterislics, tor

),
"

'II:i
:111

'I',1'1'

'I'
'1'1:11

IlS
At thi. polnt we ma;y ask what doe. causallt,- a.
neo •• sa~ succe •• lon ot appearanoes mean In the conoret.,
.trlke a match.
th1a.

A fl .... appear..

1'01'

I

Aant, the oocUI'l'ence means

One appeu8nce, that of the flame, bas tollowed ob jecti".

theretore neoessaril,-, theretore causall;y, 1.e., by the application of the causal categor,y, the appearance. that constitut.
strikIng a matoh.

ot

the

mr

On17 If we pre.upp.se the necessary connection

beini of the tlame with the action of .triklng the match

ls thel'e que.tlon here of anrthing moJ'e than neoe.saJ'7 succ ••• lon.
Oausallty 1s Intrinsic to the situation onlY' in the
senae that the "ppearanoes constituting the matoh-t'lame a equene.
can be an object In consciouane •• only through the application
of the oategor,y ot oauae, through the proper sohema, to the
spatial17 and temporall7 conditioned manifold.

The necessitl' or

the causal relation i. not the absolute neceasit;y involved in
the intrinsio

d

ependenoe of a contingent being on

its cause.

For Kant, the necesslt;y ot t he cawal relation is relatlve and.
.xtl'lnaio.
The neceasi t7 is
human consolousness.

A

I'

alatl ",e because it holds on17 of

no~human

consclousnes. which operate.

through no categories or througn dltfel'ent ones need not concei"e
the matoh-flame sltuation as cauaal. 75 At le.st, Kant glves no
uni t7 of t lme • n Paton, Kant'.
For the meaAing of •
e'c., ••• pag•
note ~5" of

.,3 ,

~__......~.......

116
concluslve reason why it should--and he ls humble enough to
adm! t his qualif'ioatlon to speak only of human e xperlence'
Watsonpolnts out the sceptlcal c oncluaion to which this relative knowledge of' Kantian man can lead.

It the world we actuall

know exists only in relation to hu.an intelligence, we cannot
be said to have real knowledge, but only knowledge true tor U8
as men.

But relative knowledge i8 not knowledge at all, in any

proper sense, though it may b. all the knowledge we are capable
01' having.

It the obs.rvations peouliar to men as indlviduals
are unwortbJ 01' the name 01' knowledge, the observations common to all men, whioh they vainly suppose
to b. knowledge, must likewlse be oounted unwortbJ
01' it. It all men were madmen, it would matter
little to th.m that there was a method in their
madness. It the best of knowledge i. only that
whioh we cannot help having, but whlch with ditterent taculties we sbould not hav., whf should we
pin our taith to itf76
The necesslty 01' the oausal relation ls extrinsio
because it ls limlt.d to human consclousness.

Human conscious-

ness 01' Object. is' it.elt contined to sanso17 experience.

Thus

the necessity 01' the causal relation can be postulated only it,
and so long aa, actual or at least possible occurrence 01' aans.
experienoe la assumed.

It at a given moment all sen.e experi-

76 Kant and His En~iSh Critics, 337. The same author
makes another ititement-rital 0 ihe kantlan positions "Unless
there were in us a capaolty tor appr.hending that which truly is,
we could not know tbat what we do apprehend is only relative to
our intelllgence as men." Ibid.

-
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ence were to cease for us, we could not say that there was
ooJectively valid causality in our world.
the category or concept of cause.

We might analyze

But since the category by

itselt is empty, our analysis of it would be a mental exercise
with no objeotive validity.

And if we somehow knew that contin-

gent spiritual beings .xi.ted, we could not apply the category
to them and say that they have a cause.
Here again, Harttain's comment is to the point that
with Desoartes began the philosophical retreat in which human
reason gradually lost its grasp on Being. 77

With the loss ot

absolute reality, absolute truth, and absolute value, arose
the relativism that characterizes much ot modern thought.
Causality 1s no longer an absolute principle rooted 1n the ver,r
nature ot contingeat being, Whatever, Wherever, and when.ver it.
interiors may be.

It is wholl, dependent on and relative to the

human consciousne.8 trom which it derives 1ts supposed reality,
truth, and va lue •
How does this relative, extrinsl0 nature of Kantlan
causality aftect Kant's relation to Hume'
answered Hume?

Is causality

oonsi~ed

Has Kant decisively

as necessary succession

the tinal refutation ot Huma'. probing analysis of causality'
At first 8igb.t, it would seem so.

17 Ih! Range

~

Reason. 186.

For what does any

\
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polnt out dlfflculties under which nec •• sarf succession ltselt
labors.
The big problem is hew the mind can know when to apply
the oategory, a problem unjustly belittled as artiriotal. 78 And
yet, i t among appearances

ca~sa11ty

can mean only necessary

sequence, how explain--without EresuEpos1ng necesaQrz

connectio~

the fact that some necesBarr sequences appear to consciousnes.

as causel and others do not1

I strike a match.

A flame appear••

At the same moment, a peal of thunder rolls aCDOSS the building
in Whlch I &In.

The match-thunder sequence is just as objective,

and therefore on Kant's principles (objectivity implies neeeasity
Just as necessar7 aa the match-flame sequence.
only the latter as a causal sequence.

Why?

Yet we regard

Watson's comment,

"Philosophy, as I understand it, doe. not seek to originate ract.
but only to give a selt-consistent explanation ot thlm,"79 is
preci.ely the point at issue.

The match-flame and match-thunder

78 "This dittioulty arises trom tailure to appreo1ate
the central the.i. upon which Kant's proof or the prinCiple ot
oauaa1ity ultim.ately resta •• , • that the catesorf 1s a nec.s8ary
and invariable tactor in all consciousness." Smith, Comment.rt,

377.

t

--

It i8 true that tor Kant, the oategory has already b.en
applied when an Object 1s thought by us. That i8 whJ Kant s&7.
"tind" the causal connection and do not tal.e1y suppo.e it.
Yet why i. the category applied in 80m. case., not in others?

w.

79 Kant and

- - - ---- ----

Hi8 English Critics.

235.
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aequences are both objectlv. 80 and so necessa~ at the moment ot
conscIousness ot th...

Yet one Is presented to conscIousness aa

causalJ the other 1s not.

Where Is the oonsistencr,el Once agaIn

Is there mere voluntarlsm here, or chance, or 1nstlnct, or same
sort ot pre-established harmoIl1?
reality than Kant would admit?

Or does the mind know more abou

The man on the street, oontDonted

with the matCh-thunder sequence, would reply equivalently that th

80 Perhaps Watson would agree with the following camme
of Calrd and thus deny the objectivity of the matCh-thunder seque
"In 80 tar as we do not reter a succession 1n our perceptions to
an event or change In the previous time as its necessal'1 eorrelat •
we do not regard it as itself representing an objective suecesai
or event. In this latter case, the 'eoming to bet of the new
perception tor me is not regarded as the objective 'caning to bet
of the state ot a substance which it represents, i.e., I regard
the sequence as merelr subjective, or as not representing an
objective sequence, though the synthesis of phenomena or sequent.
In my perceptlon may represent .ame other objective relation."
Oritical Phllo.oPhl ot Kant, I, S18. The situation, argues Oaird
mar call forth .ome otner category tor another type ot objectivit ,
e.g., substance, but not the c ... al categol'1 tor the objectivity
required by a cau.al .equenoe.
But must an obJectlve .equence alway. be a causal one'
And are not all the oategorle • • uppo.ed to be present 1n ~r
knowledge ot object.. Sm1th, oommentatI, 369, admits the possibi11ty ot objective yet nan-causal sequences.
81 Another inconslstencYI I see smoke, then tlre.
Despite the present objectlve and neoessary sequence, I .ay tlre
oauses smoke, not vice ver.a. Also,the causal categol'1 has already been applied when an Object ls first known intellectuall,._
1) How does the category deter.mine what thing 1s to be the cause
of another? 2) BoW does It '0 act that the aame cause 1s the
cause of the same ettect at wldel,. aeparated Intervals, and
constantly oviF'iian:r 7 ear,' 3) Wb.J does the same appearance
"cause" the same ettect tor all men'

I!

.

121

effect was not proportioned to the cause.

Such an argument

implies, first, the intrinsic connection (or lack of it in th1s
instance) between the disputed cause and etfect; and .econlly,
some knowledge, at least, of match-in-itselt and

thunder-in-itselt~

Kant, we have aeen, has no right to either 01' these statements.
Or take the seq)1el1ce or night and day.

Why, given

Kant's analysis 01' causality, should not niGht cause,day,
rebuttal falls short of the mark.

Watson'.

"That supposition is at once

nullitied by the tact that it night follows day, so also day
tollows night whereas in every causal succession, event A must go
tirst and event B came .econ4."82 But watson i8 dealing here
with day and night in the abstract.

Actually, we have an irrever-

aible series 01' difterent nights and days, e.g., Sunday night,
November 17; Monda,-, November 18; Monday night, November 18 J
Tuesday, November +9, etc.
. 83

82 ~~!!! Enillsh Critica, 233-234.
83 Watson has no trouble accepting Kant's example ot a

ahlp tloating downstream as a cas. of objeotive, causally categorized aequence. Ibid., 227,. But there aeems to be little or no
difterence in the sequence of the ship'a positions and the sequenc~
ot day and night. In both cases our represenaations are forCed to
tollow til definite order. Monday night follows Monday as irreveraibly as position B tollowa p •• ition A. If the one sequence is
admittedly objective, why should not the other be? If the first i.
causally oategerizad, Vhf should not the other be .0 also' In a
realist analysi., both ca.e. are examples of extrinsic principles.
There is no question of a cause.ertect or ground-consequent relati~n
between the elementa of eIther the day-night or the ship sequence.

.1

I

,
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But perhaps the succession of night and day imp lie.
only this, there is a causal sequence somewhere, but it 1s not
such that night is the cause of day.84

Once again, the reason

for objecting to the statement that night oauses day is the
Implicit assumption that causality means necessary connection And
there i8 evt.dently no neoessary connection in the series of
appearances under discussion. 85
Moreover, to ins1st that the oauaal sequence may li.
samewhere beyond the sequence il~ediately present to consciousne. 86
presupposes the knowledge of particular causal laws.
entitled to such knowledge'

Deny it.

Admit It.

But i8 Kant

In either case,

there are difficult!e ••

84 Watson,

~ ~

!!!.

En~18h

Oritics, 2)).
85 "Such a 8equence as day and night is not a real
change in the sense that we suppose the one to tollow fram the
other." Ibld.
86 This objectlon can be carrie. to .uch extremes that
the knowledge ot partioular causes might well became impossible.
"Suppose I shoot a bird and it fal Is to the ground. The talling
to the ground may obvioualy be regarded as an eftect, but where
are we to look for the cause? In spite of Kant's argument to the
contrarJ • • • most men would s&1 that it was my having previousl
pulled the trigger of mJ ~n • • • Yet this 1s an obvious oversimplification of the situation • • • That the shot found ita mar
when I aimed In this partioular direction was perhaps beoause a
depres.lon which had been oentered over Ioeland three days ago ha
moved eastward and caused strong south-east winds; this was becau e
there had been a h~icane in the West Indi •• a week before, and
So on ad infinitum. AnJ ettect 1. seen to be oonnected to previo s
events-oy an endless succes.ion of strings of events all of which
meet in the effect. D J.... leana, PhJs1cs and Philosoph{, New
York, 1943, 10). Yet the intluence 0 the Whole universe on anygiven event is so small that it can be disregarded even tor acien
Then, too, in speaking of cause. we are interested in immedIate 0

-
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.

1s not tormally identified with the necea.ity of having a cause.
Man ia a rational animal.

But it is also true that it man is a

aomething-that-comea-to-be, his esaence connote., that ia, has
as a logical property, the need of a cause.

Thua the mind can,

by a knowledge ot the meaning of "aomething-that-comea-to-be"
and "necessity or. a cause"; see of itselr the necessary nexus
between the two, a nexus which can never be given by experience.
true, the mind

lea~Da

tram

expe~ience

about tb1ngs that came into

being and thing. that cause the coming into being. 93

But thia

)

experiential knowledge, once it is acquired, tree. the mind
from any further dependence on experience to aee that a

t~ing

that cames to be as auch d.mands a cause.
Kant, then, vaa unjustitied in setting up the oausa1
principle aa synthetic ~ priorl. 94 He was equally unjustified
In

p~ea·uppoaing

ground tor
Ideas.

wIth Imme that expe:-ienoe can in no war be the

neoea.ity~

ThIs a.aumption is an echo ot the Platonio

Plato postulated the eternal immutable Ideas to explain

93 Poran acoount ot the parchologloal orlgin of the,
notlon of cause, .ee A. Mlchotte, La Peroeption d. la Causalite,
Louvain-Jaria, 1946. 'o~ the meta~a1oal account O? Ehe notIon
or cause, see Th'odore de Regnon, Meta~si~ue des Causes, Paris,
1886. See also artlol•• mentioned In
b bllograpbi.

94 Kant·. pre.upposltion of the exIstence of the
synthetlc a prlori In math.matios and scienoe also aeema uniust1fied. Paton, who generally t~iea to juat1fy Kant, a~lts, lIt
mar be maintained that all mathematloal judgments are analytio.
Thls vlew 1. the predamlaant view ot mathematical loglolan. at
the present tIme; and it lt i. true, it outs the ground traa
under Kant's teet." Kant'. MetaphIale ~ E!perlenee, I, 89.
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necessary aftd universal truths in contingent experience.

But as

Aristotle pointed out, these Platonlc Ideas are really In a world
apart and 10glcally can have nothing to do with the world of humar
experience.

Thus they had to be brought down so.me.aow into the

world of experience.

Aristotle showed how, trom a study at the

operation ot things, one can rise to a knowledge ot natures or
prinoiples ot operation.

Conceived by the abstractive intellect

of man, these natures or essencea are stripped, as it were, of
their individuating notes.

The result Is a unlversal ooncept or

idea, e.g., man, whioh can be predicated univocally, that ls,
equally and individually,ot all ita interiora, Peter, raul, John,
etc.

The univebaal exists

to~lly

only 1n the intellect.

But

In so tar as It is derived ultimately by a conaideration ot the
characteristic note. ot individual natures, it has a foundation
in reality.
Ita concepts thua rooted in reality. the human intellect
can grasp being or the real.

Knowing being, the intellect can

also come to know Its properties and the principles that govern
being.

Among these principles are those of contradiction, sut-

fic1ent reason, andcausaltty.

The.e principle. are universall,-

valid and nec •• sarJ preci •• ly becau.e they appl,- to being as 'uch.
Kant, because he turned his back on being and objective rea11t,in its ordinary non-Kantlan sense, ensnared himselt in the Scylla
of subjectiviam on tne one hand and the Charybdis of phenomenalian
on the other.
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After the arguments of the preceding pages, one wonders
how Ewing oan prove that starting from Kant's argument in the
"Seoond Analogy," an argument which will eatabliah causality for
an independent physioal world as well as for our experienoe. ot
peroeptions may eaaily be developed. 9 $ Ewing's argument, tollowing that of Kant, centera on the point that an objeot can be
conoeived only aa a neceasarily oonneoted aystem.

ThiS, he add.,

oan easily be turned into an argument for causality, ainee neee..ary conneotlon between d1tferent stages In a prooess of ohange
1a for Kant identioal with cauaality.
Whatever else the being ot a physioal objeot may involve,
it involves this at anJ rate, a necessary oonneotion between its difterent qualities or states. A state of an
Object unoonnected with the other atatea of the aame
obJeot oould not rightly be oalled a state of that object
at all, and connection of different qualities or atates
aa qualitIes or atatea of one objeot without mutual
dependenoe and ao implioation, i ••• , necessary connection, .ee.a impos.ible. And for aDJ object whioh change.
1n time, thia neceaaaP,y connection must Obviously involve
causality_ Thia .eema to be an argument that will hold
good both traa a reali.t and from an idealiat point of
view.96
Ewing'. analy.is seema to labor under some of the very
presuppositions which vitiated Kant's analysis.

He aays that an

object can be conceived on17 aa a neoessarily oonnected 57stem.
This seems to be nothing other than th. two-rold doctr'ne ot

9$

Kant's Treatment

£!

Cauaalltl. 91.

96 Ibid., 98-99. Ew1ng t s generous inclusion in his
hheory of both idea11sm and realism reminds one ot the fable of
the grain, the go~ae, and the tox.
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~epresentatlonali8m

and the atomic theory of peroeption.

Our

knowledge begins with isolated peroeptions whioh we somehow
oombine Into objeots.

But once the representationalist theory

is adopted. it i8 hard to 8eo how the incarcerated mind oan
aohieve

a~thlng

but appearances. 1 •••• its own

~.p~esentatlon ••

4Py olaim to reality is a ~atuitous assumption. 97
Ewing is oorrect, and Kant is oorreot. in emphasizing
the role of ohange in causality.

But the final analysis of the

meaning and nature ot that change must lie elsewhere.

It must

lie in a philosophy that oan attain being or the

that can

~eal;

graap the inner signifIcanoe, the essenoe,of the real,

d18eov.rln~

there the intrinsic dependenoe ot • oontlngently existing being
upon its cause. 98

'7 "The moat tempting of all the false first principl.
is: that tho~t. not being, is involved in all my representation.
Here lies th~tial optIon between idealism and realism, which
will .ettle once and for all the future course of our philoaoph1,
and make it a failure or a luoeeaa. Ar. w. to .ncompass b.ing
with thought, or thought with being." Etienne Gilson, Unittn0t
PhilOIO~hical EXEerienoe, New York, 1947. 316.
Italics i n e orIgIna •

98 ct. Hawkina, Causali:l and Implication: 38: "Dr.
A.C.Ewing has argued in hia book on lantTi freatment of Caua.lit,
that, even 1f the subjeot1vist v1ew ra rejec£ed, a ppoot tRat
without cauaa11tl knowl.dge would be tmposa1ble is st111 of value
Perhapa 80 • • • but (his protes~ shows that there 1s a proble.
to be solved; it does not l1eld the solution ot the problem. xt
the objectivity of causalItY' il to be vindicated a d e q u a t e l Y i
against Hums, it must be shown how the notion is to be analyzed
I
from the given of .xperienoe."
i

!I I

!

1'1,,1,1
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U3
p~eaupPositlona.

Kant could not help turning off on the detour

that led him farther and farther away from the true solution.
Presuppose, for example', that all the mind knows ls its
oontents.

The faot that the concepts obtained from the real are

intentional ls immediately diaregarded and the result is idealism
or

80me

fo~

of phenamenallam.

Presuppose an atomic view of sensation.

The problem

of knowledge as a 'TDthe.is of the discrete particulars of
experience at onoe ari ••••
Further presuppose .uch a relatlon between the taoultie
of sensibility and understanding that what i8 in the latter muat
have been formally in the former, even if under a different type
of .rnth.sis.
To the postulate of senaism, add the abaence of &n1
Idea ot an ab.tractlve intellect whlch, though Intrin.icallr
independent ot matter, ooordinates ita operationa with those of
the phantasy.
Presuppose with a number ot

philoaophe~

Ockham the conoeptual knowledge ot the singular.

as tar baok aa
The problem of

universality from singular experienoe 18 immediate17 highlighted.
Presuppose, in taot, that universality and neoessity
trom experienoe i8 not merelr a problem, but an impo8sibility_
Some

~

Eriori principle of the mind looma on the horizon.
Presuppose that analytic propositions must necessarily

IIII
I ..

.

Negatively, Kant'a
counts.

1)6
philosop~

is invaluable on at leaat three

First, it is another hiatorioal witness to tne impotenoe

of a non-existential philosopbJ.

Kant's system i. one of those

philosophical oorpae. whloh, as Gilson puts it, strew the path
to the Sph1nx beoause thel have tailed to anawer its riddle. a
The &nswer 1., aeing.

Secondly, Kant t • syatem ahows the fatal

weakne.s of a ph1loaopbJ Whlch looka askance on metapn,slcs,
that fails to go A£ TOl

CO(

f

u ,r,l(o(. •

For by hIs ve1.7 nature

man ia a metaP.b.J'alcal animal. 9 Thlrdly, Kant's system is one
of the best answers, even 1t negative, to the queation, how do
we know that we know realitl'

Kantta whole system, built on the

conviotion that we do not know reality, failed utterly on certain
most easential pOints, aa our atudy ot Kantian phJaical cauaallty
has shown.
In oonoluaion, the ph1loaopher ot Koenigaberg certa1nly
has more to otfer the world than mental gy.mnastlca.

But as

regards his argument tor the objective va11dity of the causal
princlple, we must atate once again: Kant dld not &nawer Hume.
~--

8 Unltl!!

~iloaophioal

.-...

E!2erience, 312.

9 "It is an objeotlve tact that men have been aiming
at metaphysioal knowledge tor more than twenty five oenturies • • •
A law ot the human mind that rests on an experience ot twentl
tive centuries is at least as safely guaranteed as any empiricall
established law." Ib1d., 307.
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FIGURE 2

Dlagram of the LogIcal Element. Involved 1n the Knowledge ot Phenomenal ObJeot ...
t-

::1
A. Sen••
or
Senalblllt;r

B. Imaf:51natlon

c.

D.

Understanding

Transcendental

UnIty

or

IpperciPtlon

Oatego1"1&.6

l1a-r-re.r
EmP iJ"ica1

Manifold2

APpe*,,§

Schemata>

..nce.

Time'4

Things
aa

Spao• .3

1DQW'l1

F Of'>m s

~

lioumenal

Things in

Themaelve.

**Notes tor the numbers and letters are on following page••

Notes on the Diagram
General Note: Kant professed not to be very much interested in
Srlnglng out the PS7ohological faoultie. and act. involved in
knowing phenomenal objeots or appearanoes. He would in tact
have great dittioultr in doing 10. ae was profel.edl7 intereste
in the logical elements necessary for an act ot pure knowledge,
element. that oan be discovered only by philosophical refleotion
on a possible object of consciousness. This emphasia on pure
thought determining ita own nature and limits is Kant's her1tage
fram the formalism of Descart~s, Leibniz, and Woltf. It ia
tberefore very important to consider the el.ments given on the
diagram aa presented at one and the same time with the Object.
For without each and every one of them, the object would a1mplr
not be an objeot, i.e., would not be present to consciousness.
Thul, the po.itlon on the diagram of the empirical manifold, tor
example, is not meant to indicate logioal priority to space and
time, .1nce one cannot speak of the empirical manifold at all
except in so far as It is under space and time.
1

Noumanar the objects unknown in themselves from which come
ihe manitold of experience, highly controversial element
ot Kantianlsm, springboard tor Fiohte and Hegel.

2

EmpirIcal manifolds material element of knowledge presented
In tleeE1ng, subjective representations that are united b7
the various fo~ ot the knower into the object known in
.on.clau.n••••

3 Spac•• a 2r1ori tora ot ••naibllit7 by which all objeots are

perceived as Selng in the same spaoe (thus making juxtapositio
pos.ible).

4

Tim•• other a erior! torm of .enaibility b7 which all objects

are-perceive~ as Selng In the same time (thus making permanone ,

aUGe.sslon, and oo-existence possible). Time is the univer.al
of sen81b1lity because all objeots are in time but not
all objects are 1n _pace.
to~

5 Schematas transcendental tunctions of time produced by the

ImagInatIon, wh1eh bridge the gap between sensibility and
understanding. Througb them the categories are applied to
perceptions. i.e., the sense-conditioned manifold.

6

Oategorles. twelve a trior! forms of the understanding corre.pondlng'to the twe ve logical ~Ulctlons in all possible
judsments b.r which the sense-conditioned manifold is brougnt
under universal and nec ••• ary rules.
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7

~e "I"i not the empirioal ego nor the noumenal ego; but the
pureI, a ,rlor1 logIcal torm of the unit, of the ego whioh 1.
requ1reaor tne unit, of experienoe. Like the other forms
1t must be consIdered as given as soon as the object is pre.ent in consoiousness. Its last plaoe on the diagram does
not therefore signlfV temporal sequenoe. It shows the
supreme role of the-~I" as the form that aocompanies the
represBntatlona of the manifold and shows them to be all part
of one and the same consoiousness. The object 1s an object
for me. Consciousness of objeots, then, oonnoting as it does
one and the same eubject, 1s impossible without selt-consoioua~
ness (l.e., unity or identity of consciousness). Cbnverse17,
self-consciousness ia imposaible without consciousness of
objects. C~to, e£fo rea aunt.
Thee on . e~gram-represents this mutual ~p11cation ot the "I" and appearances. The two arrows ind1cate
the OPPOSition of subject and object right within consciousn... or •.x.perience.

8 APpoarance., phenomenal obJeots, or things as known, sum ot
empIrIcal manifold and the oonditioning torms of the knower.
A. Sense or Sena1b1litf,purelY receptive faculty; lntuits the
manIfold In pe~cep£ on) unites the diversity of the manifold
1n the fol'lll8 ot apaoe and time.

B. Imaeinatlon, ~acult7 of determining the material element ot
knoW edge Intu1te4 1n .en.e to gertain general relat1on. ot
time. It is at once universal and partioular. It unlversallz~1
by drawins a sort ot general outline or sketch (the schema:
see note 5) ot a thing which applies to all objeots of the
same specles. (f.hus the notion of a triangle might be call~d
a schema with ~egard to the dltfe~nt t,p.a of tr1angles:
110aceles, rIght, .t.~); It particularizes because it enables
the knower te ::c!':"'p17 the categories to an individual thing.
The imagination is closely al11ed witn the understanding) lt
mar even be the understanding in a passive mode. ct. crit~ue
B 162, note b (171)1 "It 1s one and the same spontaneity wh cn
in the one cas. under t.he tl tle of imagination, and in the
other ca.e, unde~ the t1 tle of understanding, b r1ngs combination into the mani.told of Int\~ltlon."

c.

Understanding. seat of the twelve categories; through the
schema It app11es tne categori •• to the spatially and temporally conditioned manitold.

D. Transcendental Unitz of firperc~PtIonl purely logical tor.m of
the UDIty or the ego req rea fOr unIty of experienoe. nAppe~_
ception-is
a term ...talbn1z
us.d to desIgnate consciousness ot
................. _
... _A _
+ __ + ... ,"'..... _ ................. .

..
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